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Following Roberts (1990) and Dent (1990). this study investigates the 
importance of complexiPying the relationship between strategy and 
accounting. The genealogical approach of Hoskin et al (1997) provides 
inspiration as to the ways in which strategic discourse (itself promoted as 
a subject of study by Knights and Morgan (1990,1991,1995)) is 
historically contingent upon practices of accounting. I take up this task 
of inaugurating the study of accounting practice and strategy discourse, 
from strategy to accounting, to develop a new perspective of how their 
interaction takes place. This gives birth to a re-reading of the strategy 
(and accounting) literatures, from the direction of a constitutive notion of 
accounting practices. In particular, the processual and critical schools of 
strategy are found to promote conventional notions of accounting as 
mirror, as secondary and passive practice, which circulate beneath the 
usual level of visibility. Building on this emergent approach, a post- 
Foucauldian theory of practices is outlined from a methodological 
viewpoint. This approach does not begin from such general categories as 
'the individual', 'the social' or 'the economic', and thereby does not follow 
conventional understandings of 'doing ethnography'. 
The inquiry is empirically situated within the context of a longitudinal 
investigation (1997-2000) into the U. K. based part of a global 
telecommunications company, Teleco. I discover complex interactions 
between accounting practices and the workings of strategy, both as 
presence and absence. There is a partial presence of strategy even within 
the most 'strategic' parts of Teleco, in conjunction with a growing 
absence within those parts most distant from 'the strategy'. Despite this, 
or perhaps because of this, the spread of accounting and accounting 
based-practices rolls on, albeit in a non-uniform way. 
This brings forth the possibility of a strategic accounting, one whose 
practices are perhaps most visibly internalised and effected on my very 
self, thus adding weight to the rejection within this thesis of the 
metaphysical categories of either 'strategy' or 'accounting. 
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(I) An Introduction to Accounting and 
Strategy 
Beginnings 
'Me beginnings of this thesis come hand-in-hand with the concern with the beginnings 
of modem business strategy. Conventionally, such a history has been left Implicit, as 
accounts have presumed that strategy derived naturally from the military sphere, and 
from there to business. As Cummings (1993: 133) points out, 'strategy' comes from the 
ancient Athenian position of strategos, which denoted the head of a tribal division. 
These heads together formed the Athenian war council. Strategos, in turn, was 
composed of s tratos, meaning 'an encamped army spread out over ground' and agein, to 
lead. As such, there would appear to be considerable parallels with today's practices of 
strategy. Instead of 'army, insert 'organisation'. Also, 'leadership', through 
conceptualisations of the role of 'top management' has been long a key facet of strategic 
activities, despite the changing interpretations of how this should be effected. Indeed 
Cummings goes on to suggest how strategic principles from ancient Athens could be 
usefully applied in today's context. In quite the same critical vein, but taking a 
chronologically opposed stance. certain sets of practices may have, In fact, been taken 
for granted as always e--dsting within strategy. However, as Miller and Napier (1993: 
633) argue, the serious study of practices emphasises their historical contingency, 
thereby 'debunking the apparent permanence of the present. ' 
The secondary and passive role of accounting within strategy has long been taken for 
granted; see the works of, for example, Chandler (1962; 1965; 1977). Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987). Knights and Morgan (1991). Following the teachings of graduate and 
postgraduate courses, MBAs and even Chartered Accountancy training, it Is strategy 
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that carves out both the environment and the internal workings of the organisation, 
with accounting practices following in its wake, being merely a tool with enables 
strategy to proceed and disseminate. As Nietzsche warned, however, such innocent 
beginnings hide deeper calculative truths. 
'Every time a beginning that is calculated to mislead: cool, scientific, even ironic, deliberately 
foreground, deliberately holding off. ( ... ) In the end, in the midst of perfectly gruesome 
detonations, a new truth becomes visible every time among thick clouds. ' 
(Nietzsche, 1967/1908: 312) 
Hoskin (1990) began such a challenge through asserting the absence of a historical 
dimension within the modem study of strategy. Drawing critically on the works of 
Michel Foucault, the pivotal role of practices was highlighted as being instrumental in 
the proper understanding of the power cxnd knowledge that strategy propagates. The 
practices he identified are the subtle educational practices of writing, examining and 
grading, ones that are missing from the ancient world, at least in a sense that promotes 
the global viewing of the military situation. The more recent paper of Hoskin et al (1997) 
takes this argument further and can essentially be interpreted'. to be asserting a 
controversial case for the constitutive role of accounting within the genealogy of 
strategy, finding that grammatocentric practices are central to the development of both 
disciplines. The strength of this finding has not, until now, been explored thoroughly 
either in contemporary theories of or empirical studies in strategy. It does, however, 
follow in the path of Critical Accounting discourse (e. g. Burchell et cd, 1980; Miller and 
O'Leary, 1987: Roberts, 1991), where the metaphor of accounting as mirror has been 
penetrated and subverted by studies demonstrating just how accounting has powerful 
effects both for individual and social knowledge. Research by Dent (1990). Roberts 
I Bearing in mind Hoskin and Macve (1986,1988). 
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(1990) has also made significant strides in comple)dfying the relationship between 
accounting and strategy. 
It is this problematic which is the subject, both theoretically and empirically, of this 
thesis 
Sections 
The Literature Review begins from the genealogical insight that strategy is a set of 
practices and discourses, highlighting critical work from both strategy and accounting 
as evidence that this is a productive theoretical stance. Underpinning this stance is the 
assertion of that accounting practices circulate in different ways within discourses of 
strategy. It is therefore the challenge for this chapter to investigate this accounting 
problematic by re-examining three main streams of the strategy literature, separated 
into Rationalist. Processual and Critical discourses. In addition, the accounting 
literature is brought into focus, looking at both the Rationalist standpoint of Strategic 
Management Accounting as well as Critical developments. An archaeology of theoretical 
strategy discourse is therefore attempted, drawing on both strategy and accounting 
disciplines. 
The Methodology chapter further develops the focus on practices and discourses, 
analysing the post-Foucauldian viewpoint on the construction of the self and social. 
While the case study is ostensibly an ethnography, it departs from conventional studies 
through its particular conceptualisation of practices. This chapter analyses in detail the 
dualisms that compromise conventional ethnography, and proposes that practices 
constitute a satisfactory resolution to the questionable boundary between the self and 
the social usually propounded. As such, the problem of generalisability is re- 
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approached at a new level, the level of practices. It is argued that the case study is 
therefore not simply an atomised version of reality because of regularities and 
differences in discourse. A new theoretical framework for studying strategy and 
accounting is proposed. 
Perhaps the centre-point of the thesis comes in the form of the Empirical Study. This 
Is a3 year study into practices and discourses within the U. K. based part of Teleco, a 
large U. S. -led multinational telecommunications company. 'Me study began during my 
MSc, April 1997, and concluded in May 2000, during the third and final year of this 
thesis. (In total, 23 weeks were spent on site. ) 
Telecommunications forms part of the *new economy', a term used to describe fast- 
growing technology based stocks which offer extremely high revenue growth, but 
comparatively small earnings figures. The practice of revenue growth as an external 
indicator of success was to prove pivotal in the study of the internal circulation of 
practices and discourses. I was able to trace both regularities and differences over time, 
within the U. K. operating company, the International overlay organisation (which 
sprang up to cover Europe and Asia) as well as gain insights into the U. S. parent. 
Drawing from the Literature Review, I concentrated on the power of accounting 
practices, and the way they constituted knowledge of and the 'doinW of strategy both at 
the individual and social levels. Beginning as an outside observer, I was able to gain the 
trust and respect of senior management and directors, securing a month's project work 
within the ostensible heart of strategy, International Strategy. This was to prove 
invaluable in appreciating International's perspective on U. K. activity as well as gaining 
first-hand experience of strategy practice. 
While the Empirical Study draws on the theoretical frame developed in the Methodology 
as well as distilled from the Literature Review, it does not attempt to take this theorising 
to a new level. Theoretical Implications undertakes exactly this step by returning to 
II 
the work of Hoskin et al (1997) and Hoskin and Macve (1999). With the case of Teleco in 
mind, this chapter compares contemporary empirical findings to genealogical 
predictions, asserting that both similarities and differences eodst. As this thesis has 
taken Hoskin and Macve's work as a starting point, it is fitting that any endings engage 
thoroughly with their findings. Ibis chapter continues by pulling out significant 
dimensions of the case, and applying these in a re-theorisation, based on practices. 
While the Empirical Study focuses on discursive regularities and differences, this 
chapter focuses on practices, a subtle yet important distinction In the conceptualisation 
of accounting within strategy. 
Finally, in Conclusions, directions for future research are tackled through highlighting 
issues that arose during the thesis which, through time restrictions, were not engaged 
with satisfactorily. Reflections on the interactions of accounting and strategy are given, 
together with how this may develop in the future. Strategic Accounting is suggested as a 
potential direction which would benefit both Critical Accounting and Critical Strategy 
discourses. 
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(II) Critical Literature Review 
Introduction 
It is the rise to prominence of the discourse of strategy that is my concern within this 
chapter. The literature is now wide-ranging and complex, and often accused of being too 
disparate for its own good (c. f. Booth, 1998: 257). 1 will not be attempting, however, to 
follow the usual path of further segmenting the available writings. Reading the work of 
Roberts (1990) and Dent (1990), 1 became aware of the growing comple-xJUes of the ways 
in which accounting and strategy interact. I realised. however, that their respective 
practices were (otherwise) generally treated quite separately in both theoretical and 
empirical accounts of corporate activity. Furthermore, I began to take a keen interest in 
the controversial 'beginnings' of strategy. 
Inspired by Hoskin (1990), 1 became aware that perhaps there could be an underlying 
shared frame of reference to the different schools of strategy, a subtext which would 
allow a new approach to the study of strategy. It is the relation to accounting within 
strategy, as practice and discourse, that I approach here as what has been overlooked 
in the different schools. Despite the diversity of research on strategy. accounting has 
been perennially perceived as a passive, secondary technology that supplements the 
doing of strategy. Strategy, as a vehicle of power-knowledge relations, promotes certain 
representational practices of accounting which are then widely internalised and 
reproduced. This chapter attempts to disinter the overlooked presence of accounting 
from within strategy discourses, and investigates how accounting is implicated in the 
articulation of what has been previously been labelled simply as strategy. 
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The field of 'doing strategy' has been riven with rationalisation and naturalisation. as 
competing discourses of managing have asserted their respective rules and rights over 
this contested territory. Whittington (1993), for example, maps the terrain out through 
four quadrants of strategy perspectives. Divided through outcomes of profit-maximising 
or pluralistic, as well as processes of deliberate or emergent, the generic approaches of 
Classical, Evolutionary, Processual and Systemic can be identified. At the same time, 
strategy has emerged as a necessary aspect of managerial organising. the absence of 
coherence failing to deny strategy's stature within business discourse as a seemingly 
essential means by which Anglo (and now global) managements should organise their 
companies' activities. Despite their self-proclaimed differences, the work of authors 
such as Chandler and Pettigrew or Mintzberg and Porter, can be identified as jointly 
seminal in the judicious positioning of strategy at the forefront of organisational activity 
In capitalist societies. Their discourses join to obscure the mundane little dramas of 
calculated (and/or calculative) activity lying hidden beneath and between the 
considered layers and textures of rational-sounding argumentation. 
Within the critical work of Knights and Morgan (1991), the self-evident privileging of 
strategy was directly thrown open to question. My thesis hopes to follow their lead, 
heeding Whipp's cry that 'it is arguably research which has questioned the fundamental 
nature of strategy ... which offers the most exciting practical insights' (1996: 270) (see also 
Whittington, 1993; Alvesson and Willmott, 1995; Calori, 1998; Morgan and Sturdy, 
forthcoming). At the same time I question even this emergent discourse, by introducing 
a further sense of disquiet into the field of strategy research. My claim Is that, despite 
the disruptive challenges made by critical studies, discourses of strategy still exhibit 
some potentially significant silences, particularly over the way that discourses on 
strategy relate to accounting. As embedded within the heart of managerialist models of 
planning and control, accounting has been made readable as an objectified technique, 
forming a subordinate part of the toolkit available to strategists. Yet there are already 
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grounds for arguing that accounting has a constitutive role in the genesis of 
management (and within that shift modern forms of strategy-, Hoskin and Macve, 1988; 
Hoskin, Macve and Stone, 1997) as well as within contemporary corporate activity 
(Roberts. 1990; 1991). There is also a range of work that now points to the more general 
and contingent way in which calculative practices, and discourses of calculation, have 
grown in significance dramatically over the past hundred years or so (c. f. Miller and 
Napier 1993: 633). In a similar vein, Deleuze (1988: 75) argued, '(0here is no State, only 
state control, and the same holds for all other cases', making the point that there is no 
essence of the 'State' as such, and that its power-relations and forms of knowledge 
Indeed stem from the operation of 'continual state control'. Hence there is a danger in 
utilising metaphysical categories such as Strategy, as this has hindered the deeper 
understanding of its very constitution. 
My argument here is that the relative failure to engage with accounUnWs role in strategy 
has meant that the different schools of strategy have been artificially constrained. While 
there are a number of ways of partitioning the different schools. I choose to denote their 
themes as Rationalist, Processualist and Critical. 'Ibis enables apparently different 
arguments and assertions to be analysed from the breadth of the literature. and allows 
me to show how all three schools reduce, in at least one crucial respect, to ironical 
versions of the same, even as the tantalising possibility of critical difference 
materialises. I will, following the insights of Knights and Morgan (1991) and Alvesson 
and Willmott (1995), argue against the idea of a rationalist/processualist divide, 
warning that the processual school ultimately reneges on premises given and promises 
made, in a fashion which echoes that of the rationalists. But I will additionally argue 
that this collapse of difference occurs where accounting steals into the different 
analyses of strategy, as both approaches treat it as purely secondary, thus failing to 
appreciate the extent of its power to structure what is done and said in the name of 
strategy. But then this argument becomes a critique of critical analyses, for at or on 
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this point their espoused difference begins to weaken. For, to date, the critical school of 
strategy has said little on accountings constitutive role, joining instead with the other 
schools in perceiving accounting as a secondary issue, and indeed implicitly asserting 
the view of accounting as a mirror, reflecting rather than constructing organisational 
reality. 
Thus, while this paper is situated within strategy's critical project, I hope to make a 
contribution by drawing on what is in many ways a parallel yet often ignored literature, 
that now knovrn as 'critical accounting7. Following the genealogical paths of Knights 
and Morgan (1991) and Hoskin et al (1997) as well as the theoretical excavation of the 
strategy literature in Lim (1998) and Lim and Hoskin (1998) 2,1 wish to further develop 
the agenda of firstly de-naturalising the question of strategy, and secondly, disinterring 
accounting from the obscured depths of modernist strategic discourse. 
9 This project exhibits a constant tension between theory and practice. While Hoskin et al (1997) theorise the 
entrance of accounting into the discourse of military strategy, it is not clear just how widespread these 
practices were fn-use. This blurring of the boundary between text and action may be intentional, but the lack 
of clarity extends to contemporary studies of the inter-relationship between strategy and accounting. This 
paper upholds the thrust of Hoskirfs thesis within the critical re-reading of theoretical discourses of strategy 
but finds the empirical picture far more complex. Theoretical and empirical discourses are joined in their 
ignorance of the constitutive power of accounting practices within knowledge of strategy. yet as a result of 
their differing contexts. empirical practices construct different formations to those found in theory. While this 
presents a barrier to the transfer of situational knowledge, this does not prevent the deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms at work across theory and practice. 
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On the concept of strategy -a historical 
perspective 
It is the recent strand of genealogical research, inspired primarily by the work of Michel 
Foucault, that will be turned to first. Broadly speaking, this has conceptualised strategy 
as a set of discourses and practices, forming a moving vehicle of power-knowledge 
relations rather than an essentialised way of seeing. As such. the question of strategy 
can be denaturalised, being no longer taken as given. It is this reworking of the history 
of strategy that enables the previously hidden role of accounting to first become visible. 
The emergence of strategy out of managerialism, 
'How do we escape the logic of our reasonT 
(March, 1988/1971: 261) 
Hoskin et al (1997) begin their challenge to the history of strategy by highlighting how 
conventional accounts presume that strategy derives in some automatic or 'natural' way 
from the military sphere (where it is in the special province of generals). From here, it 
has passed thence to the business sphere, whether in the distant past or via twentieth- 
century military science. However, it is this very alluring simplicity which allows the 
most critical aspects of this transformation to be overlooked. 
During the nineteenth century, the practices of writing, grading and examining. so 
central to the power-knowledge relation which spawned modem management 
accounting, can also be identified within the history of military strategy. Alfred Mahan 
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is identifled as the person who, in midst of the growth of these new practices, 
constructs a new discourse of (naval) strategy. This discourse differentiates itself from 
the old. by its perpetual drive to analyse and thus control the future, through the new 
practices. Prior to this, strategy was almost entirely concerned with conflict itself-, 
giving primacy to the annihilation of the enemy on the field of battle. Mahan's 
conceptualisation is strikingly different3 seeing strategy as (Hoskin et al 1997, p15) 
'.. something that must stretch indefinitely over time and space, continuous, ubiquitous 
and constantly under appraisal'. Such ambitions can be seen to have pervaded 
strategic talk to such an extent that by the time of the appropriation of formal strategy 
discourse by business, the displacement of the old is complete, with traces all but 
eliminated. 
'Ibis approach questions the nature of 'doing strategy' In general, by arguing that 
traditional military strategy, with a textual pedigree dating back to ancient Greece, is 
essentially different from modem strategy, in either its military or business forms. For 
in this older regime, 'the general was the plan'. By contrast, the distinctive feature of 
modern strategy is that it always requires a level beyond the general, as the Head 
Office, the Staff Function, or some other entity, which plans on the basis of key 
information drawn from below, summarising the organisation's activities and capacities, 
but simultaneously focused on dealing with what one military strategist (Luttwak 1987) 
describes as the 'reactive enemy'. This kind of strategising is a distinctive break with 
the old military tradition, as much as with older ways of doing business, and can, in 
both cases, be traced to the mid- 19th century. Mirroring the disciplinary shift which 
3 Interestingly, Sun Tzu's (1993) The Art of War, written more than 2,400 years ago, states in Chapter 4. 
Dispositions: '.. the elements of the art of uxtr are _fLrst, 
the measurement of space: second, the estimation of 
quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and YU4 chances of victory. ' Sun Tzu's work has very 
distinctive similarities to the modem concept of strategy. 
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occurred at the birth of managerialism (Hoskin and Macve, 1994). and at the 
introduction of standard costing (Miller and O'Leary, 1994). it shows off the 'disruptive' 
style of Foucault's work, focusing in on the hitherto ignored elements of the power- 
knowledge relationship. Thus, to put it another way, this work refuses to fit its 
theorising within the paradigm of, for example, Johnson and Kaplan's (1987) history of 
accounting, visualising such discourse as limited in its ability to capture what 
happened. Their paradigm can best be described as rational-economic, being strongly 
influenced by a privileging of the economic. This placing of accounting as a response to 
corporate profit-maximising demand constitutes (or indeed subjugates) accounting as 
an unproblematic and stable activity. 
The genealogy of strategy was being studied independently by Knights and Morgan 
(1995,1991,1990) and at the same time as Hoskin (1990), the predecessor to Hoskin 
et al (1997). Like Hoskin et al (1997), they identify military strategy as articulating a 
'means of planning war and regulating combats'. but. they focus especially on the role of 
a military and professional elite (Knights and Morgan, 1990: 477). It is this class, they 
argue, which developed strategy as a means for sustaining their powerful position 
within society. During the inter-war years, advances in technology are seen as 
constituting a focus on surveillance techniques which could analyse time and space. 
This is asserted by Knights and Morgan (1991: 258) as providing a model of how the 
external and the internal could be linked, thereby rendering attractive the discourse to 
business. Post-Second World War saw further changes, notably the separation of 
ownership from control, the increasingly global market and the growth of the multi- 
divisional company (Knights and Morgan, 1991: 257). 'Mis created a new discursive 
space which was filled by the discourse of strategy. As befitting 'critical' theorists, 
Knights and Morgan provide a strong warning of the dangers of assuming that such an 
occurrence was inevitable. The new discourse emerged from. and was propelled by the 
academic community, specialist practitioners as well as others. This led critically to a 
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switch from controlling events within the organisation to those outside. Disseminated 
throughout academe and business schools alike, it constituted a new form of expert 
knowledge. 
To illustrate the applicability of their analysis, Knights and Morgan (1995) turn to the 
life insurance industry. Although the broad institutional environment was 'ripe', the 
spread of strategic discourse is necessarily discontinuous and problematic, relying on a 
myriad of Industry and organisational specific factors. With regard to the industry, 
there was little need for strategy until the 1960's, owing to (p 201). '.. stability, order and 
conservatism'. There was little competition owing to cartel conditions. Companies felt 
that they were in control of their environment, removing the need for the sort of 
sustained, pro-active planning which characterises strategy. The 1980's, however, 
brought the perception of radical change, much of it, as they see it, under the umbrella 
of Thatcherism. Competition intensified as barriers to entry were breached with the 
deregulation of potential competing industries such as banks and building societies. 
Restrictive practices and other impediments to free market competition were clamped 
down on, the Financial Services Act heralding the end of the widespread complacency of 
insurance companies. Knights and Morgan (1995) analyse a specific company, Pensco, 
and trace the moment of the activation of strategic discourse to a new chief executive. 
Inspired by the changes In the competitive environment, this chief executive instigated 
a variety of controls, formalising and tightening up operations, In a move designed to 
break away from the dominant 'traditional' culture. The new discourse was moulded 
by two main Influences - cultural inertia manifesting as resistance, and the exploding 
demands in the marketplace. The latter influence led to a paradoxical culling of the 
strategic horizons, biasing them towards short-term needs. As such, I would argue that 
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Knights and Morgan demonstrate to an extent how accounting practices have infiltrated 
the discourse of strategy, in line with Hoskin et ars thesis 
(1997)4. 
Strategy has been shown to be a product of a multiplicity of players, discourses and 
practices, with activity taking place simultaneously in a variety of interlinked contexts. 
The questionability of the assumption of strategy has begun to be unveiled, 
problematising the formation of strategic discourse in general. Knights and Morgan 
(1991; 1995) focused a critical attention on the construction of meanings as a process 
or practice in which the individual (and the individual text) cannot be separated in some 
absolute way from the social or organisational context. Morgan and Sturdy 
(forthcoming: 305) argue for a post-strategic framework which will respect the role 
played by varying environmental structures in the proliferation of discourses of 
strategy, as well as the ways in which these discourses actively participate in the 
construction of their own alluring representation of reality. In this way, therefore. the 
boundaries of the organisation are app reciable as made visible through the discourse of 
strategy, and the separation of external from internal can be denaturalised. 
Disinterring accounting practices 
The practices identified, which are today invisibly infused into NVestem societies, 
provided the catalyst for the explosion of what is now accepted as business strategy. If 
Hoskin et al (1997) are correct, both the development of modem strategy and the 
emergence of managerialism. are aspects of the same 'disciplinary transformation'. and 
involve the same sets of people. The argument has been made previously (e. g. Hoskin 
and Macve 1988) that the invention of the managerial 'modem business enterprise' in 
MS IS critiqued later under the Critical school section. 
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the U. S. (cf. Chandler 1977) was engineered not by businessmen but by graduates of 
the U. S. Military Academy in West Point, who translated the new 'disciplinary practices' 
under which they learned there into the world of work. This occurred, as Chandler 
(1977) argued first at the U. S. Armory at Springfield and then on the early U. S. 
Railroads, but not for the reasons Chandler posits. 
His 'administrative coordination' is made up of putting writing, examining and grading 
to use to coordinate activity within units (setting targets, generating performance 
reports and generally introducing forms of human accounting and accountability), and 
across units, In the form of the hierarchical coordination of activity via a line and staff 
system. These practices were then disseminated not only into other business sectors (as 
Chandler shows) but back Into the military world generally. In particular this occurs 
during the American Civil War, as certain of the West Point pioneers get involved in 
helping the Union army to retrieve a losing situation, through the introduction of the 
same type of hierarchical co-ordination of activity. The most visible sign of this is the 
introduction of a General Staff office to coordinate all the individual Union armies, thus 
ending the autonomy of the individual general. In this contextý the fact that it should be 
Mahan who becomes the first theorist of modern military strategy takes on an added 
significance, since he was the product of this very environment. Not only was he a 
graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, but he was the son of a leading West Point 
teacher, and so was born and raised at the heart of this new disciplinary world (Hoskin 
et al 1997). 
One could argue, against such a proposition, that many companies operate today which 
do not impose formal systems of accountability. Munro (1995) for instance has charted 
the cardinal reliance on rituals, precedence and 'permission-seeking talk' within a large 
and very successful financial services company. The practices of writing, grading and 
examining are apparently absent, as is an explicit commitment to a discourse of 
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-strateW - at least in terms of managerialist practices of prediction and control. 
However, one can now, some years on, counter-argue that perhaps these practices were 
not immediately visible, but were embedded deep within the companies, or alternatively 
were operating from 'out there' in the wider financial world. This latter possibility has 
gained in credibility, as these companies have become increasingly compelled to 'prove' 
the rigour of their efficiency and accountability systems under the glare of Merger and 
Acquisition bids. These frequently deploy accounting valuations on both sides to prove 
and counter-prove how complacent/efficient the handling of funds has been in terms of 
generating shareholder value. Thus, while there may have been a 'virtual absence of any 
fonnal or accounting based management control systems' (Munro, 1995: 438). there is 
now a question-mark over the earlier perception of 'Bestsafe' as a 'highly successful 
market leadeT' (1995: 438), a question-mark made visible through the effects of 
accounting practice. Insofar as Bestsafe has had to demonstrate accounting-derived 
'good value' at the external level, it has thereby exposed itself to the penetration of the 
accounting eye into its internal strategic management practice. 
Summary 
The critical reworking of the history of strategy produces a profound insight into the 
contemporary study of strategy. Most importantly, an accounting problematic, springing 
out of managerialism, is uncovered within the rupture that produced what is now 
known as business strategy. Driven by this genealogical work, I now present an 
accounting-focussed re-reading of the strategy literature, one which attempts to make 
more visible accountings role within strategy. 
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Rational Strategy Theory 
Early rationalist work was exemplified by Selznicks (1957) work on leadership, whereby 
a strategy was designed before facing up to the organisation, thus injecting long-run 
intentions into day-to-day behaviour. Alfred Sloan (1963), the former President of 
General Motors, drew on his personal experience in claiming that the strategic problem 
as one of positioning the firm in those markets in which maximum profits can be 
earned. Accounting thereby had an integral secondary role in defining the success (or 
failure) of the business goal of achieving the highest return on capital. Ibis strategy 
literature was a distillation from earlier US-derived forms of strategy practice, as with 
Sloan's experience at General Motors of developing and running the M-form 
divisionalised corporation via Return on Investment measures from the 1920's. Thus 
within rational strategy, what mattered was the long term view, epitomised in the 
rationally planned strategy policy of the leader or manager. 
The strategic aim of an enterprise is to produce a satisfactory return on the resources 
invested in it, and if the return is not satisfactory, either the deficiency must be corrected or 
the resources allocated elsewhere. ' 
(Alfred Sloan, quoted in Ansoff, 1979: 13 1) 
Prescriptionsfor planning and control 
The two great early strategy theorists within the US business-academic world were 
Ansoff and Chandler. Ansoff produced a series of landmark books extending and 
developing the concept of rational strategy, moving beyond policy to policy management. 
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From the 1960's on, his focus was on the process of strategy formulation, in which 
strategy became visible as formalised planning - controlled. conscious and capable of 
being broken down into executable pieces such as objectives, programs. budgets and 
decision procedures. Ansoff also recognised that there was an inherent set of twin 
problems in making this process work: there was the problem of being contextually 
aware as to what the appropriate strategy was, and how it n-dght change in a world of 
flux, and then there was the problem of implementing the strategy once decided. As he 
put it, quoting Sloan: 
'A complete strategic theory of the firm must model two distinctive phenomena: (a) the 
relation between external and internal stimuli on the firm and the resulting strategic action; 
(b) the relation between a given strategic action and the consequent performance of the firm. ' 
(Ansoff, 1969: 39) 
The consequent multiple linkages between the internal and the external therefore had 
to be identified and made visible. But the way this had to be handled as process was 
managerially, which made the managerial 'class' a if not the key organisational 
resource. So, as he stressed: 
'Unlike most available theories, this theory is managerial in the sense that management is 
identified and treated as an influential social class within the organization. Management Is 
neither idealized, as in microeconomic theory, nor neglected altogether, as in the bulk of 
organizational sociology. Instead. a variety of managerial behaviours is treated, ranging from 
forceful to conservative. This element is essential if the connection to practical technology is to 
be made visible. ' 
(Ansoff, 1979: 3) 
The analysis of 'managerial behaviours' was argued to be realistic, in that within the 
model management behaviour was recognised as varying from pathological to 
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progressive. Ibis contingency type approach to understanding strategy was justified on 
the grounds that success stems from a matching of environment, response, culture and 
capability. At the same time it was not to any great extent a reflective or critically aware 
description of how management operated in practice, or at the level of management 
practices. Instead this strategy discourse was dominated by normative prescriptions 
about how management ought to manage, as in exhortations like the following. 'In the 
business fu7n, the work-giving management is responsible for the weyýwe of the 
enterprise. The very reasonfor its existence is to provide guidance and control to thefu7n 
in a way which will assure its survival and success. '(1979: 125). 
Perhaps this is explicable in part as a means to getting strategy and strategy theory 
taken seriously. However it meant that Ansoffs work was in this respect a form of 
managerial prescription, which therefore took the existence of management as a 
powerful 'class' for granted. The issue was how to run the firm and not whether 
managers or management were problematic categories which might need sustained 
reflection in and of themselves. 
During his later work (e. g. 1979, Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990), Ansoff continued to 
plough much the same furrow, while developing new variations on his prescriptive 
theme. For instance, the late 1970's saw him focussing on 'issue management, given 
the way that turbulence in the envirorunent made it so difficult to plan precisely for all 
outcomes5. However, he continued to work with a view of strategy as essentially top- 
down and non-problematic (if only It is 'done right). Even in his late work, as he shifts 
5 At such moments Ansoff is not so far from the processualists in his recognition of the 
endemic significance of change, as in comments like : 'In a majority of cases ... changeis 
triggered by events in the outside environment, but strategic change is also frequently caused 
by internal power shifts. ( ... ) ... change is an ongoing process. ' (Ansoff, 1979: 175) 
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into the study of the management of discontinuous change, the focus on prescriptive 
planning and control is unwavering, as in the following: 
Ibus, strategic management is a systematic approach for managing strategic change which 
consists of thefollowing: 
1. Positioning of the firm through strategy and capability planning. 
2. Real-time strategic response through issue management. 
3. Systematic management of resistance during strategic implementation. ' 
(Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990: xvi) 
Ansoffs work has much In common with Chandlees, not least since (1979) he names 
Chandler's historical work (1962; 1977), along with Cyert and March (1963). as one of 
his major influences, stating: 
'Ibis book. like Chandler's, is built on the basic hypothesis that environment, external 
strategic behaviour, and the internal 'structure' are interrelated. ' 
(Ansoff. 1979: 7) 
But Chandler's work is differentiated by its deeper historical analysis, which raises the 
issue of management as problem in a more integral way, since one of Chandler's major 
themes Is that management is an invention of the 19th century, therefore something 
that needs explaining in its own right. However, it is similar to Ansoffs in that it also 
underscores strategy as being for the long run, and thus requiring an explicit and 
deliberate conception of goals. Chandler's distinctive contribution is to think through 
the strategy/structure relation on the basis of his historical analysis, seeing the 
emergence of modern business enterprise, most notably In the multidivisional form, as 
a distinctive new means of enabling top management to focus on strategic aspirations. 
In his formulation, strategy precedes structure, based on his analysis of the way that 
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successful long-term businesses have in general emerged and thrived within the 
modern managerial world. 'Ibus strategy formulation and control needs to be the task of 
top management, with implementation left to the operational managers positioned at 
appropriate positions within the required structure. 
So for Chandler strategy may continue to be conceptualised as top-down, planned and 
prescriptive, but he did focus on how management was done in practice, in particular 
through the practice of administrative coordination. Here Chandler was critical of the 
failure of economists to understand, or factor in, the consequences of management's 
invention for the functioning of modern economies. For him, the power accruing to 
adn-flnistrative coordination has meant that the visible hand of management has, in 
many sectors, replaced the invisible hand of the market at the heart of economic 
activity. As he puts it: 
'By routinizing the transactions between units, the costs of those transactions were lowered. 
By linking the administration of producing units with buying and distributing units, costs for 
information on markets and sources of supply were reduced. Of much greater significance, the 
internalization of many units pen-nitted the flow of goods from one unit to another to be 
administratively coordinated. ' 
(Chandler. 1977: 7) 
'Ibus Chandler has established grounds for seeing not only why strategy could be so 
central to the running of individual flrms, but why It was likely to be so ubiquitous in 
the world of modern business enterprise generally. For it is the means by which the 
visible hand of top management is able to dominate the Invisible hand, via the 
development of oligopoly. 
28 
Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the kind of strategic discourse that Ansoff and 
Chandler initiated has been Michael Porter. Porter's influential research (1980.1985) 
on Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage has shaped the more recent 
discourse of strategy in the business world in significant ways, by combining a focus on 
sectoral environments with a detailed analysis of how the production value is 
coordinated through a judicious and appropriate choice of strategy. His work can 
therefore be seen as having added substantially to the rational literature. While his first 
book describes in detail analytical techniques for positioning in a given industrial 
sector, his second breaks the Inside of the firm down into the discrete, albeit 
interdependent, components. In the revised introduction to the latter, he re-iterates the 
importance of therefore studying activities rigorously. 
'It Is simplistic to think that positions (product market competition) and supposedly more 
enduring internal skills, reputation, and organizational competencies can be disconnected. In 
fact, activities connect the two. Is a firm. a collection of activities or a set or resources and 
capabilities? Clearly a firm is both. But activities are what firms do, and they define the 
resources and capabilities that are relevant. * 
(Porter, 1998/1985: xix) 
This enables Porter, despite criticism as the range of what gets said within strategy has 
increased, to continue to stand by the approach developed in his books. It Is rational to 
treat the firm as a single goal-directed entity, with the critical questions being 'what is 
the business doing now, what is happening in the environment, what should the 
business be doing? ' Thus the core of competitive strategy is sustained, through 
positioning the firm optimally in the industry environment, and ensuring that activities 
are coordinated to exploit optimally the internal stock of assets which drive competitive 
advantage. 
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Amongst other key figures in the rationalist mould, Goold and Campbell (1987) in their 
work on Strategles and Styles, continue on from the classical works by investigating 
further the role of the centre. 
The role of the centre in policy formulation. planning and resource allocation was viewed as 
critical by Chandler and Williamson. But how these roles should be defined and discharged is 
less clear. ' (22) 
Two core practices of the centre are pulled out, planning and control. 
'Our research has demonstrated that no single account of the role of the centre is adequate. 
( ... ) To bring out ... differences, we focused on the way that the centre influences managers 
lower down and affects the decisions that they make. Following the work of previous 
researchers. we defined two dimensions of the centre's influence process - planning influence 
and control influence. ' (35) 
Three dominant styles are thus produced: Strategic Planning, Strategic Control and 
Financial Control. It is intriguing. however, to see here how planning and control 
approaches are both underpinned by notions of control. Strategic Planning companies 
are characterised by strong central leadership, focusing on core decision-making 
processes aimed at building a co-ordinated portfolio of businesses. Financial Control 
companies concentrate the achievement of financial performance, whereas Strategic 
Control companies attempt to balance strategising with short-term financial goals. All 
styles therefore display a tendency to conflate planning considerations with those of 
how the centre should control. Goold and Campbell conclude by highlighting what they 
see as the key issue for central management, '[aldding mdue (Chapter 13). 
'Ibis chapter is central to our thesis. It explains the nature of the value created by the centre: 
it shows how the centre can help business units and why multibusiness units can outperform 
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single-business companies. ( ... ) We conclude that each of the three main styles can add value. 
( ... ) ... each style inevitably subtracts value as well as adding it. 
Ibe task of managers at the 
centre, is to ensure that their net contribution is positive. ' 
This underlying conunitment to adding 'value' is where the reliance on accounting 
practices becomes visible as something that is common across the Rationalist 
approach. As Mintzberg astutely points out, the notions of planning and control 
(particularly as relied on so heavily by Goold and Campbell 1987, et al) are becoming 
inseparable, to the extent that their analytical power begins to be substantially reduced. 
In the light of this thesis' focus on accounting practice, it is noticeable that this 
conflation of planning and control is tied to the discipline of accounting entering 
strategy. The influence of accounting is to penetrate strategic decisions so that they 
appear accountable and controllable. 
'Perhaps the clearest theme in the planning literature is its obsession with control - of 
decisions and strategies, of the present and the future, of thoughts and actions. of workers 
and managers, (20 1) of markets and customers. ' (202) 
'An obsession with control generally seems to reflect a fear of uncertainty. We all fear 
uncertainty to some degree, and one way to deal with a felt lack of control. to ensure no 
surprises. is to flip it over - to seek control over everything that might surprise us. ' (202) 
'In effect, planning means control, at the very least over the processes by which decisions are 
made and interrelated, but more commonly over the premises that underlie those decisions if 





ighlighting the reliance on accounting 
The Rationalist approaches can be seen to draw on accounting ideas and techniques in 
various primary ways. Chandler for instance recognises the constructive role of 
accounting in the development of modes of administrative coordination. 
,... a constant flow of information was essential to the efficient operation of these new large 
business domains. For the middle and top managers, control through statistics quickly 
became both a science and art. This need for accurate information led to the divising of 
improved methods for collecting, collating. and analyzing a wide variety of data generated by 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. Of even more importance it brought a revolution 
In accounting... (... ) ... to meet the needs of managing the first modem business enterprise, 
managers of large American railroads during the 1850s and 1860s invented nearly all of the 
basic techniques of modem accounting. ' 
(Chandler, 1977: 109) 
This innovation in accounting was translated into a practice for measuring and 
monitoring overall financial performance, making success fundamentally reliant on 
accounting information. 
'After defining costs carefully, Pierre du Pont and his financial managers turned to a more 
precise definition of profit and with it a more precise criterion for evaluating financial 
performance. ' 
(Chandler, 1977: 445) 
Porter also necessarily employs accounting In the construction of his Value Chain and 
the rational analysis of 'competitive advantage' that flows therefrom. Its function is to 
make better sense of the organisation by producing a cost-derived set of rational 
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calculations of where value is (and is not) being added, and how value can therefore be 
increased either by reducing costs or increasing revenues. In Porter's own words: 
'Competitive advantage cannot be understood by looking at a firm as a whole. It stems from 
the many discrete activities a firm performs in designing, producing, marketing. delivering, 
and supporting its products. I ... I The value chain disaggregates a firm into its strategically 
relevant activities in order to understand the behaviour of costs and potential sources of 
differentiation. ' 
(Porter, 1985: 33) 
Ansoff has drawn on similar accounting-based ways of conceptualising key strategic 
management problems, as in this example from his most recent book: 
'When a discontinuous change impacts on the firm. two costs arc incurred. The cumulative 
loss of profit, and the cost incurred in arresting or reversing the loss. The management 
problem is to minimize the sum of the two losses by restoring profitability of affected product 
lines, or by shutting down the operations that support them. * 
(Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990: 367) 
Summary 
Of great importance here Is the view of accounting which enables such an approach to 
proceed. Accounting is wielded as the non-problematic calculative Instrument which 
can provide the antidote to managerial arudety, offering the suppression of uncertainty 
through quantifiability of performance. 11iis formulation of accounting is drawn upon 
as if it were already or always there, naturalising its discourse and refraining from the 
reflejdve consideration of its genesis. 
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Processual Research 
The first great debate within the broadening field of strategy was that between the 
prescriptive and managerial focus of Chandler, Ansoff and Porter, and the more 
sociologically-informed 'processual' research of Mintzberg (e. g. 1994), Quinn (e. g. 1980) 
and Pettigrew (e. g. 1985). Rationalists have not taken this challenge lying down. One 
may for instance cite Porter's warning (Porter, 1996) about the dangers that attend 
abandonment of the rationalist approach in favour of the more reflexive and anti- 
rationalist approaches found in the work of processualist 'management gurus' (e. g. 
Hamel and Prahalad 1994). These 'beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and they are 
leading more and more companies down the path of mutually destructive competition' 
(Porter, 1996: 61). Yet despite these strictures, processualist approaches continue to 
gain ground, as appearing more nuanced, or more 'realistic' in a world where both the 
external and internal environments are increasingly unpredictable and thus 
unresponsive to a rigorous rationalist approach. . 
Within processual work. however, the persistance of conventional accounting notions 
and practices can also be discovered and exposed. This Is of interest because 
processual work was supposed to be the oppositional approach which got beyond the 
rigidities of, and offered a genuine alternative to, the rationalists. Yet in this respect the 
radical alternative seems to be conventional, as in general it leaves accounting 
unexamined, as the instrumentally unproblematie handmaiden to strategy. 
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Emergence of rationalist/processualist divide 
It is possible to see the emergence of processualism itse[f as a process, in which a new 
kind of claim to rational understanding of strategy was articulated. 6 'Ibis approach has 
a certain virtue here, in that it enables one to bring out key points of difference that the 
processualists themselves claimed, before asking how or how far they 'remain the 
same'. And arguably the path by which they claimed difference from the rationalists is 
critical in understanding the ground upon which they now walk. Certainly such an 
argument has informed Eisenhardt and Zbaracki's thesis (1992: 18) that the 
processualists have set up a straw man of 'strategy', as something supposedly fixed and 
unchanging, in their critiques of the rationalist school. rMis is one accusation upon 
which this section will hope to throw light- I 
However, returning to the key differences, a typical processualist claim is Pettigrews 
contention that, while the rationalists progressed from the study of strategy formulation 
to its implementation, in so doing they never looked effectively beyond the field of 
strategy as 'content'. Against this, Pettigrew constitutes a new discursive domain, where 
strategy is to be seen as inherently contextualised process. He puts the difference thus: 
'Mis rational picture of business problem-solving has as its concern the content or what of a 
strategy - the outcome which is sought - and has nothing to say at an explicit level of how to 
achieve that outcome. In other words it has no process theory within it of how and why to 
create the strategic outcomes so perceptively and logically derived from the analysis of 
competitive forces. ' (Pettigrew 1985: 19) 
6 This is not to claim that this was the only alternative with a claim to be establishing a new reason. Around 
this time the economics paradigm which is now strongly established, was also developing (e. g. Rumelt. 
Schendel and Teece 199 1). 
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Context therefore needs to be systematically kept in view, as the frame within which 
strategy is both formulated and implemented. 
'Strategy formulation is contextually based. Strategy may be understood as a flow of events, 
values, and actions running through a context. .... This context affects the process of strategy 
formulation. The implementation of any outcomes of the strategy-formulation process in turn 
become the new contextual background for resolving future dilemmas. Out of the partial 
resolution of those dilemmas evolves strategy. ' (Pettigrew 1982: 94-95) 
'Ibis constitutes the grounding for a new kind of debate, over whether strategy is 
planned or emergent. For here strategising is seen as being undertaken within a world 
of 'bounded rationality, where constant recognition needs to be given to the difficulties 
that managers face in articulating their visions. Thus the processualists tend to criticise 
what they see as the over-normative overtones of Its predecessor. As Pettigrew (1987: 
655) remarks, 'much research on organizational change is ahistorical, aprocessual and 
acontextual in character. ' 
The recognition of strategy as emergent over time produces the well-known distinction 
between intended and realised strategies, and highlights the complex and therefore 
unpredictable socio-political nature of organisations (Nhntzberg 1994). Internal 
organisational cultures become seen as multiple and often conflicting, revolving 
ambiguously around changing beliefs and power distributions. Set against this messy 
backdrop, the deliberate top-down administrative co-ordination promised by strategic 
planners can be perceived as falling way short of its hard-hitting rhetoric, as they 
undertheorise the internal context of organisational strategy. Indeed, the promotion of 
systematic and formalised analysis may now be reproached as counter-productive, as it 
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potentially suppresses, instead of encouraging, the fleidbility that firms may need to 
compete effectively. 
If the rhetoric of processual advocates is to be acceded to, then, the study of process is 
inaugurated as the antithesis of the rationalist school. So Mintzberg for instance. in his 
book 'The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning' (1994). dissects a wide variety of what he 
sees as myths, which he argues cloud the reasoning of the strategic planning 
phenomenon, claiming that '(u)lffmately, the term "strategic planning" has proved to be 
an oxymoron' (1994: 32 1). 
One of the distinctive features claimed by the processual approach is the move away 
from pure prescription towards a more descriptive emphasis. Yet here is a first slippage 
of difference, insofar as processualist discourse sometimes demonstrates a propensity 
of its own to slip into a managerialist kind of prescription within description. So, while 
Quinn forcefully states that 'strategy deals with the unknowable, not the uncertain' 
(1995/1978: 114) this does not prevent him on a later occasion from delineating the 
strategy process as a sequence of steps which are 'generally' followed when 'managing 
strategies incrementally' (1988/1982: 805). There is a prescriptive sense in which 
'effective managers' are described as taking up tentative positions, building 
organisational awareness and broadening political support before formalising strategic 
goals. Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) have recognised this dimension in Quinn's approach, 
characterising his message as 'very prescriptive' (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991: 173). Yet 
this does not mean that their own work is necessarily free of the same tendency. On 
occasion Pettigrew can sound somewhat prescriptive, as when he makes statements 
such as: 'the starting point for Otis analysis of strategic change is the notion that 
formulating the content of any new strategy inevitably entails managing its context and 
process' (1987: 657). Similarly, Pettigrew and V%Thipp (1991: 104) identify a pattern in 
the behaviour of managers in higher performing firms. and extract a five-factor 
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framework which they believe is used in practice (environmental assessment, leading 
change, linking strategic and operational change, human resources as assets and 
liabilities and coherence in the management of change). 'Ibis might be argued to be 
pure description 7. However, despite their insistence that this model 'is not intended to be 
used narrowly as a manual for managing change' (1991: 270), it still runs the risk of 
becoming a checklist for *doing strategy well' via a managerialist approach which 
emphasises management (and accounting-derived) control. 
So perhaps, as Eisenhardlt and Zbaracki (1992: 22) suggest, the story of the 
processualist approach is more complex. Processualism presents itself as a reasoned 
reaction to the rationalist approach, notably in moments like Mintzbergs (1994) critique 
of planning. Focussing on process, It sees explanation as more rational when it 
recognises the influence of power and politics, and the ubiquity of context. The 
processual approach can therefore be seen in a sense as post-rationalist. yet in the 
name of a deeper reason, which variously recognises the roles of the social, the political 
and the subject. 
But in particular when it turns to the question of the different, and differently located, 
subjects involved in 'doing strategy, the difference from rationalism, I would argue, 
becomes hard to maintain. 
However, interestingly the form chosen for Pettigrew and WhipVs model matches that of Portees (1980: 4) 
five-forces. 
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Concepts of subjectivity 
The heart of the political perspective is the process by which conflict is resolved among 
individuals with competing preferences. Simply put, decisions follow the desires and 
subsequent choices of the most powerful people. 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992: 23) 
Within the processual approach to strategy, the question of what 'powerful' managers 
do becomes centrally pertinent. This is not to say that what is done to them and to 
other subjects in the name of strategy is not relevant also, but the role of the 'powerful 
subject' is likely to be particularly significant. since the processual focus is so much on 
what 'leaders' do (or fail to do). So while general investigation into management or 
workplace identities Is important -under processualism, the study of the top manager as 
subject engaged in the strategy process is particularly so. It is here that it sometimes 
proves so difficult to avoid some lapse itowards the prescriptivism of the Rationalist 
approach. 
This is not consistently the case. For instance, Pettigrew (1992), In an editorial for a 
special issue of the Strategic Management Journal on strategy process research. begins 
a discussion of agency by viewing social life as a 'process of structural emergence via 
actions' (Pettigrew 1992: 8). He then develops a nuanced understanding of the problem 
of agency, referencing a number of social theorists, and recognising that 'although there 
is capacity for agency in all human beings, differences in power, knowledge, and other 
resources provide different opportunities for the realization of injluence in social 
processes' (Pettigrew 1992: 8). The question that emerges, however, Is how far the top 
manager as subject is then recognised at the level of action as confronting choices and 
making decisions in conditions of undecidability. Alternatively, how far does 'top 
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management' as focal point around which so many undecidabilities swirl become the 
means of resolving the undecidabilities of doing strategy? 
The criticism has been made that too often the 'top manager' as subject becomes the 
unwitting device through whom the problems involved in doing strategy are foreclosed. 
Undecidabilities are seen as having been resolved through their 'leadership'. a term that 
therefore conceals process as much as revealing it. So Alvesson and Willmott comment, 
'[a] basic limitation of much processual analysis is that little or no account is taken of how 
managers come to assume and maintain a monopoly of what has become institutionalized 
as "strategic" decision-making responsibility. ' (1995: 95). 
The way In which this sort of analysis becomes prescription Is quite nuanced. It is not a 
matter of telling top managers what to do; Instead it reveals that there is no other way 
to resolve problems than through top management's 'leadership'. As an example of this 
sort of 'passive prescriptiveness', Quinn offers the dictum that 'effective managers of 
innovation channel and control its main directions' (1995/1985: 713). Pettigrew and 
Whipp, in a similar moment, call for 'leadership which can operate with multiple levers 
and at multiple levels' (1991: 166). At such moments, it seems, processualist work 
breaks off from investigating why and how (i. e. as a process) strategic managers as 
subjects come to make decisions under conditions of undecidability, and equally how 
other organisational subjects acquiesce or conspire in enabling them to do so. In 
Willmott's (1984: 361) view, the approach fails in the sense that, '... although this 
highlights the signJilcance of structural power dffierentials and conjlicts of interests within 
organizations, the pluralist perspective offers little or no explanation of the distribution of 
power. ' In Fincham's overview observation, the insufficient processual engagement In 
deconstructing 'leadership' is the flaw: 
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The need to account for the 'management of meaning produces a central dilemma, in the 
resolution for which Pettigrew turns to concepts of leadership. He places strong emphasis on 
the actions of 'transforming' and 'visionary' leaders, or simply 'exceptional people'. Yet the 
idea of strategic change as the product of figurehead personalities in management is itself 
oversimplifying; it becomes a deus ex machina in accounting for how intangibles like culture 
and politics can be 'managed'. Strongly value-laden concepts like charismatic leadership are 
difficult to build into any clear model of organizational change. as change itself becomes 
bound up with the actors who bring it about. ' 
(Fincham 1992: 746) 
So from the point of view of this study, while it Is reasonable that, within the politicised 
context of organising, individuals are seen as boundedly rational and goal-directed, 
what too often happens is that the subject's relation to practices is marginallsed 
through being substituted by images of the 'visionary leader'. So for instance this 
obscures how concepts of 'leadership' are in themselves maintained via practices (c. f. 
Knights and Willmott 1992: 777). So while the processualists recognise the importance 
of contextual questioning and have made substantial progress along this path. their 
discourse appears at such moments to forestall the continued formulation and 
Investigation of the questions they purportedly pursue. 8 
Of course this may not all be unintentional. For instance, if one reads back to the early 
work of Pettigrew, It is apparent that one of his concerns was to move away from what 
he saw as the over-individualisation of decision-making and the failure to acknowledge 
structural and contextual dynamics. So he observes: 
8 Perhaps the failure to engage with the subject as such is a manifestation of a 'desLre for exhausttm 
representations of the Lvorld as part of a project of self-autonomy and sovereignty. * (Knights 1997: 1 
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'However, March and Simon's (1958) tendency to project individual processes of choice into 
statements about organisational processes of decision-making means there is a liberal bias to 
reconstructing the organisation from the perspective and interests of the individual. and not 
enough on demonstrating how the organisation structures the perspective and interests of the 
individual.. ' (Pettigrew, 1985: 20) 
There is an important point here insofar as the approach that focusses on such 
phenomena as bounded rationality and satisficing fails to appreciate the role of political 
processes in shaping organisational action. Yet what critiques like Fincham's indicate Is 
that the problem of the subject is not thereby erasecL and Pettigrews reliance on the 
concept of powerful leadership as the 'hinge'. so to speak, on which explanations of how 
top managers, as subjects, act, allows an idealised subject back into the centre of 
analysis. Ibis subject, as he/she who acts in accord with the requirements of 
leadership. is the vehicle of strategy as positive presence, and thereby as vehicle for 
prescription of what managers ought to do. Constituting such an ideal-rational and 
powerful entity as so central leaves the question of how organizational subjects in 
general Interact receding from view. How leadership and followership are mutually 
constituted and negotiated in practice is a question constantly deferred. 9 
9 The effect of thinking in terms of idealised subjects is well captured in the rather difrerent context of 
education by Lave and Wenger (1991): 'Painting a picture of the person as a primarily "cognitive" entity tends 
to promote a nonpersonal view of knowledge, skills, tasks, activities, and learning. .... It is by the theoretical 
process of decentering in relational terms that one can construct a robust notion of "whole person- which 
does justice to the multiple relations through which persons deftne themselves in practice ... * (Lave and 
Wenger 1991: 53-4). 
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Some of this can be seen through a close analysis of the following passage from 
PettigreWs (1985) The Awakening Giant Chapter 9, '77ie top-down strategy for creating 
change: Mond Divistorf. 
'rbese changes ... were driven by a chairman and board of Mond who had been uplifted by the 
business pressures of the day. But in this case it was not just a question of a combination of 
the business imperative galvanising business purpose and political will to create necessary 
change, the other part of the jigsaw ... was the guiding influence of an intellectually coherent 
and well-communicated framework for thinking about the content of the changes... The 
evolution of th[is] framework ... and the political will and process skill to make it happen, can 
be explained as a result of both the business imperatives of the day, and a long-term process 
led by a number of senior board members of Mond - with consultancy help. to first open up, 
and then clarify, the purpose and total business development of Mond in the changing sociaL 
economic, and political environment of the 1970s and 1980s. ' 
(1985: 319-320) 
Here, even as context and process are celebrated, the hinge role of 'leadership comes 
into play in explaining what took place. The way changes were 'driven' by chairman and 
Board as they gravitated into the special state of being'uplifted' by business pressures. 
In a sense these top management subjects both embody the 'business imperative ... and 
political will' (as conductors of the 'galvanisinX effect) and are the vehicles articulating 
the 'intellectually coherent and well-communicated framework for thinking. They are in 
that respect the carriers par excellence of power-knowledge relations. When the change 
process was : falteTing, meandeTing, and haphazcLrd' (1985: 320). it is they who get it 
back on track, who decide the undecidabilities. But that very characterisation of top 
management means that the way in which, processually or at the level of practices, 
those relations play out remains unexplored. The work remains a defining study of 
leadership of a certain type: in Pettigrew's words 
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,... as seen through the eyes and actions of the main board, divisional boards, and senior 
managers of ICL 'Ibis book therefore contributes to knowledge about the part played by very 
senior executives in corporate-wide strategic changes, the role of divisional boards and 
directors in making division-wide changes in structure. organisational culture and 
manpower ... ' (Xviii) 
But in the end the play of power and resistance, decision and undecidability, remains 
under-explained. 
This kind of critique is not limited to Pettigrews work alone, however. Instead the 
leading processual writings seem in general to share in versions of the same problem. 
For instance, NUntzberg7s early work discusses the ten different roles of managers 
without ever engaging in the study of management practices in practice at the day to 
day level. So he observes that '[tlhe Lvork of managers of all types may be described in 
terms of ten observable roles: figurehead, liaison, and leader (interpersonal roles), 
monitor. disseminator, and spokesman (information roles), and entrepreneur, 
disturbance handler, resource allocator. and negotiator (decisional roles). ' (1973: 96). 
But how the manager as subject and object is constituted In undertaking these roles 
remains unexplored. Take, for instance, the analysis of the 'decisional roles' which for 
Mintzberg constitute the most critical part of the manager's work, as such work 
justij'Les his great authority and his pourerful access to informatiorf (1973: 77). Mintzberg 
asserts: 
'One clear conclusion emerges from my study: The manager takes full charge of his 
organization's strategy-making system. ' 
(1973: 77) 
But as Willmott (1984) counters: 
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'... although the manager's role set is said to be embedded in 'formal authority. there is no 
discussion of the contribution of managers' activities to the on-going reproduction and 
legitimation of this authority. The roles are supposed to provide a descriptive theory of what 
managers do. Yet. because the task content of their activities is abstracted from the 'hoW and 
'why' of managerial work, it is given the appearance of being peculiarly mechanical and 
unconditioned by historical and contextual circumstances. ' (Willmott, 1984: 357) 10 
By the time of his more recent work (e. g. Mintzberg 1994). he is looking at different 
processes, e. g. the practice of planning, where he undermines the simple notion that 
planners plan, by showing how much of the planner's work is taken up in nonplanning 
roles, e. g. as finder of strategies, analyst, or catalyst. His critique of planning as 
strategy makes him hold back from crediting the planner with a fourth role as strategist 
(1994: 391), but even in this critically insightful moment, he does not engage with how 
planning as practice might take place beyond the manager/planner. Ibus planning 
itself is left as an undisputed managerial activity, and therefore the manager as 
problematic subject (and object) again recedes. 
An assumption that authority is somehow given, and given to manager/strategists, 
therefore runs through processualist work, and is inextricably linked to the creation of 
an idealised managerial subject as leader-figure. So a hierarchical power structure is 
unproblematically given, rather than needing to be explained. And it is at Ods level that 
the lack of difference from, or underlying affinity with, the Rationalist school becomes 
10 Willmott further notes that Mintzberg is espousing a scientific analysis in this early work, rejecting 
unstructured observation '... because the theory It produces cannot be validated scientifically. and the 
reader is asked to show great faith in the 'honesty and reliability of the researcher". ' (1984: 359) Yet this 
deferTing to 'science' is not apparently sufficient to focus on practices as such. 
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manifest. Processualists may transcend the focus on content, but, along with 
Rationalists, can now be seen to presume the existence of managerial power as a 
necessary feature of the modern organisation, and thus to concede the presence of 
strategy as necessaTy "thin that. 
Given that, a focus on such features of the organisational world as inner and outer 
context, though insightful, fails to break the silence on 'the leader' as sub ect. The way 
in which, in many modem organisations, experts are created throughout the 
organisation, destabilising any simple implementation of hierarchical management 
control per se, is hard to handle. The potentially 'positive' role of resistance, and of 
reflexive critique from 'below, will tend to remain tangential at best. Meanwhile the 
problem of the subject, and of the relation of subjectivisation and objectivisation to 
practices, remains systematically excluded. 
11 Whittington makes the point that the distinction between inner and outer context is in part established 
through portraying the outer context as econornistic, and so essentially alien and other from what goes on 
'inside'. This on one hand enables management to be portrayable as powerful since they are part of 'the 
inside'. But it makes the outside (supposedly something accessible and comprehendable via 'inside' 
understandings) into the radically unknown (and perhaps unknowable), in the sense both of what is 'to be 
dominated' via strategy, and what the company is 'a part: of, the economy, society. etc. As Whittington puts it: 
'Pettigrew (1985. pp. 37,52-83) goes on to distinguish between 'inner' and 'outer' contexts, describing thefirst in 
terms of organizational politics, the second almost exclusively in terms of the business and economic 'envLron- 
(700) ment'. 7he slippagefrom, structure to context is significant. Mus the relationship of the 'outer conte-d' to 
IC is portrayed in the language of 'trends'. 'Unpacts'. 'pressures' and 'triggers' (Pettigrew, 1985. pp. 49,426, 
428). Just as revealing is the distinction between 'levels', with the inner context treated as somehow different to 
the outer context. rather than being expressive of a single totality. ... the outer context is rendered quite literally 
as alien. with little sense of ICI as an organization actually constituted by the mobilization of the structural 
properties of the wider society. ... this economistic and detached conception of context does hinder hirnfrom 
recognizing ICTs place in wider social struggles extending beyond the enterprise. ' (Whittington, 1992: 700-70 1) 
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In the end, under this analysis. processualism fails to make the break from the 
deficiencies that it recognises In rationalism because of this failure to get beyond a 
residual acceptance of strategy as 'presence'. in the way that it allows leadership to 
remain an ffisufficiently examined term. There may be many contingent reasons for 
this: the concern of Pettigrew concerning the over-indivtdualistic focus of earlier 
leadership literature, the too-ready acceptance of management as, in the first and last 
Instance, a science by Mintzberg. 12 But whatever the specific factors, in the end, as 
Alvesson and Willmott (1995) put it: 
'The fact that Mintzberg and others routinely recognize "strategies" rather than just directions 
or guiding values, and emphasize the notion of strategy as the key element in business 
organizations, reinforces the hegemony of strategic thinking - even though variation in its 
manifestations is emphasized. ( ... ) Consequently, even though parts of the strategic process 
literature question a number of basic assumptions of mainstream strategic management 
thinking, this literature also contributes to the construction of 'strategy" as a highly 
significant phenomenon. ... discourses about strategy serve to reinforce and extend means- 
end thinking as every conceivable activity and operation is subordinated to the test of its 
strategic relevance and contribution for the realization of taken for granted corporate 
objectives. ' (Alvesson and Willmott, 1995: 98-99) 
12 Mintzberg himself comments on the possible biographical antecedents of his 'search for order'. I was 
trained as an engineer, a point I tended to dismiss for many years until people began to conunent on certain 
engineering characteristics of my work... Perhaps that is behind my search for order. * (Mintzberg and Miller 
1983: 73) 
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Revealing the hidden role of accounting practices 
What this study proposes is that the way beyond this impasse is to break from 
rationalism and its discontents in a different way and at a different level than 
processualism. 7be proposal is that a focus on the way in which practices enable, shape 
and limit what subjects say and do within and across managerial organizations will 
yield a different kind of understanding of how subjects successfully engage in 'doing 
strategy' despite all the problems, internal and external, attendant on the attempt. 7bat 
this is a different level of analysis will become apparent, since it can consistently refuse 
to suspend critical thought in the 'presence' of leadership. Leadership, like strategy, is 
never purely a presence. It is both presence and absence, it implies followership in 
order to function at all. So the focus is upon the means in which it can have effects 
once it is refused the possibility of doing so automatically simply by 'being there', being 
invoked as a term that is ipso facto an explanation. This is where this approach looks to 
the role of secondary practices, including accounting, in enabling, shaping and limiting 
what gets said and done across a whole set of subjects. The approach is not necessarily 
totally divorced from processual work. Indeed the value of processual work in 
elaborating the approach is that it often tacitly supplies evidence for the effects of such 
secondary practices, since It is so focused on how people act and react. 
As a first illustration of this, I return to Pettigrew's discussion of the Mond division, and 
of the way a particular crisis was handled and resolved. Up to 1980, Mond was 'bg, 
successful, conjildent and had a concept of se! f-worth founded not only in its latter-day 
business results, but also in its place in the history and development of ICI'(1985: 319). 
However, this began to change in the light of the 1980 economic recession, as 
profitability fell. This is equated to a Yall from grace (1985: 319) by Pettigrew, who is 
enabled to make this value judgement on the basis of 'the numbers' provided by 
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accounting which showed that profits had fallen. But help was at hand, in the shape of 
a new framework for implementing change, known as the Mond Management Model, 
which is described by Pettigrew as a way of 'answering ... the strategic question of 1980'. 
But the way of answering it yielded was totally based in an accounting metric. As 
Pettigrew puts it: 
Ibis ... model, focussing as it did on the structure, systems, and management processes of the 
division, provided a ... way of answering what became the strategic question of 1980 - how can 
we run the division's business activities more effectively at substantially less costT 
(1985: 338) 
Subsequently he relays the comments of a director, first on the need for change. and 
then on how steps were taken to achieve it. Again, both the strategic question and its 
answer were framed through accounting 'numbers'. 
'It was obvious in the division what was going to happen with the change in exchange rates. In 
the end you had to put some figures on it... The prices will be determined externally. what we 
need to do is reduce costs. .... We set and articulated some pretty challenging targets. we'll get 
the division down to such and such a number - this was the key to survival. ' (1985: 368-369) 
Similarly a manager looking up to the top and describing what he saw talks wholly in 
accounting terms, and 'sees the light! of what is Yeally going on' through what the 
numbers reveal. 
'I didn't used to believe cost reductions were necessary - now I could see the need... Employee 
costs to added value, the graph for 1964-79 shows employee share ... gradually going down. 
after 1979 the employee share was rising like mad .... I remember Frank Bay saying to the 
Division Committee- -rhe numbers are too high. they'll have to come down by 10% perhaps. "' 
(1985: 369) 
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Finally, Pettigrew records the praise for the Model, and relays a perfect summary of how 
managing by the numbers exercises a 'disciplinary' power: 
'A senior member of the board felt that there are "sharper management standards all around". 
and -we're much more disciplined in our use of each other's time". ( ... ) The sharper 
management standards are leading to "more objective performance measurement than ever 
before. and if people aren't measuring up they are told much earlier ... and at a stage when they 
can do something about it". (1985: 374) 
So at the heart of a classic processual text. where it is engaging with the hidden core of 
strategic success, accounting proves to be everywhere: within the model and its 
strategic targets, within the proof of success, and so within the subjects who are the 
objects of the initial plan and known objectively in their truth on the basis of the 
records of performance. 
One may then read many passages in a new light, waiting for the appearance of 
accounting at the heart of 'doing strateV. Pettigrew and Whipp. in their book on 
Managing Change for Competitive Success, describe the implementation of strategic 
change through the creation of a tight managerial link between strategic and 
operational change. Accounting marks the beginning. end and middle of the system 
they recommend: 
'[nJot only must [strategic] intentions be broken down to actionable pieces, those components 
must become the responsibility of change managers, operating within appropriate structures 
at various levels within the organization. Clear and exacting target setting has in turn to be 
supported by re-thought communication mechanisms and adjusted reward systems' 
(1991: 199). 
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Accounting practice here becomes endemic and continual, since Pettigrew and Whipp 
stress that the process of implementation must be ongoing, with a constant feedback 
loop being required to ensure information within the reward and communications 
mechanisms is both timely and relevant. 
'Put together with the constant monitoring and feedback of the process such mechanisms 
generated valuable information. This data then enabled management to modify the original 
intention over time. ' 
(1991: 178) 
Here, at the heart of strategy, we may therefore see the whole set of classic disciplinary 
practices: writing, examining and grading. ibis accounting is quintessentially a human 
accounting. What is being articulated here is suddenly not a million miles away from 
the kind of things said within the supposedly non-strategic mundane world of 
Management Accounting texts. Drury, for example, defines responsibility accounting as 
'the recognition of individual areas of responsibility as specified in afuTn's organization 
structure. These areas of responsibility are known as responsibility centres. A 
responsibility centre may be defined as a segment of an organization where an individual 
manager is held responsible for the segment's performance' (1996: 504). Arguably the 
only signifIcant difference (or non-difference) is that the former has the label of being 
. strategic'. 
In a paper published subsequent to the book, Pettigrew and Whipp offer insights (drawn 
from their case studies) into the role of intangible assets. within the management of 
competition and change. As the publisher Longman's is held up as an example of 
effective implementation, the emphasis on constant and continuous monitoring 
continues. 
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'Longman was able not only to deploy a spread of devices which facilitated operational change 
but to refine them almost continuously. ( ... ) The result has been an increasing elaboration of 
the communications apparatus to include briefmg groups, sectoral conferences and company- 
wide financial commentaries given to all staff. ' 0 993: 24) 
A comparison is then made with the weaknesses suffered by APB. This produces further 
evidence of the practices recommended by Pettigrew and VVWpp. 
'While Longman was mounting a series of adjustments to its structure to release managerial 
responsibility, improve market alignment and try out innovative publishing units ... ABP was 
still struggling to clarify its internal form. The skills of monitoring, feedback and 
adjustment had little chance to grow... 
(1993: 24-25) 
'Iben. the narrative moves to divulge the opinions of a newcomer to ABP. David Croom. 
with specific responsibility for the academic division from 1980. Pettigrew and Whipp 
specifically paraphrase and quote from this clearly important person, stating that he 
'makes the point u. %--ir. 
'He is clear how the new growth objectives for the mid- 1980's were given to the imprints. Yet 
in his words no dialogue. no testing or interrogation followed to develop the objectives at the 
operational level. The growth targets were not 'drawn out in human terms'. The budget 
forecasts of each division were not tested for their operational implications and means of 
implementation... ' 
(1993: 25, emphasis added) 
The above quotes provide convincing initial evidence of the hidden, yet pervasive, 
influence of orthodox accounting within Pettigrew and Whipp's discourse of strategy. 
Fle., dbility in strategic direction is encouraged through the recognition that strategies 
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. emerge'. However, a constant modernistic form of human accountability is embedded 
within their text, however little it seems to call for comment. The overt focus may be on 
the articulation of a coherent vision of the firm (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991: 244). but 
that vision is engineered through accounting practices. These practices therefore 
constitute strategic objectives as visible within the activities of 'change managers'. 
thereby enabling the targeting of control systems around the respective trajectories of 
both strategy and human actions. 
Mintzberg's (1994) polemic against strategic planning, for example, would appear at 
first glance to be resistant to such critique. In a section entitled 7Tw Soft Underbelly of 
Hard Data' (1994: 257-266). however, the Achilles' heel is revealed lurking within the 
critique of rationalism. To show the limitations to information's utility, Mintzberg is 
forced to draw on a comparison with a 'hard' Ideal; '(m)uch hard iqformation arrives 
too late to be of use in strategy making' (1994: 263). The implication therefore is 
that there is an objective and ordered reality, capturable in the numbers of hard 
information, even though timing thwarts its realisation. Thus, accounting remains a 
mirror. The reflection it affords may be cloudy, but In Mintzbergs writings. the 
informative principle is one of mirroring, thus failing to grasp the different critical 
possibility, to look through the accounting mirror and realise that accounting as practice 
constructs strategy. Mintzberg conceptualises information as passive, enabling his 
dictum that'(b)ecause analysis is not synthesis, strategic planning is not strategy 
formation' (1994: 321). After making this point, the tone in the book changes from 
. critical to cortstructive' (1994: 323), and the issue of how planning should take place is 
tackled head-on. 
Following on from his critique of formal strategy formation, Mintzberg pictures strategy 
formation as'an impenetrable black boe (1994: 331). Thus, the most planners can do is 
to 'program the strategies they already have, that is, to elaborate and 
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operationalize their consequences formally' (1994: 333). This is broken down Into a 
three-stage process; Step 1: codifiying the strategy, Step 2: elaborating the strategy and 
Step 3: converting the elaborated strategy. This is most reminiscent of the rationalist 
model, and indeed, NUntzberg states that he has 'positioned the conventional model of 
"strategic planning" in the process of implementing, not formulating, strategy. ' (1994: 
341). As such, the rationalist model was simply misapplied. Furthermore, Mintzberg 
adds the qualification that such programming only makes sense under particular 
circumstances, Le. 'when viable strategies are available, in other words when the world 
is expected to hold still or change predictably while intended strategies unfold, so that 
formulation can logically precede implementation' (1994: 341). Taking this further, two 
roles of plans are circumscribed, as communication media and as control devices. It is 
the second that concerns us here. While Mintzberg is scathing of control through 
'planning as a numbers game, he is more complimentary of focus[ing] on the bottom-line 
effectiveness of the organization's strategies' (1994: 357). This is a clear reference to 
accounting practices defining the ultimate success of the organisation. He then takes 
up Goold and Quinn (1990)'s explication of the paradox that is strategic control. While 
they propound the dangers of control systems in conditions of uncertainty, Mintzberg 
attempts to develop a model of strategic control that can take account of the possibility 
of emergent strategy: 
,... we characterize strategic control as a two-step process. The first requires the tracking of 
realized strategies. as patterns in streams of actions, to consider the deliberate realization of 
intended strategies as well as the emergence of unintended ones. The second step then 
considers, in a more traditional control manner, how effective for the organization were the 
strategies that were actually realized. ' 
(1994: 359) 
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This is underpinned by the maidm that 'strategic control must be concerned with the 
perfonTtance of the organization' (1994: 360). 7be reading of Mintzberg (1994) therefore 
gives warnings over the applicability of formal strategic planning, yet conveys a sense 
that strategic control must be applied, once strategy is conceptualised as emergent. The 
system can then be appraised through the performance of the organisation. 
While Mintzberg avoids where possible the investigation of the 'black box7 of strategy 
synthesis, he falls back into practices of accounting to both introduce control and 
measure performance. Strategy Is naturalised, forming an entity which cannot be 
reached through rationalistic plarming methods. Ibis sense of 'going aftee and 
'catching ug (Munro 1997: 510) is not directly theorised by Mintzberg, yet still 
manifests itself through a hidden and omnipresent *will to account'. continuing to 
stimulate a discursive focus on strategy as ordered planning within a coherent 
imagination of the filrm (leading to the selection of preferred tactics deemed appropriate 
to context). It is not strategic planning that Is an 'oxymororf (Mintzberg 1994: 32 1). but 
strategy formationll Formal planning is not already/always separated from strategy 
formation. Neither pre-eidsts13, as both are constructed discursively and reproduced 
through these disciplinary practices. 
13 Indeed, to separate planning from formation reinforces strategy as a colonising discourse (Alvesson and 




A closer analysis from the direction of accounting indicates how it is that processualism 
has not necessarily enabled a new and better way of strategising (even allowing that in 
its own terins It claims only to describe not prescribe). For certain contradictions can 
be seen to materialise, which undermine the internal coherence of this approach as an 
altemative to the rational school (Lim, 1998). In a general way, it is possible to identify 
an Anglo-Saxon manifestation of managerialism (cf. Hoskin and Macve 1988) as 
common to, for example, Porter's definition of strategy as the 'Icreation] of Lt ng a _f arno 
company's activities' (1996: 75). the 'Contingent Strategic Success Formula' of Ansoff and 
Sullivan (1993). and the process-sensitive models/ explanations of strategic choice. such 
as that of Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), Quinn (1988/1982). That there should be a 
widely shared 'managerialist' view Is perhaps one sign of the power wielded by 
accounting, as the primary technology of 'managing by the numbers' in profit-focused 
organisations. It is also the underlying reason we suggest for explaining why, in 
practice, a deceptively passive, technical image of accounting as mirror of economic 
reality has Infiltrated modem strategy research, not only within the so-called 
'rationalist' school, but also within the discourse of its most visible contestant. 
Paradoxically, the very passivity of the (implicit) accounting mirror metaphor releases 
accounting to construct a managerialist bias in processual research, concurrently 
disregarding accountinWs constructive role in practice. Miis double-blindness detracts 
significantly from the processualist ability to theorise the dynamics of organisation. And 
with this in mind, it becomes possible to challenge fundamentally the implicit claims 
made by processualists (see above), asserting that firstly, the complex terrains indicated 
cannot be mapped objectively into prescriptive rules, and secondly, organisational 
discourses do not produce subjects who, In 'doing strategy', are unitary and visionary. 
56 
The intriguing point is that under both the rational and processual versions of strategic 
discourse, there can be found a certain 'proper' use of accounting knowledge. 
Processualists consistently fail to consider explicitly the embeddedness of conventional 
accounting in their research, and hence overlook its active constructive role in their 
discourses on the strategy process. 
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Note on Guru texts 
Summary review 
Works by leading business book authors are usually referred to in the literature as 
those produced by gurus. Recent strategy 'guru texts' include Hamel and Prahalad 
(1994), Peters (1989), Brown and Eisenhardt (1998). The interesting point, in relation to 
the argument here, is that they seem to have no time for accounting at all, since they 
are about getting beyond all manifestations of rationalist control, as found within 
conventional management and strategy texts. Guru writers instead celebrate the 
limitations of rationalist strategy and the inability of managers to manage In this 
idealised way. They attempt to capture a more fluid notion of management, one which 
accepts discontinuity and chaos. 
Hence, Hamel and Prahalad articulate concepts such as 'strategy as stretch', which 
attempts to overcome the differences between strategy as grand plan and strategy as 
incremental. They recognise the limitations of top management's ability to predict the 
future and therefore attempt to build into their framework the ingenuity of lower level 
employees. Strategy is described through apparently paradoxical maxims such as 
-strategy as forgetting' (as well as learning), 'strategy as foresight' (as well as 
positioning), 'strategy as architecture' (as well as plans) (1994: 26). Within this, the 
creation of meaning for employees is underscored, and they warri that 'tilt is impossible 
to create a financial reward system so finely tuned that the single-minded pursuit of 
personal gain will not, in the longer run, dilutefuTn success' (1994: 148). They constitute 
their term strategic intent as being required to oversee any accountability system., and 
thereby bring success. A successful firm is defined as follows: 
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'For a successful firm, the definition of served market, the value proposition put forward to 
customers, the margin and value-added structure, the particular configuration of assets and 
skills that yields those margins. and supporting administrative systems together constitute an 
integral and well-tuned profit "engine". ' 
(1994: 67) 
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Yet even this anti-rationalist celebration therefore proves to have practices of 
accounting circulating at the heart of organisational action. The concept of strategy as 
rational may be subjected to considerable critical appraisal, but the text seems unable 
to escape from a concept of the firm as constituted through accounting. 
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The need to compete effectively is constituted as a necessity within this discourse, and 
a recent cover article in For-tune magazine (Hamel, 1997) entitled Killer Strategies That 
Make Shareholders Rich affirms the state of the game: 
'raking risks, breaking the rules. and being a maverick have always been important, but today 
they are more crucial than ever. We live in a discontinuous world - one where digitalization, 
deregulation, and globalization are profoundly reshaping the industrial landscape.. 
Inevitably, the economic sea change now under way will drive an extraordinary amount of 
wealth creation over the next few decades.. But just who will capture the new wealth? On 
the road to the future, who will be the windshield. and who will be the bug? ' 
(p24) 
-lbe goal is to-develop strategies that take us in the right direction.. Ahe best way to create 
wealth for employees and shareholders is to renew our commitment to developing and 
executing innovative strategies. '14 
(p34) 
Those 'innovative strategies' might be anything (part of their success is precisely that 
they are unexpected). But they are still to serve the managerial focus on value. whether 
it be denoted profit or wealth, and hence accounting practice remains within the loop of 
'being innovative'. even as it is yet again overlooked. 
14 Interestingly, a dual responsibility is specified, le to shareholders and employees. The reality Is. however, 
that shareholders often come first. 
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Critical Approaches 
The critical project now spans a number of new directions away from the discourse of 
the processualists. Jones (1998) builds on Whittington (1993) to produce a second 
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CRITICAL MAPPINGS OF THE STRATEGY SPECTRUM IN WHITTINGTON (1993) AND JONES (1998) 
There has been an increasing and unifying drive, however, to problematise the notion 
that is 'strategy'. Whipp traces the development of the strategy field, and notes that 
strategy experts and organisation writers have remained separate (1996: 268). He then 
analyses silences that have resounded throughout the strategy literature, focusing 
especially on the lack of reflexivity as 'perhaps the most serious and potentially 
debilitating for the strategy territory' (1996: 270). It is inspiring therefore that Calori 
(1998) pulls out three main biases that sit concealed within rationalist models of 
strategic management, namely a bias towards thinking, a bias towards binary logic, and 
the marginalisation of feeling as a basis for reason. His epistemological analysis 
questions the presumptions within managerialist approaches to cognition, thereby 
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exposing both their weaknesses and their subservience to 'performativity', the need to 
demonstrate that a desired outcome can be performed. In an earlier paper, but in a 
similar vein, Tsoukas reveals the different epistemological world views that underpin 
Ansoff and Mintzberg, concluding that this 'epistenwlogical inconuriensurability... need 
not be translated into sociological inconunensurability' (1994: 777). He argues that there 
are rules which arbitrate between different types of knowledge constructions, rules that 
can only be understood within the study of practice. 
It is, however, the discursive approach of Knights and Morgan (e. g. 1991) that will be 
analysed here in depth, as they have perhaps achieved the greatest recognition for a 
refle)dve and philosophical approach to strategy (c. f. Calort, 1998; Whipp, 1996: 270; 
Jones, 1998: 417-419). 
'While both the rational and processual approaches tend to take for granted the historical self- 
formation of strategic discourses and practices, we treat it as problematic. ' (196) 
(Knights and Morgan 1995) 
Knights and Morgan (1991,1995) provided the first concerted effort to critique 
processual discourses on strategy. Their Foucauldian inspired analysis of practices and 
discourses was argued to change radically the concepts of subjectivity and power so 
managerially propounded within processualists. Most apparent in their approach was 
the introduction of refleidvity into the study of strategy. 
* ... we believe that 
discourse analysis (266) effects a more radical break [than processual 
studies] with the orthodox rationalist view of strategy. ... they do not seem to question the 
rationalist view that [strategy] exists to resolve problems vis-A-vis the organization and its 
environment... By contrast, we conceptualise strategy as a discourse that also constitutes the 
problems which it then claims to have an exclusive expertise in solving. ' 
(1991: 266-267) 
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Hence a shift is marked out. While processualists effect a change by critiquing the way 
strategy is practised, Knights and Morgan point out that the problem of strategy has 
remained unchallenged as a managerial project. Perceiving strategy as a discourse is a 
first step to undermining the taken-for-grantedness of strategy. 
'[critical study] may redirect attention away from the preoccupations of the rationalists who 
prescribe strategies or their improvement and the processual theorists who, in reporting the 
political machinations surrounding strategy, may merely encourage a more reflective and 
efficient approach to its implementation. ' 
(1991: 271) 
The approach of Knights and Morgan provides a new entry point for re-examining the 
context of managing, constituting an external environment that is less econornistically 
disciplined than, say, that of Pettigrew. Strategy emerges as a discourse which 
constitutes its problems and solutions, both within and outside of the organisation. The 
mobilisation of strategy and its practices is crucial to the study of subjectivity, and 
there lies the differentiating thrust of the critical discourse. 
Watson (1994) also takes up the notion of discourse, and his empirical study identifies 
two main discourses. There Is an empowerment. growth and skills discourse, which 
attempts to capture the desire to grow the business through service to customers, and 
within which, people apply competencies and skills for further growth. Acting generally 
against this is a control, jobs and costs discourse, whereby employees see themselves 
as primarily there to do the job for which they are recruited and trained and senior 
management's role is control using costs. It is not at all surprising that accounting 
practices form a dominant discourse within Watson's ethnography. 
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'A discourse, in this sense, is a connected set of statements. concepts, terms and expressions 
which constitutes a way of talking or writing about a particular issue, thus framing the way 
people understand and act with respect to that issue. ' 
(Watson, 1994: 113) 
Discourses convey power and knowledge, and control as well as being controlled by 
individuals. The play of the intersection of different discourses begins to demonstrate 
just how the managerialist programming of processual theories is only one potential 
approach that can be taken in the study of strategy. Metaphors such as Mintzberg's 
(1987) strategy-as-craft and strategist-as-potter emphasise manageable aspects of 
strategy, pushing aside the cultural, social and historical contexts (Barry and Elmes 
1997: 430). Barry and Elmes propose a narrative turn. which emphasises the 
multiplicities of strategy practice, acting to destablise the current 'stylistic signatures' 
(1997: 439) present in strategy theory. While Watson tends to stray into a use of 
discourse similar to that of rhetoric, both these papers contribute to the critical 
breaking down of the presumption that the language of strategy derives from an 
essence (thus privileging what has been described above a 'strategy as presence'). 
This new kind of approach therefore maintains that the discourse of strategy has 
defined its own reality: in terms of the 'strategic' environment and the 'strategic' 
decisions to be taken. This occurs through the truth effects of discourse. effects which 
resound with knowledge and power (Knights and Morgan 1995). Subjects draw upon 
such discourse, defining the success or failure of operations in these terms (Knights 
and Morgan 1991). 'Ibis pervades throughout the organisation, cascading down the 
levels of responsibility. Instead of taking the mainstream as today's 'nonn', and 
passively accepting its dominance, it is highly instructive to examine just how it asserts 
its truth effects. Knights (1992) characterises its course to power as akin to that of the 
positive sciences. Human behaviour is objectified through representation, dividing 
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practices and subjectification. The use of the value chain constructs, classifies and 
orders Its representation of business activity; organisations which successfully follow 
the deflned strategies ie cost leadership or differentiation are promoted as successful, 
with others relegated as failures; finally and most importantly, the exercise of strategic 
discourse subjectiftes its usersI5. 
Understanding subjectivity 
'This leads us to what we consider to be the most important difference between our approach 
and processual theorists. it concerns the way in which we see power to be productive of 
subjectivity. ' (269) 
(Knights and Morgan, 1991: 269) 
Knights and Morgan argue that the subject is constituted through discourse, drawing 
on previous Foucault-inspired work in organisation studies . The development of the 
concept of the subject has been one which explicitly or implicitly stems from the notion 
of an essentialist concept of the self (Knights and Wilmott 1989). The effect of this 
being16 has been to suppress the complex construction of individual subjeCtiVityU. TIIJS 
Ignores the inherent conflicts and ambiguities which characterise organisational 
15 Human behaviour is 'objectified' through 'subjectification'. See further on this relation. the 'Accountability' 
section of this chapter and the discussion of 'the subject: and the 'care of the self in the Methodology chapter. 
Is As opposed to becoming. 
17 Marx (in his later work) swamps any consideration of the subject with his pre-occupation with class 
relations and related interests. Braverman (1974) seems happy to persist with this labelling, attaching the 
desire for control to management, at the same time displaying a (Knights and Wilmott 1989) '.. romantic 
attachment to the essential creativity of the ux)rker'. 
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subjectivity. In an attempt to move away from this normative moralising of the 
Enlightenment, management theorists have turned to discourse - as Foucault (1984, 
p43) reminds us: 
'We must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event, or a set of events and complex 
historical processes, that is located at a certain point In the development of European 
societies. As such, it includes elements of social transformation, types of political institution, 
forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological 
mutations... ' 
The proper consideration of subjectivity must therefore recognise the precarious nature 
of Enlightenment discourse, never forgetting that discourse is produced by power and 
knowledge. The assertion of an autonomous self is both misguided and misleading 
(Knights 1997a), resulting from a disciplinary split between self and society'8. 
With respect to strategy, subjectification refers to the identity producing effects of 
strategic discourse (Knights 1992). The conditions required for success are internalised 
and reproduced, defining organisational roles and activities. The discourse is drawn 
upon in organisations within power relations, as subjects constitute themselves as 
knowledgeable experts (Knights and Morgan 1991). The strength of such discourse lies 
in its self-fulfilling effects - 'strategic' problems are defined within the same field as the 
related 'strategic' solutions (Knights and Morgan 1991). Externalities are swept aside 
as their existence only reveals the 'underdeveloped' nature of the discourse. This has 
positive effects for organisational participants. It gives activities a sense of purpose, 
clarifying the'how' and 'why'. 
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As Knights and Morgan (1990, p482) argue: 
'.. strategy operates as a power that normalises and individualises those who are subjected to 
It: not only does it force them to act strategically and take responsibility for their own 
strategies, it actually transforms individuals into subjects who secure their sense of meaning 
and reality through the discourse and practice of strategy. 
The imperative in the study of subjectivity is thus, in fact, power relations. This power 
is exercised through discursive practices, such as strategy, which constitute the 
subject. The pervasiveness of the strategy discourse can enable it to define what is 
regarded as rational within the organisation, although no single discourse can capture 
all meaning (Holmer-Nadesan 1996). 'Ibis lack of closure opens the opportunity for a 
range of competing or conflicting discourses, complicating organisational identities 
(Wilmott 1994, Kondo 1990). Power is conceptualised as residing 'everywhere', but it is 
not a monolithic entity, owing to its lack of uniformity or unity (Knights and Vurdubakis 
1994). Ibis opens up a space for action. and avenues for resistance19. It is tempting 
for organisational researchers to stress or reify one dominant discursive practice such 
as accounting or strategy. While this eases the complexity of the analysis, an 
undesirable effect will be to marginalise more 'informal knowledges, which will impact 
considerably on individual subjectivity (Knights and Morgan 1994). Practically 
speaking, however, no analysis will be able to cover adequately all discursive 
formations. 
It is salient to conceptuallse strategy as a disciplinary power (Alvesson 1996). one which 
pervades organisations, deflning the normal and the abnormal. The invisibility and 
18 Dualisms are covered in 'rhe Action-Structure Debate' within this chapter. and also in the methodology 
chapter. 
19 See section onAgency and organisational identity' later. 
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stealth of such powers within the organisation has led Deetz (1992) to argue that they 
are, in fact, a more potent and revealing example than that which was manifested 
within Foucault: s study of penal systems (Deetz 1992). While Discipline and Punish 
(1977) represents a vivid example of formalised control over the human body, modern 
organisational practices extend throughout contemporary life, producing and 
reproducing the normalisation of the work experience. In contrast to the visible (and 
objectionable) effects of penal regimes, modern practices constitute the individual as 
autonomous and free (Habermas 1972). arousing the incessant search for these very 
same senses (Wilmott 1994) within the invisible regimes of discursive practices. This 
allows identity to be derived from these internallsed and subliminal self-disciplinary and 
self-examining forces. 
It is important to note that the construction of subjectivity is not a purely organisational 
phenomenon. Identity is constituted through discourse for men and women. professors 
and students, doctors and patients etc; of (more) direct consequence to this thesis is the 
consideration of the subjectivities of consumers as well as producers (Knights and 
Morgan 1994). Commodification, or the standardisation of consumption patterns, is a 
prevalent feature of late-modernity (Giddens 1991). Selling techniques may be direct, 
face-to-face with the customer, or more subtle, through advertising methods. All base 
their acceptance on discourses of need, whether local or society wide, and on the way 
these discourses constitute the subjectivity of the consumer. This process is not 
separate to the forces at work within the organisation; both are inextricably linked, and 
should be interpreted as such. In the context of service industries, (Knights and 
Morgan 1994, p 138) '(t)he employees uurk directly under the gaze and inspection of their 
customers, whilst the experience of the customers is directly dependent on the activity of 
those serving them. ' 
68 
While this theorising of subjectivity has enriched critical strategy discourse, however, 
this has not been transplanted unproblematically to the empirical context. Newton 
(1998) provides an astute critique of the theory-practice divide which appears to 
characterise these particular Foucauldian studies. Indeed, he likens the way Knights 
and Murray (1994) present data from Pensco to writings by processualists such as 
Pettigrew. 
'... Knights and Murray exhibit what might be called a 'de-functionalized processualisrn' 
attentive to the way in which 'micro-organizational power relations are constituted and 
sustained within both specific identities/subjectivittes and broader [socially constructed] 
politico-economic markets and inequalities' (1994: 199). 
However, their analytical language remains strikingly processual in character, and they 
conclude by arguing that 'political process lies at the heart of organisations' (1994: 245), 
(1998: 430) 
Newton claims that there are striking differences between Foucauldian analysis and the 
'processual' approach that Knights and Murray employ. These differences manifest 
themselves most markedly in the way agency is treated. Newton pulls out an example 
from Pensco where 'senior management was able to mobilise its superior forces to 
encourage closure around a "successful" construction of the project' (1998: 430, quoted 
from Knights and Murray: 1994: 177). There is a sense of agents manoeuvring, 
mobilising, challenging, taking responsibility, in a way which appears to confer a non- 
Foucauldian emphasis on agency to their accounts of organisational life. 
Turning to Knights and Morgan's work, a similar characteristic is arguably also present 
in the discussion of a 'new regime of contror (1995: 209), as they underscore the 
personal contributions of both the Chief Executive and his newly recruited Information 
Systems chief. 
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'At Pensco strategic discourse enters the company and ruptures the existing paternalistic 
mode of management via the agency of one actor - the CE. ( ... ) 
Without question, the power effects of this new regime were felt particularly by middle and 
junior managers subject to the disciplining and punitive gaze of the IS chief. ' 
(Knights and Morgan, 1995: 208-209) 
As Newton (1998: 4390) points out, the question of why this occurs is Ignored by 
Knights and Murray. There is also no mention in Knights and Morgan (1995). However, 
a potential reason becomes apparent once the treatment of accounting within these 
critical discourses is unveiled. 
Unveiling the hierarchy of strategy over 
accounting 
In spite of the promising advances revealed Above, the role of accounting has typically 
been overlooked or underplayed, both as a technique which is embedded within the 
'doing of strategy'. and as a knowledge which has accrued considerable institutional 
power within modern businesses. For what remains silent is how far these supposedly 
different discourses of strategy share a similar blind spot, and so may be versions of the 
same. Arguably, what we have here is an intensified version of the quandary found 
within strategy research prior to e. g. Knights and Morgan's (199 1) piece. Then there 
was a supposedly fundamental theoretical difference between two schools, e. g. between 
those focused on content and those recognising the correlative signifIcance of context, 
plus a vigorous debate over which was the more relevant for the practice of strategy. 
But that supposed difference has now come under threat, by showing a number of ways 
how 'strategy' as a term remained unexamined so that the the schools end up being 
versions of the same (see discussion above). Knights and Morgan further contribute to 
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this critique, by showing how neither school has successfully engaged with the 
possibility that strategy as practice was open to a more fundamental question, as 
constructor as well as answer to the problems of modern business enterprise. 
To conclude this re-reading of strategy, I now propose to analyse the silences 
concerning accounting within the critical school, as exemplified by the ground-breaking 
work of Knights and Morgan (1991,1995). As just demonstrated, this work clearly does 
shift the ground of understanding away from that shared by the rationalist/ processual 
discourses, moving to a 'central concern [on] the emergence, development and 
reproduction of the discourse of strategy per se' (Knights and Morgan 1995: 196). Their 
U. S. A. -based genealogical analysis problematises the formation and proliferation of 
strategic discourses and practices, seeing this as a condition and consequence of the 
effects on subjectivity. An attempt is therefore made to 'understand how the discourse 
of strategy becomes part of the identity of managers and workers' (Knights and Morgan 
1995: 196). 
For work like that attempted here, their work is particularly helpful, in the way that it 
shows a way to deal systematically with the problem of 'the subject', getting beyond the 
idealised treatment that rationalist/processualist research has too often promoted. If, 
however, we are now to construct a new sustainable 'study of strategy. as per Knights 
and Morgan's (1995) case study in Pensco, I propose that we need to move beyond the 
primary focus noticeable in the passages just cited, on strategy as discourse (or 
'discursive practice'). Not only may this have the unintended effect of still privileging 
strategy, now as the dominant discursive formation within organisations, it also leaves 
unthought the relation of discourse to practices. Or alternatively, it sees discourse as 
the centre, and practices as secondary. That will be argued in the Methodology chapter 
as a necessary theoretical step, but only once it is undertaken in a 'knowing way, i. e. 
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seeing secondary practices as the primary focus, while recognising all the time that they 
therefore remain secondary. 
It is, I argue here, only through taking this further theoretical step that a critical 
approach can finally overcome its lack of reflection to date with regard to the active role 
of accounting. This I see as the step now necessary in order to further the thrust of 
Knights and Morgan's critical project, In the light of advances in critical accounting, I 
feel that a continuing concentration on strategy, per se, threatens to obsfucate the 
power-knowledge effects of alternative practices. This in effect reduces managing to 
strategising, potentially reproducing. albeit in a more diluted form, the colonising effect 
of strategic discourse. A first step can perhaps be made by Integrating genealogies of 
strategy with genealogies of accounting. The recent research of Hoskin et al (1997) can 
help in this process and reverse any residual hierarchising in the work of Knights and 
Morgan of strategy over accounting. 
The issue of the relation to this work is clearly one that Knights and Morgan have 
already considered. Their resolution has been to argue the antithetical case to that 
proposed here. From their standpoint, Hoskin's (1990)2() argument that the genesis of 
modem strategy can be understood as a product of the new modem configuration of 
disciplinary practices, with accounting having a major (i. e. secondary) role, is directly 
challenged as 'a partial and reductionist analysis that subsumes strategy beneath, and 
conflates it with, the discourse and practice of accounting contror (Knights and Morgan 
1995: 193). Such criticism serves as a valuable caveat to Hoskin et al's (1997) 
implication of accounting in the practice of modem strategy. For it reminds us that any 
simple reversal putting accounting over strategy as its cause. will just perpetuate a 
'chicken and egg quagmire. while relapsing Into a positivistic account which will indeed 
20 Hoskin (1990) Is the predecessor to Hoskin et al (1997). 
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be partial and reductionist. At the same time, what can perhaps be read off from their 
work is a challenge to the equally reductionist alternative. that strategy simply came 
before accounting, an alternative (or so I have just argued) which still seems implicitly 
embedded in the Knights and Morgan analysis. The issue is whether this kind of 
reductionism can be avoided in general. This, I suggest, requires a rather different 
genealogy of strategy than the one that Knights and Morgan currently espouse. 
In their approach, two chronological stages can be distinguished, 'the emergence of 
managerial discourse in general... and the changing nature of corporations ... in the post- 
1945 period' (1991: 256). Managerial discourse, which is identified as being primarily 
intra-organisational with its 'notions of internal control and monitoring' (1991: 257), is 
argued to have not engaged sufficiently with the external environment to open up a 
space for the discourse of strategy. Post-1945, changes in market and institutional 
conditions led to the emergence of a new regime of truth. a new way of seeing 
constituted by the power-knowledge discourse of strategy (1991: 258). Such an 
analysis ostensibly separates the 'internar focus of managerialism from the 'externar 
focus of strategy, a separation which subordinates accounting discourse to that of its 
more pervasive successor, strategy. However, in their eagerness to denaturalise the 
discourse of strategy, accounting practice yet again slips from view as strategy still 
remains the primary focus: '(c)an there be any other way of looking at organizations than 
one which derives from the discourse of corporate strategy? (Knights and Morgan 199 1: 
260). 7he emergence of the new kind of management rationality which purports to 
evaluate and forecast the future is located within the post-1945 period, when a 
discursive concern with rendering the external environment controllable takes shape. 
However. the argument I would now advance is that this genealogy, as a genealogy of 
discourse, places too much emphasis on the discursive distinction between the internal 
and external environment, and so never engages with how this discourse and earlier 
forms of strategic discourse may be produced out of such secondary practices as 'the 
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invisible technologies (of) writing, examination and grading' (Hoskin et al 1997: 6). The 
counter-argument is that subjects engaging with (and being subject to and objects oo 
these practices initially propagated the twin possibilities of gaining (internal) control 
and doing (external) strategy, since these are the practices always involved in both. 
Now arguing that Knights and Morgan focus on discourse may admittedly be a criticism 
which they would acknowledge wholeheartedly, as no indication is given within their 
work (on strategy) that this is not desirable or appropriate as a Foucault-derived 
analysis. However. in the light of bringing a critical accounting approach to bear, we 
may suggest that this is a systemic (strategic? ) error, insofar as it sees how far 
accounting is at work as secondary practice, forming strategy's discursive claims as 
much as it articulates modes of Internal control and accountability. So, perhaps 
Knights and Morgan 's (1995: 193) critique of Hoskin (1990) (see above) can be turned 
back to illustrate a silence in their own research which can now be transcended without 
relapsing into a sterile opposition. While I agree that strategy has effects as 'a 
technology of power in transforming managers and employees alike into subjects who 
secure their sense of purpose and reality by formulating, evaluating and conducting 
strategy' (1995: 196), 1 would now want to argue that one of the ways this is achieved is 
through the internalisation and reproduction of practices of accounting. The 
imperatives of managerialism, as 'action at a distance' (Hoskin et al 1997: 7), manifest 
themselves throughout the discourse of strategy, fed by our desire for, and dependence 
upon, practices of grammatocentrism and calculability. 
As such, the focus on discourse as opposed to practice is a potentially serious limitation 
within Knights and Morgan's analysis of strategy. The section on subjectivity above has 
indicated one way in which they move away from their Foucauldlan agenda at one 
critical moment in their empirical analysis (cf. Newton 1998). Here, I wish to suggest 
that another such departure takes place in their treatment (or non-treatment) of the 
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constitutive role of accounting practices. For their own empirical work again reveals a 
systematic dependence on such practices in the shaping, enabling and limiting of Vhat 
gets done as strategy' and of how subjects (both the more and less 'powerful') interrelate 
in the space and time of strategising. Consider the following description of how the new 
discourse of strategic management irrupted into Pensco. 
'... In the space of a few years the CE introduced budgeting ... and planning procedures into 
Pensco. Planning was based on a tight top-down approach and 'key corporate tasks' were 
derived from a six-monthly business plan based on a strategy document which set out the 
company's broad aims. This ... linked the allocation of key tasks to individual senior managers 
and these as well as broader divisional targets were closely monitored by the CE at monthly 
executive meetings... This ... create[di a 'league table' of senior managers 
based on their 
achievements of key corporate objectives. ' (Knights and Morgan, 1995: 208) 
In a way reminiscent of the work of Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), the discussion of the 
'doing of strategy' reveals (at this most 'strategic' of moments) the total supplanting of 
strategy by the accounting supplement. There is the drawing up of the 'strategy 
document' (for whence are the aims formulated? ), the linking of strategic to operational 
objectives via the 'business plan', the calculation of targets to set responsible activity in 
motion and to evaluate performance comparatively via a 'league table'. From planning to 
implementation to the minute calculation of success/failure and reward /punishment, 
this is a strategic practice saturated by forms of accounting practice. 
Now Knights and Morgan attribute the spread of this discourse to the wider competitive 
environment within the life insurance industry. This backs their 1991 thesis of 
subordinating the internal focus of accounting (managerialism) to the external focus of 
strategy. They critique pre-1945 managerial discourse, Le. that in their terms concerned 
with practices of internal control and monitoring, as being 'only tangentially related to 
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the analysis of the external environment (1991: 257). And yet within their 1995 paper, 
the external environment is almost analysed separately from the internal organisational 
context. 'Ibus while one section deals with the competitive conditions which stimulated 
strategy discourse, the next section deals solely with the managerial practices of 
internal control and monitoring. 
Within the IS division, however, the new manager aggressively introduced 'new planning 
and monitoring mechanisms'(1995: 209) which were ultimately thwarted by burgeoning 
user demands. Thus 'short-term reactive demands took precedence over longer-term 
systems conversion and renewal goals' (1995: 2 10). 
,... we found that commitments to IT strategy were readily abandoned when market changes 
were interpreted largely through the corporate strategy as a whole as urgently demanding 
immediate and IT-intensive product developments. Regardless of the importance of the IT 
strategy to the corporation, it had to be abandoned in order to meet other strategic goals. ' 
(1995: 211) 
Indeed, 'a proliferation of competing demands on scarce resources in the face of major 
external changes led to the kind of reactive, 'short- termism' that the imposition of strategic 
management promised to eradicate' (Knights and Morgan, 1995: 2 10). 
The explicit focus that they put on accounting practices in their own narrative is 
therefore limited to the consideration of the internal environment. It Is therefore not 
possible to trace how such practices circulated in the wider contexts (though one may 
speculate that the meeting of the short-term demands was effected through accounting- 
style practices, thereby subverting the longer-term goals of the IT division). However, 
what we may take away from this analysis is the way in which accounting practice 
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proves to be already-there at the heart of the strategic moment, even as the Knights and 
Morgan narrative is apparently discussing the significance of strategic discourse. 
Summary 
The critical approach has enabled a better understanding of rationalist and processual 
discourses, as apparently intrinsic pressures towards managerialism can now be more 
thoughtfully explored and explained. Following the above re-reading, this can be 
furthered by awakening the roles of accounting in strategy from their prior (atheoretical) 
slumber, differentiating the power-knowledge effects of accounting from strategy, and 
recognising the traces of their respective, although inter-linked, influences in practice. 
Following Knights and Morgan. I argue against the idea of a rationalist/processualist 
divide, stating that the processual school ultimately reneges on premises given and 
promises made, in a fashion which echoes that of the rationalists. But I would argue 
that this collapse of difference occurs precisely where accounting steals into the 
different analyses of strategy, as both approaches treat it as purely secondary, thus 
failing to appreciate its structuring power. And this is, additionally, precisely the point 
at which the difference claimed on behalf of the critical analysis collapses as well. For, 
to date, it joins with the other schools in perceiving accounting as a mirror, reflecting 
rather than constructing organisational reality. 
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In Summary: disentangling discourses of 
strategy 
'... a kind of unity that that Is hard to disentangle. hard to analyze and, as must be 
emphasizcd cspecially, totally indefInable. ' 
(Nietzsche, 1967/1887: 80) 
A significant and sophisticated 'discursive' fleld has emerged in strategy research, 
encompassing rationalist, processual and critical elements. Yet, and heeding Calori's 
(1998: 301) call for epistemological scrutiny, from within all three schools can be 
disinterred an accounting that is perceived to be a passive, supplementary technology 
(Lim and Hoskin, 1998). Thus, strategy's image of accounting as mirror can be 
subverted, indeed, penetrated by discerning that the apparently innocent and 'objective 
spirif of reality Is Indeed a powerful construction, sustaining a knowledge only 
knowable through accounting.. 
Rationalist stipulations 
Rational discourse has been shown to be underpinned by a primary reliance on 
accounting practice. Such a reliance on the objectivity of accounting Is, however, badly 
misplaced, although acting as a reminder of the sturdiness and pervasiveness of its 
modem influence. 
It is fascinating to see how central thts accounting is to the rationalist school being 
wholly relied upon to feed in the life-bloods of visibility and prediction so essential to 
their analyses. Knowing the environment is perhaps the centre-piece of rationalist 
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strategy, but this environment is promoted as knowable through accounting. However, 
accounting itself developed as a way of knowing, a peculiarly managerialist affair 
identillable through its key tenets of prescription and control. An assumed 'proper' use 
of accounting within rationalist strategy can therefore be disernbedded and confronted. 
Processualist elisions 
The critique of processualist discourse continues the theme of identifying the continuing 
pre-eminence of managerialism, and of accounting as its instrumentally unproblematic 
handmaiden, within strategic discourse. The dissemination of this way of seeing things 
in processualist research is increasingly remarked upon (e. g. Lim and Hoskin, 1998; 
Knights and McCabe, 1998: Morgan and Sturdy, forthcoming) and in my view it 
decisively hinders the development of a more viable way of doing strategy from within 
the processualist perspective. What processualists fail to move away from is the 
bounded rationality which so characterised the work of March and Simon (1958) within 
decision-making. While Pettigrew (1985: 20), for example, promotes the 'clemonstrati[on 
ofl how the organisation structures the perspective and interests of the individuaL', his 
critique of the individual-centric focus of the decision-making literature clearly refrains 
from de-centring the individual, and thereby has the effect of reifying domains of 
knowledge within the organisation (cf. Lave and Wenger, 1991: 52). The limitations of 
such an approach is indeed recognised by March himself, as he found it impossible to 
continue to Ignore the experimental and ambiguous context of decision-making In 
organisations. Thus, 
'How do you construct an account when you do not know when that account is going to be 
used, or by whom, or for what purpose, or in what context? 
(March, 1988/1987: 400) 
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Instead of theorising the social and institutional conditions which have created this 
particular ideal of management, processualists prefer to centre their studies around a 
capitalistic monolith, acting to bolster the strength of their rhetoric. Consequently, 
strategy within processualist research is a top management discourse which presumes 
the existence of a hierarchical structure of power and knowledge. Accounting practices 
are naturalised as (opaque) reflectors of this strategy (Lim and Hoskin, 1998). ignoring 
therefore both their constructive power within what can be seen as 'strategic' as well as 
their sustenance of hierarchical knowledge within capitalist societies. 7be Interesting 
point here is that while the processualists, by their very name. can be presumed to 
agree fundamentally with this contextual questioning, their discourse in fact forestalls 
the formulation and investigation of these questions, distracting attention away from 
the very practices which assemble or disassemble notions of hierarchy or structure. 
'Perhaps the Idea of the founding subject is a way of eliding the reality of discourse. ' 
(Foucault, 1981/1970: 65) 
It is my suggestion that this has led to a stagnation of the discourse as re-affirmation of 
the truth of accounting representations is again effected. 
Critical silences 
Within the critical school, forcefully proposed by Knights and Morgan (1991,1995). a 
vital switch is undertaken away from the rationalist/processual discourses, moving to a 
'central concern [on] the emergence, developrnent and reproduction of the discourse of 
strategy per se' (Knights and Morgan 1995: 196). While the literature review consents 
with and indeed wishes to further the thrust of Knights and Morgan's critical project 
(also see Morgan and Sturdy, forthcoming), silences on the role of accounting cannot be 
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left unchallenged (Lim and Hoskin, 1998)". As Clegg (1998: 39) asserts 'felach 
disciplinary practice ... will calculate organizational rationalibj from distinct auspices of 
pou-vr and knowledge. ' 
What this critical re-reading can now add to this discursive analysis is that the link to 
accounting is increasingly inseparable from the study of strategy. As such, this adds 
weight to the thesis pursued here, that accounting practices can be found at the very 
nucleus of strategic practice. 
Summary 
There is now the need for a renewed questioning, but one which also subsumes the 
critical approach developed so far. For the failure to engage with accountingýs role In 
strategy has meant, we fear, that all three schools reduce, in a crucial respect, to 
versions of the same, even as the possibility of critical difference is articulated. 
21 In the light of advances in critical accounting, I feel that a continuing concentration on strategy, per se, 
threatens to obsfucate the power-knowledge effects of alternative practices. 
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Part 2: Positioning the accounting 
literature 
Rationalist Accounting 
Examining the breadth of discourses of strategy has not as yet covered the 
consideration of management control systems. It is here that the accounting literature 
has asserted its power, constituting a calculative knowledge of control within discourses 
of strategy. There Is a certain deferment to strategy as pre-existing. one which 
propagates a secondary support role for accounting practices. Roslender's review paper 
(1996) describes the emergence of accounting for strategic positioning. Activity Based 
Costing is perhaps the most well known of these, building on Porter's focus on activities 
(see above). Shank and Govindarajan contributed further developments with their 
strategic cost analysis technique (1989), focusing on value chains and their most recent 
Strategic Cost Management (1993). These rational accounting works attempt to place 
accounting at the heart of strategy, being the instrument through which rational 
strategising can be effectively measured, monitored and implemented. As such, they 
support a top-down and prescriptive notion of strategy, one which carefully avoids more 
processual as well as critical issues. 
Control practices of accounting 
Early work on strategy and control was pioneered by Chandler (1962) with his in-depth 
study of major US enterprises (such as du Pont) at the turn of the century. His 
overriding hypothesis was that there is an interaction and inter-reliance between the 
control system and strategy. Following the epistemological trend in the accounting 
literature, this hypothesis has been tested using the rules and methods of the natural 
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sciences, through contingency studies. Researchers attempt to fit companies into 
typologies according to their strategy, which can then be used to prescribe the 
associated best control systern. 
Organisations which are careful in their operations, preferring to improve current 
activities than to search for new opportunities, are labelled 'defenders' (Miles and Snow 
1978); to support this, a tight and centralised set of controls is needed. Similarly, 
Porter (1980) argues that organisations which follow a cost leadership policy, selling 
standardised products, need controls which emphasise calculation rather than co- 
operation, with 'tight cost control; frequent detailed control reports; structured 
organization and responsibilities; incentives based on meeting strict quantitative targets' 
(1998/1980: 40). There are some apparent correlations between different empirical 
studies, lending a degree of credibility to contingency approaches. However, the 
managerial focus produces a reductionist and therefore simplistic account of 
accounting practices, as the need to link dependent and independent variables is 
prominent. 7bis cause and effect presumption does not produce a deep examination of 
the processes involved (Langfield -Smith, 1997: 221). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
studies of this orientation are contradictory22. Simons (1987) finds that successful 
prospectors use tight planning and budgetary procedures, yet de-emphasise cost 
control, while defenders generally benefit from a looser control system. This directly 
conflicts with the suppositions of Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter (1980). Plausible 
reasons for Simons' findings could be the way control systems in prospectors can set a 
limit to risk-taking, as well as contributing to learning processes (Dent, 1990). In 
addition. the focus on financial targets in prospectors may be the more effective way to 
capture performance in situations of high uncertainty. 
22 While this thesis does not. in any way, purport to rernove contradictions, the approach aspired to can at 
least highlight some reasons for these problems. 
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Moving onto Simons (1990), he critiques contingency based, large sample studies for 
their inability to comment on why management control systems differ between contexts. 
The separation of strategy implementation from formation is an 'artificial dichotomy that 
equates strategic planning with formulation and management control with 
implementation' (1990: 128). As such, he promotes the concept that accounting 








Choice of Interactive 
Management Control Systems 
by top management 
PROCESS MODEL OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTROL SYSTEMS AND SRTATEGY IN SIMONS 
(1990) 
'Ibis model illustrates ... that emergent strategies can be influenced and managed - serendipity 
can be guided by top management who use formal process to focus organizational attention 
and thereby generate new ideas, tactics and strategies. Management control processes, which 
have been characterised solely as tools for implementing goals, can be instrumental in 
allowing the organization to learn and adapt over time. ' 
(Simons, 1990: 137-138) 
He therefore aligns himself with processual discourse, and examining his six-part 
breakdown of management control systems finds the central role of accounting 
practices within that. 
Strategic Financial Budget prep. Budget revis. Program Eval'n 
Planning --lo- Goals -10- & review -Oo- & updates -* Reviews -00- & 
Review reward 
BREAKDOWN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW IN SIMONS (1990) 
The issue for Simons is not simply whether control practices exist; it is how they are 
used in the context of strategy, and managers should decide to monitor only those 
control systems which relate to the organisation's strategic uncertainties. These should 
be operated interactively (Simons 1991). The imperative is that strategy is a process. 
and it is taken for granted that managers need to manage this process in the most 
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effective way. Simons (1994) further develops this to investigate usage patterns of 
formal control systems by newly-appointed top managers, in strategic turnaround and 
strategic evolution situations. He pinpoints a skilful manipulation of formal control 
systems, ranging from the intangibility of belief systems, centering around the 
establishment of core values, to the full-blown Interactive system, arguing that this 
allows the desired strategy to be effectively implemented, as well as achieving strategic 
change. Again, accounting practices play a central role. Looking, for example, at the 
strategic turnaround situation, accounting targets were seen as critical for both 
mapping out and justifying strategy: 
*All four managers attempting strategic turnaround used diagnostic control systems (i. e., 
formal measurement and feedback systems) to structure and communicate their agenda to 
superiors. Diagnostic control system goals (e. g., financial targets. market share targets, new 
business targets) were used to communicate the details of the proposed new strategic 
direction to the governance structure. One manager, for example, presented goals that would, 
over a 4-year period, take the business Into new geographical markets, increase sales from 
$375 million to over $1 billion, and increase net profit percentages from 12 percent to a range 
of 15 percent to 16 percent. These goals served as an explicit road map and justification for 
the new strategy. ' 
(1994: 178) 
Simons, through his extensive studies, has been able to resolve some of the difficulties 
which impair contingency approaches. He underscores the multiplicity of uses that 
control systems are put to, such as 'nwnitoring, learning, signalling, constraint, 
surveillance, nwtivatton and others' (1990: 142). attacking the conflation of these 
practices into 'the management control system'. Different companies will be at different 
stages in their strategy, and will therefore be operating their control systems in different 
ways. In addition to this, the existence of a control system does not imply it Is being 
fully operated. Simons makes important progress in highlighting the importance of in- 
86 
depth work within organisations (as opposed to survey work) as well as showing how 
control practices can constitute strategy. He remains tied, however, to a very 
prescriptive and managerial notion of control. 
The special issue of Management Accounting Research, entitled Strategic Management 
Accounting' contains several papers which illustrate just how widespread Simons' 
perspective is within this Rationalist Accounting work. Within the concluding paper, by 
the editors Tomkins and Carr (1996), they describe a model they have produced out of 
the papers. 
'Figure 1 addresses the question of how to design a formal strategic analysis of individual 
investments aimed at delivering new products and services. It can also be used to appraise 
investments in new processes in so far as they aim to improve attribute delivery. Figure 1 is 
not, however, a dynamic model for strategic management. It has elements required for such a 
model in terrns of indicating a firm's ability to stay in a market, but it does not offer an on- 
going system of strategic control because the notion of continuing control beyond the 
investment and product/service launch was not explicitly considered. ' 
(Tomkins and Carr, 1996: 277) 
This quote neatly demonstrates the view of accountings contribution to strategy as one 
of control. They introduce only the first stage in this, one of analysing individual 
investments. Their intention, however, is clear. Strategic Management Accounting can 
constitute an on-going system of strategic control, thus providing the Implementation 
system to complement the rational strategist. It is the continual design and 
improvement of these practices that Rational Accounting propagates. 
Research in this area is persuaded of several 'truths'. Companies need an effective 
business strategy. Such a strategy needs to be implemented. 7bus the research 
question Is how to implement this strategy, while accounting for processual changes, in 
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the way which mwdmises performance. It is precisely the 'truth' of these statements 
which this thesis has sought to question and possibly, undermine. Beginning from 
these needs leaves them unsatisfactorily theorised, confining research to its present 
unreflective state. The question of implementation leads unavoidably to the control 
system - whether it be formal or informal. This makes the presumption that the 
problem and thus the solution lies within the grasp of management control. Mintzberg 
(1994, p210) captures well the questioning spirit of this section, devilishly comparing 
modemity's obsession with control with Saint-Exupdry's The Little Prince (1943), where 
'the King claims he has the power to order the sun to rise and set But only at a certain 
time of the day. ' Is strategic control just an illusion? 
Goold and Quinn (1990) tackle this very issue in their paper 'The Paradox of Strategic 
Controls'. Promisingly, a divergence between theory and practice is identified, with the 
literature prescribing formal strategic control systems in direct contrast to the 
reluctance of practitioners to incorporate such extensive measures. This is 
acknowledged to stem from the complexity of strategic control, as '[sltrategic objectives 
(competitively set milestones for non: fuiancial targets) are often hard to define with 
specificity, clarity and precision' (1990: 50). In addition, budgets, which are 'short-term 
and narrowly financiar will be necessarily partial (1990: 53). Goold and Campbell 
therefore recommend caution In the implementation of strategic control systems. In 
conclusion four problems to be addressed are delineated - (p 54): 
1. devising strategic controls that can ... 
2. defining strategic controls that are ... 
3. ensuring that strategic control systems assist 
4. building a strategic control system that... ' 
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The reasoning is self-referential; strategic control systems are not being introduced; so 
Improve the system; why aren't they being introduced? Because they haverft been 
improved enough. Goold and Quinn say that these problems can be combined 
tentatively into a framework, where 'environmental turbulence and the 'ability to specify 
and measure precise strategic objectives' will drive the value of strategic control systems 
in measuring performance. 
Deferring to strategy 
Despite the development in the management control literature, most notably in the 
move to strategic control, there remains a black box effect with respect to what 'strategy' 
is. The stance taken by many researchers to strategic control is to take strategy as a 
'given' (see Simons 1987,1990,1991,1994). 'Ibis restricts the analysis to that of 
accounting within the context of 'strategy, without recognising the broader picture. 
Such an approach avoids questions of how such a context is produced and reproduced. 
Ignoring context brings into play an implicit assumption that the context of strategic or 
management control is a stable entity, impervious to outside influences. 7be 'space' of 
strategy is not however predefined, and boundaries are not rigid. One manifestation of 
this delimitation is within the prejudice towards the potential supremacy of 
management or hierarchical control. As Gray (1990: 146) points out, the implication in 
Simons (1990) is that the company can be controlled from the top-down, without 
querying what practices influence those that control. Practically speaking, although 
managers can instigate strategic learning, the questions of what managers will actually 
choose to do as well as how and why are left unanswered. Referring back to Simons 
(1994). (1990) for example, It is not clear how management learns to deal with strategic 
uncertainties or renewal. (cf. Simons 1994,1990). A further limitation, admitted in 
Simons (1994: 170). is that he deals only with formal controls. His research does not, 
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however, manage to impose some kind of clear dividing line between the formal and the 
Informal. Belief systems refer to the ideology or culture of the organisation; although 
formally stimulated through mission statements and the like, in practice. these will be 
shaped by a myriad of social and political factors. Simons identifles one side of the 
coin, but ignores the other. The formal is inseparable from the informal (c. f. Dent, 
1991; Ahrens 1996). thereby rendering overly partial any analysis which focuses only 
on the formal. Also, as Langfield-Smith (1997: 218) notes, Simons falls to take non- 
financial controls into account. 
As Gray (1990: 146) puts it with reference to Simons (1990). such presumptions within 
Rationalist Accounting discourse of 'an image of top management as an omnicient and 
omnipotent navigator of the seas of uncertainty' leave the question of strategy to the 
Rationalist and Processual strategists and their discourses. As such, the role of 
accounting practices firn-dy secondary, and clearly as reflectors rather than constitutors 
of strategy. 
What then remains is the work of Kaplan and Norton (1996). This has been perhaps the 
most influential synthesis of Strategic Management Accounting to date, bringing 
together a Balanced Scorecard of financial and non-financial measures to enable real 
and integrative corporate control. For, as they state: 
'... financial measures are inadequate-for guiding and evaluating the journey that Information 
age companies must make to create future value through investment in customers, suppliers, 
employees, processes, technology, and innovation. ' (7) 
The rhetoric of accounting as mirror is wielded proudly as the comerstone of this 
method. 
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'MEASUREMENT MATTERS: "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it. " An organization's 
measurement system strongly affects the behaviour of people both inside and outside the 
organization. If companies are to survive and prosper in information age competition. they 
must use measurement and management systems derived from their strategies and 
capabilities. ' (Kaplan & Norton, 1996: 2 1, emphasis added) 
Kaplan and Norton therefore clearly see the role of the scorecard within strategy as both 
positive and non-problematic. Accounting is the means by which strategy can be 
implemented. Measurement derives unproblematically from strategy and is simply 
secondary - never a supplement that supplants. Therefore the clear split within rational 
strategy between planning and control is tightly adhered to, and there is no space for 
the kind of questioning that either processual or critical analysis would make. Thus 
instead: 
'Company managers have* discovered that the scorecard enables them to bridge a major gap 
that formerly eýdsted in their organizations: a fundamental disconnect between the 
development andformulation of strategy and Its implementation. 
The disconnect between strategy formulation and strategy implementation is caused by 
barriers erected by traditional management systems... (191) 
1. Visions and strategies that are not actionable 
2. Strategies that are not linked to departmental, team, and individual goals 
3. Strategies that are not linked to long- and short-term resource allocation 
4. Feedback that is tactical, not strategic (192) 
In one sense, the rational world of order and control is re-established via the play of 
supplementarity. But for Kaplan and Norton that supplement is the addition to 
financial measures of the non-financial. The possibility that accounting practice might 
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be at the beginning as well as the end of this apparently virtuous circle never even 
arises. 
Summary 
Arguably, present research within Strategic Management Accounting does little to 
advance knowledge of the meaning of strategy, preferring to vacillate between technical 
solutions to an inappropriate problem. This process of representation has served to 
distract attention from real-world issues, hampering the progress of research. What is 
uncovered here is a very specific role of accounting, that of accounting as control. As 
Dent (1990) concludes, in his review of possibilities for accounting research within 
strategy, organisation and control, Irlesearch at the interface beftwen accounting and 
strategy is, as yet, underdeveloped' (1990: 21). 
Critical Accounting 
Accounting as constitutive 
Critical accounting is distinguished by its recognition of the breadth as well as the 
specificity of accountin& effects, raising it from being seen as a technical instrument of 
strategy to being a deeper and more powerful practice of disciplinarity constituting the 
self and the world of modernity. Recent work has engaged in the re-thinking of 
accounting, and thence of strategy, from outside the traditional boundaries of both 
discourses, thus challenging the generally held assumption that strategy precedes 
accounting. Genealogical research has argued that the genesis of modem accounting 
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and management stems from the C19th amalgamation of disciplinary practices of 
control with expert disciplinary knowledge systems, including that of accounting 
(Hoskin and Macve 1988). From the US Military Academy at West Point were spawned 
the disciplinary systems of control, planning and accountability found at two particular 
sorts of location, the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts and the railroads, 
particularly the Western and Pennsylvania Railroads. 
'A whole new human ecosystem which went wider and deeper than any specific socio- 
economic system was being put in place. beginning within the sphere of elite education. A new 
regime of disciplinary organization and human accountability was internalized by the people 
who underwent that education. ( ... ) They were privy to a new wide-ranging set of power- 
knowledge relations: subjected to a grammatocentric organizational structure, they were 
trained as disciplinary specialists, their ability and conduct objectively evaluated through 
quantified measures. 77hese three things - grammatocentric organization, specialist 
differentiation and quantified evaluation - they then exported to the world of business via the 
armories and the railroads. ' 
(Hoskin and Maeve, 1988: 66) 
7hrough pedagogic practices of writing, examining and grading, pressures towards 
grammatocentrism and calculability were and continue to be manifested throughout the 
Anglo-Saxon world, enabling the re-presentation of accounting as being able to 'write 
the world', thereby facilitating 'action at a distance' (Hoskin and Macve 1986,1988). 
Accounting is conceptualised as a technology of power and knowledge, and has been 
shown to have significant social and economic effects (e. g. promoting managerialism, 
imposing regimes of performativity, constructing individuals as calculable and 
governable (cf. Burchell et al 1980; Hoskin & Macve 1986; Miller & O'Leary 1987)). It is 
from within this historical-theoretical field of work that Hoskin, Maeve and Stone (1997) 
developed the thesis that modern strategy, in both business and military spheres, may 
be an outcome or product of the deeper disciplinary transformation. For historically it is 
93 
possible to trace the way in which the same people were involved in internalising and 
then disseminating such practices as constant writing and calculation, and accounting 
for and examining performance across these arenas. Thus the disciplinary practices 
that enabled the articulation of first forms of modem strategy discourse prove to be the 
same in both military and business contexts, and the people disseminating them are 
the same as well. 23 
By the 1960's. conglomerates were proliferating across America. disembedding and 
transmuting the definition of the corporation. Accounting practices became one of the 
strategic arenas where battles over the definition of the firm, were being waged, as the 
model of the firm that was emerging was *rooted in the imagery of the stock market 
(Espeland and Hirsch, 1990: 78). These practices advanced capital interests and claims, 
contributing to the constitution of stock market apparatuses as discursively reflecting 
the dual image of the identity and value of a firm. 
"Ibe manipulation of seemingly technical concepts such as earnings, profits, growth and debt 
by managers and accountants. the significance these concepts achieved for investors as 
representations of a firn-fs worth, the way this interpretation motivated the investment 
behaviour of specific audiences (e. g. investors, bankers, managers) all serve to illustrate the 
symbolic potency of accounting technology. ' 
(Espeland and Hirsch, 1990: 80) 
The importance of wider societal discourse is analysed by Ahrens (1996) through a 
comparison of British and German styles of accountability. Underscoring the mutability 
23 The earlier work of Ezzamel, Hoskin and Macve (1990) demonstrated how the management by numbers 
that Johnson and Kaplan (1987) identify as a response to new business 'need' is actually just one version of a 
disciplinary practice that Is now In place In much of modem organisational life. The legacy of managing by 
numbers is much broader than a simple technical problem. and cannot simply be discarded. 
94 
of the effects of numbers, he demonstrates how his case studies in the British brewing 
Industry were 'characterized by what was called a return-risk: frameWork 
which. -privileged the reality of accounting information in judging proposals for 
operational action' (1996: 169). Financial performance was held up as the imperative to 
enable strategic ambitions, such as brands, to be fulfilled. Practices of accounting were 
thereby given a prominence not seen in Germany, where in contrast, 'the accounting 
Profit seems less substantial. What matters are conceptions of physical integrity and 
operational economy' (1996: 153). 
The effects of these accounting concepts are tracked within the privatisation of the U. K. 
water industry by Ogden and Anderson (1999), being highlighted as pro-active in the 
construction of new representations of activity. As they note, Thairmen's statements in 
annual company reports have consistently celebrated their companies' success in terms of 
profitability, and creating value for their shareholders' (1999: 94). Within the water 
industry, accounting practices were internalised and disseminated by top management, 
with contradictions emerging between a rhetoric of 'empowermenir and the practice of 
greater responsibility to meet specific targets. Processes of change were framed through 
accounting numbers. While Ogden and Anderson focus more on 'use: Eý of accounting by 
top management rather than the practices themselves, they nevertheless provide a 
valuable account of how accounting can play a prominent role in organisational change, 
and underscore the utility of such a primary focus. 
A case for a focus on practices is strongly made by Roberts and Scapens (1985) and 
Roberts (1991). They aim to decentre accounting by critiquing its apparent 
manifestation, the accounting system, and situating accounting practice in 
organisational contexts. Roberts suggests that accounting is analysed through 'the use 
of accounting In systenis of accountability (1991: 355). While the system is an abstract 
ideal, systems in use will form systems of accountability. opening up the exploration of 
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how such practices circulate and have powerful effects. Accountability is deflned as 
'.. the giving and demanding of reasonsfor conduct' (1985: 447) and as such, 'the closer 
one gets to the production and use of accounting information the more the apparent 
solidity or reality of the image crumbles' (1985: 454). The strength of an analysis of 
accountability is in the way accounting Images are destabilised, being necessarily 
imperfect representations of the events and practices they purport to capture. As 
Roberts (1991: 355) surmises, 'accounting appears not as a mirror of organizational 
reality but as a set of practices which helps create and shape organizational reality'. The 
particular form of accountability within an organisation can be beneficially studied by 
acknowledging its discursive context. Competing strategic discourses may be mobilised 
in power struggles, each referencing its own system of accountability (Mouritsen 1997). 
As Hopwood (1983) urges, (in respect of accounting) social practices must be studied in 
their environment. Thus accounting can be contextuallsed. Thus (Wilmott 1996, p36) 
'the coherent analytic response to.. understanding is to study our accounts of the world as 
the product of specjilc regirnes. ' 
Through the practice of the examination, accounting purports to write the world inside 
us (Hoskin and Macve, 1986: 107) as 'individuals become describable, analysable 
objects to be measured, judged and compared with others' (Townley 1996: 573). Ibis 
contrives to discover an innate reality, bringing a 'truer' knowledge of the self, and as 
such, can be seen as a process of 'self-awareness'. whereby contrary to the progressive 
or relative self of the strategically positioned subject, the individual is constructed as an 
object, one which is calculable and ultimately governable. Miller and O'Leary's (1994) 
work on standard costing unveiled the thrust of financial accounting as one of 
calculability. What was enabled was a way to systemise individual actions within 
organisations. 
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'Standard costing has been located as a key component within an ensemble of practices that 
sought to make the actions of individuals visible and calculable in relation to norms and 
standards. The 'success' of standard costing and budgeting was its ability to give financial 
form to attempts to govern the actions of individuals. ' 
(111) 
Managerialism prescribes the technology of target-setting as a means of acting at a 
distance on employees, enabling control to be effected without continual direct 
supervision - performance can be 'seen' through the practices of writing, examining and 
grading. Individuals are examined on the basis of how they compare to norms. This 
process objectifies individuals, asserting that they can be constructed and represented 
using these accounting technologies. The act of representation overcomes the 'physical, 
temporal and spatial' problems of controlling at a distance (Chia 1996: 130). 
This visibility highlights the disciplinary potential of strategy, accounUnWs outer face of 
objectivity opening up the possibility of individualising effects (cf. Roberts 1991). 
Individuals can become pre-occupied with the self they see reflected in 'the numbers', 
leading to a reproduction of power effects through self-examination. Self-esteem may 
thus derive from 'progress' as defined within strategy. Financial and non-financial 
goals must be met to Improve market share and raise share price. Operating costs or 
cost of sales need to be managed in the context of the quest for higher revenue and 
profits, perhaps through expenditure on product promotions and research and 
development or through curtailing property rent and staff numbers. All strategic 
activity can be accountedfor 24, possibly through cost-benefit analysis, but always on a 
rational and formal basis. 
24 This Is not to say strategic decisions either should be or are accounted forl Firstly, Uie fonnalisation of 
essentially qualitative or intuitive factors may not be advisable (Mintzberg 1994). and secondly. politics may 
lead to more of an ex post than an ex ante calculation (Burchell et al 1980). 
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Townley (1996) identifies the further practice of the confessional, which 'gives the 
impression of a relative symmetry of power inface toface contact. thereby shadowing the 
hierarchy inherent in holding someone to accountfor their actions' (1995: 574). The self- 
assessment form is identified as the technology which makes the subject see him or 
herself as the very object to be self-managed. Through the Interpretation of one's inner 
feelings and motivations, one incorporates new practices of examination on oneself. 
This more subtle form of performance appraisal is thereby internalised and reproduced, 
being a notion of self-control. 
'Both the confession and the examination capture the individual within a form of visibility, a 
gaze, which attempts to render the Individuals' actions and thoughts knowable. ( ... ) Each 
appraisal system is a disciplinary process. The examination is not simply the neutral process 
of acquiring information, but provides the opportunity for establishing norms within which to 
measure and gauge. Neither is the confession simply a process of accessing knowledge of, or 
yielded up by, an accountable subject, it also acts to constitute the subject in terms of 
providing an aspect of identity. ' 
(Townley, 1996: 577-8) 
Rational Accounting research conflates the issue of accountability to accounting. 'Ibis 
is, in the light of the above, a dangerous misjudgement of exactly what effects 
accounting has. Roberts (1991) argues that two interdependent forms of accountability 
can be distinguished, hierarchical and socializing. Accounting appears to perpetrate 
only the former, a disciplinary power that operates through making Individuals visible 
and calculable in an apparently objective way. While values such as profit and rate of 
return on capital feature centrally, they also exclude the individual in a way which 
ironically shapes our subjectivity. Practices of accounting will always be accompanied, 
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however, by socialising forms of accountability. Roberts (1991: 362) picks out the 
alternative forums for this 
'O)ourneys to and from work, lunches and after work drinks, toilets. corridors, all the 
unsurveilled "back regions" of organizational life serv(ing) as locations for such sense-making 
talk. ' 
This type of interaction constitutes a different type of reality, one which contextualises 
the abstract nature of the accounting system. Accountability here is not only to one's 
superiors, but also to one's colleagues and sub-ordinates. Intangibles such as culture 
and group norms will pressurise the individual, promoting an alternative narrative for 
the development of the self. The lack of calculation would appear to infer a freer, more 
subjective trajectory. With the reduction of formal hierarchy, however, comes the rise of 
informal networking, infused with loyalties and grudges, rumour and deceit. 
Townley (1995) analyses the principle of self-formation, distinguishing this from the 
excavating and examining practices of self-awareness (e. g. the performance appraisal). 
Here, the self is not taken as mechanistic and functional, and practices work to create 
the individual and his/her rights. The concept of inner self is cast aside and 
subordinated to the progressive dialogue of learning, remembering and constituting our 
selves. The self as subject is one that is not normally considered within practices of 
accounting, and yet as these complementary practices (of self-formation and self- 
awareness) circulate, both effects will be felt. 
99 
Accountingfor strategy %. R%Zw 
Amidst the review of research on accountability, Munro's (1995) excellent work on 
control practices reveals the extent to which accountability can be practised despite an 
absence of both conventional accounting controls and strategy. 
'As a highly successful company, Bestsafe offers an instructive example to those who take 
accounting to represent a necessary condition for control. Indeed, Bestsafe seems to exemplify 
the aporia that only the financially successful escape accounting controls... ( ... ) 
The control practices comprise: a formal distribution of responsibilities and resources, a 
formal reporting system identifying two major exception categories to work flow, and, most 
actively, a management ethos. 
Ultimately, the "function-in-use" of all of these control practices is to support each other. For 
example, the management ethos provided a need for formal reporting to remain ceremonial 
and. once constructed, this need created pressure for control to be exerted through the 
management ethos. This mutuality ensures that formal controls are productive in a very 
special and important sense. Their effective work is not to align output to themselves, as is 
likely to be the case where accounting is used as a -mirror- (Roberts, 1991). Primarily it is to 
influence actors in ways which support the more informal systems, such as the putative 
tradition or management ethos. In individuating performance, managing by ambiguity does 
not turn managers "inward", accounting "for themselves to themselves", but turns them 
outward to instantiate kinship through organisational talk. ' 
(Munro, 1995: 466-467) 
The complexity of the practices he uncovers is testament to the very partial appreciation 
of accountings effects within rational accounting. Furthermore, when he turns to the 
subject of strategy, he finds that'[sltrategy was not a term much in use within Bestsafe' 
(1995: 442). Instead, terms such as objectives and policy were preferred, being more 
directly linked and relevant to management action. In the context of 'managing by 
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amb(guihj', strategy is not available as a legitimating device (1995: 456), and is left 
ambiguous, being a product of post hoc rationalisation. (1995: 457). 
It was Roberts (1990), however, who pioneered the critical study of accounting practices 
[later developed in Roberts, 1991) within the contemporary strategic context. He 
specifically analyses the interactions of accounting and strategy in a U. K. conglomerate, 
finding that *strategy is potentially a much more powerful set of meanings around which 
to mobilize action than the thin abstractions of accounting information can ever provide' 
(1990: 125). What he finds is that in Conglom, corporate managers grant business unit 
managers a significant level of autonomy with regards to strategy formulation. Roberts 
argues that interfering with business strategy would compron-dse the strength of the 
financial control practices in place. Hence 'local management can more easily be held 
unequivocally accountable for the financial consequences of what they do' (1990: 115). 
Ironically, local autonomy is conditional on meeting central targets. 7bis tension 
between accounting and strategy is partially resolved through the use of conferences, a 
socialising form of accountability which : focuses the collective mind' (1990: 119). 
The power of the two papers above is that the critical study of accounting and strategy 
is shown to produce significant insights into practice. As such, this knowledge expands 
the discourses of both literatures, revealing regularities as well as differences in their 
respective practices. 
Summary: accounting as practice 
As McSweeney (1995) points out, therefore, the importance of defining accounting in 
research is relatively unrecognised. He demonstrates how it varies in the literature from 
ignorance to defining very widely, an inconsistency which needs to be rectified to ensure 
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that developments in critical accounting retain a sense of coherence. The above review 
has pulled out a variety of accountings effects in practice, moving from accounting to 
processes of accountability. A common drive to understand practices of accounting can 
be seen to characterise the Critical Accounting literature. A limitation has also become 
clear. While a trend has emerged towards the study of practices, there is a focus on 
social practices in a way which hampers, for example, Townley's efforts to constitute a 
Foucualdian discourse of 'taking care of the self in the study of performance appraisal. 
It is this very focus on practices, in a way which is neither simply at a social nor 
individual level, that is the theme of the methodology chapter. 
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Part 3: Closing the gap 
Those attempting to research such order and disorder should be prepared to work at the 
process of struggle which is impelled by an accumulation of anomalies in existing theories and 
which stimulates alternative theorising (Willmott 1993: 683). Such creative deconstruction is 
to be welcomed. ' (273) 
(Whipp 1996: 273) 
Whipp's creative deconstruction attempts to capture the unstable development of 
theories of practice. The anomaly of interest for this chapter is the reflection of 
accounting produced within discourses of strategy. In this chapter, I have drawn on 
Hoskin et ars (1997) genealogical insights, excavating the strategy literature for 
modernist presuppositions about accounting, and challenging the validity of the 
discourses and practices found therein. The re-thinking of the histories of both 
accounting and strategy opens up new possibilities for understanding how these fields 
inter-relate in the present. I challenge the view, embedded in strategy research, that 
accounting is a passive, secondary technology when it comes to 'doing strategy, and 
chart a path towards a reasoned investigation of the active and pro-active effects of 
accounting practices in the construction and re-construction of strategic discourse. 
Furthermore, the accounting literature is examined, showing how discourses are split 
between an image of accounting as mirror, and accounting as constitutive. It is the 
latter that holds out hope for the stimulation of alternative theorising within discourses 
of strategy. 
I believe in this way, we may give an insight not only into strategy, but management in 
general, of a kind that we may call 'post-structured'. For this approach is not purely 
post-structural' (nor 'post-modeml. For while it draws on post-structural modes of 
thought. it also poses a question to the whole idea that there is a thing called 'structure' 
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to which strategy has to be related. What is here in question is whether 
strategy/structure questions are well posed: should one, in looking beyond the classic 
idea that strategy emerges only when organisations achieve the M-form, be also looking 
beyond a search for strategy's 'fit' with other forms (the holding company, the N-form 
etc). Such a possibility may as yet seem perplexing. I leave it, at present, open, but a 
possibility for further investigation Is signalled by viewing managing, and the doing of 
strategy, as things which are not purely structured, nor necessarily related to 
6structures', and which therefore should be named as 'post-structured'. 
The emphasis on 'post-structured managing is significant in two particular ways. 
Firstly, from an epistemological stand-point, our theoretical conceptualisation of 
'managing' seeks to move radically away from the modem impasse, challenging 
established norms and delving deeper into reflexive understanding. While ways of 
seeing are always framed within their own partial reflections, applying the term post- 
structured suitably indicates the extent of our dissatisfaction with modernistic 
structured (and structural) perspectives. Secondly. I feel that the argument is made 
more pertinent by locating the concurrent empirical study within one of the most 
volatile industrial contexts, that of telecommunications. The level of perceived 
uncertainty is notably higher than within. for example, the manufacturing Industry, 
presenting a specific, and arguably tougher, challenge to discourses of strategy. It is 
Important, however. to point out that I do not subscribe to the 'postmodem' idea of the 
beginning of a completely new era or Baudrillard's hyperreality. Ibis rhetorical move 
has the potentially dangerous side-effect of objectifying the old era, ie. modernity, a 
dualistic misconception which prevents more holistic understanding, either of the kind 
which sees an inter-penetration of both eras (Adam 1996: 143), or of the kind which 
questions whether we have ever even been modem (Latour 1994). To avoid such a 
quagmire, I perceive telecommunications as post-structured only in reference to the 
contrast between differing contemporary industrial contexts, where the break away from 
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modernist assumptions would appear most valid. This double manoeuvre celebrates 
both the instability of apparently established meanings, and the power-knowledge 
constitution of specific organisational contexts, hoping to avoid the reductionistic 
totalistng sometimes exhibited by contributors to the modern/postmodern debate (cf. 
Alvesson. 1995: 1064). 
This chapter explains how the various prior approaches to understanding strategy have 
demonstrated a blind spot over accounting, seeing it as secondary, and thus failing to 
see its central constructive impact. It seems disappointing, therefore, although not 
altogether surprising, that conventional accounting continues to persist, even within 
processualist accounts of strategy, continuing to contribute significantly to the 
Mystification of strategic control which, on the face of it, had been left behind in the 
conventional rationalist school. While processualists, in questioning the rationalism of 
mainstream strategy theory, question the effectiveness of accounting, they not only fail 
to deny its integral role in the 'rational' practice of strategy but effectively promote its 
continued involvement. Such a catering for managerialist prerogatives biases research 
towards accounting ideals of 'strategy' in practice: these discourses *reinforce and 
extend means-end thinking, as every conceivable activity and operation is subordinated 
to the test of its strategic relevance and contribution for the realization of taken for 
granted corporate objectives. ' (Alvesson and Willmott 1995: 99). Even recent critical 
approaches (e. g. Knights & Morgan 1991; Zan 1995) have not demurred over 
accounting's significance in any major way. Thus all such approaches, while having 
different explicit objects of analysis (from the strategy/ structure relation to the role of 
irrational forces of political conflict, ambiguity and uncertainty), have tacitly allowed 
accounting into the citadel of strategy. 
The close ties theorised above between the two apparently distinct schools of strategy 
points ever more urgently to the need for a critical re-appraisal of strategic discourse. 
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Critical accounting and strategy research now enables a new kind of critical stance 
towards both the rational and processual approaches, as it articulates a different, even 
inversionary, relation of accounting to strategy, and suggests a new way of seeing how 
accounting is involved in constructing strategy from the latter's initial emergence in the 
nineteenth century (c. f. Hoskin et al 1997). Accounting, with its apparent bottom-line 
certainties, has encouraged strategy to define itself as a discourse of calculation, 
promoting the comforting illusion of certainty and control in an uncertain world, In a 
way that echoes this institutionalised image of accounting. This powerful rhetoric of 
objectivity has proved difficult to resist, continuing to successfully- disseminate 
accounting practices within the Western markets (both business and academic) for 
strategic discourse. All three discourses of strategy reviewed In this chapter are thus 
made relevant in a way which forges wider Institutional support for both strategy and 
accounting. While the rhetoric of strategy is considerably strengthened by a partnership 
with accounting, accounting Itself benefits hugely from the massive expansion of its 
marketplace. 
However, the development of strategy research may have been both constrained and 
enabled by the dissemination and interrialisation of conventional accounting principles. 
This can be explored on two inter-related fronts, in theory and in practice. 
Processualists have pinpointed, as potential trouble spots, manifestations of 
conventional accounting in practice, but, as a result of an inhibited theoretical 
understanding of accounting, are unable to explain why. Quinn, for example, identifies 
situations where a fixation with more 'objective' data obtained through 'accounting 
practicesý (1995/85: 706) can impede the emergence or considered evaluation of 
intuitively plausible alternatives, but holds back from theorising why this might 
happen. Mintzberg, meanwhile, begins to theorise why formal control remains an 
important issue within strategic planning, asserting that the 'preferred nzeans [of 
planning] is articulation. ideally quantification' (1994: 194) and making the observation 
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that the planning school's 'obsession Lvith control generally seenis to reflect a fear of 
uncertainty'(1994: 202). In common with other schools of strategy, however. Mintzberg, 
does not fully appreciate the reluctance of management to dispose of their accounting 
constraints. Accounting discourse is internalised and reproduced by individuals, being 
institutionalised through pedagogic and cultural forces (Hoskin and Maeve 1986,1988). 
Power-knowledge discourses such as accounting, are therefore ably manoeuvring both 
within and without individuals, merging and conflicting with discourses of strategy. 
Is therefore, research on strategy relevanf? 25 Relevant to whom or what? This chapter 
investigates the 'relevance' of Anglo-Saxon discourses of strategy to managerial practice 
(as opposed to managerialism), exploring the hypothesis that the particular role of 
accounting has remained hidden, thus hindering the development of more relevant 
strategic discourses. In a slightly paradoxical vein, managerialism may not be relevant 
to managers. Conventional notions of accounting have infiltrated rational, processual 
and critical theories, to the extent that the ability of such research to explain practice is 
actually inhibited. Does this, therefore, support Hoskin et ars rather worrying 
assertions that 'inevitably managerialism. invents strategy, for strategy is simply one 
more manffestation of [the] desire for grammatocentrism. and calculability' (1997: 7)? 
Perhaps, hopefully, it points more positively to the need for a re-appraisal of critical 
strategy research from the direction of accounting, offering the prospect of a more careful 
25While an interesting parallel can thus be drawn between the retention of orthodox 
accounting in both the theory (rational/processual) and practice of strategy, this does 
not in itself Justify the unreflective theoretical reliance on its presumptions, and indeed, 
it Is my thesis' contention that such notions are becoming increasingly out-dated in 
practice within contemporary competitive conditions. 
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move away from the current modernist juxtaposition of accounting and strategic 
discourseS26, and towards a new kind of enabling 'accounting for strategy'. 
The introduction of the reflective study of accounting practices has the potential to force 
a displacement of current strategy discourses. There is a possibility of moving beyond 
strategy as talk or discourse, to viewing strategy as practices enabling, shaping and 
limiting discourses of power with truth effects. This directly challenges the presumption 
over organisation as bureaucracy which is found within processual discourses. This 
also enables the analysis of denunciation, denial and disruption of strategy as Munro 
found (1995: 442) within contexts of perceived high uncertainty and de-centred 
management control. The critical edge is therefore against the primacy of strategy as a 
top management discourse, and draws on similar philosophical foundings as Chia 
(1994,1996). Process can be re-understood through a more complex web of practices 
and discourses, one which break free from the constraints currently imposed. 
Perhaps the stagnation problem stems from the double hurdles, as Pettigrew (1997) 
recognises. facing management research - at its most basic. 'scholarly quality and 
relevance (279) or 'embeddedness in the social sciences and the worlds of policy and 
practice. The study of change adequately meets this hurdle. ' (292) It is clear, however, 
that Pettigrew has the foresight to recognise the Inherent limitations of any dominant 
discourse, including his own. 
26 Hoskin et al (1997) locate accounting as playing an instrumental role in the construction of modern 
strategy, but U-its genealogical study is focused on the nineteenth century. While the continuing importance of 
this work is confirmed by my thesis' deconstruction of processualist research, at the same time. the 
conditions which supported such an emergence have indisputably changed. It Is the examination of the 
possibility of a second discontinuity which therefore forms the research question. 
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'rhere is a role for iconoclasm and criticism in management research, as anyone who has read 
Pettigrew (1973) and (1985) will appreciate. To work on relevant research is not simply to 
address problems of current interest to power figures framed in U-ieir tenns. ' (295) 
Caveat: presence and absence 
In the light of concerns over the hegemony of strategy, it is fitting to point out that 
neither strategy nor accounting is all-pervasive in practice. In addition, while this 
chapter wishes to promote the reflective study of accounting within strategy, it does not 
wish to promote presence where absence e., dsts. TWo papers, Choudhury (1988) and 
Inkpen and Choudhury (1995), argue how presence Is over-privileged in studies of both 
strategy and accounting. They highlight what they see as a cognitive bias of researchers 
towards presence, leading to a marginalisation (or indeed preclusion) of absence. 'Me 
avoidance of the possibility of absence may constitute a barrier to the deeper 
understanding of both phenomena. I conclude with a quote from Choudhury (1988: 
549-550). which deals with absence in the accounting literature27. 
'Accounting researchers appear to be preoccupied with accounting presence. The literature is 
replete with "discoveries- of accounting - normative discoveries of accounting solutions to 
problems.... positive discoveries of -real-world" accounting phenomena. They observe the 
e)dstence of budgetary systems. of standard costing procedures, of transfer pricing 
mechanisms, and convince themselves of the everywhereness of accounting. This is a non- 
discriminating view of reality. Accounting in the form of systems and procedures develops. 
changes, sometimes is and sometimes ts not' 
27 Also see discussion of Munro (1995) above. 
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(III) Methodological Stance 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to frame methodologically my 'ethnographic' inquiry into 
the discourse and practice of strategy. If my literature review has signalled the nature of 
my critical focus on discourses and practices, from a post-Foucauldian viewpoint on the 
construction of the self and social. I want here to consider the methodological 
Implications of this approach. For arguably my work destabiltses more conventional 
forms of analysis into strategy and accounting at various levels. For the approach does 
not begin from such general categories as 'the individual', 'the social or 'the economic'. 
Instead, its focus on the constitutive role of practices in the construction of 'powerful 
knowledge' turns attention to terms such as 'organization', 'accounting' and 'strategy'. 
The first two may variously refer to structure or process, as well as the practice of 'doing 
accounting or 'organizinEr. This therefore means that the conventional approaches to 
'doing ethnography' become questionable, insofar as they derive their understandings 
from categories such as the individual and the social, thus maintaining a reliance on an 
objective-subjective dualism, or aiming to maintain some apparently scientific notion of 
generalisability about their findings. As part of my own approach to doing ethnography, 
I attempt to see how I as researcher am also engaging In, and structured by. practices, 
thus hoping to develop an adequately (but not debilitatingly) reflexive approach, which 
will succeed in unveiling within the narrative, the twin orders of discourse and practice. 
I therefore begin by outlining my theoretical position concerning the relations of 
discourses and practices. 
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Towards a theory of practices 
The purpose of this section is to analyse how individuals (including this individual) - 
come to speak and write through practices, constituting knowledge of their selves in a 
way which Is expressed and developed through discourse. My argument is that a theory 
of practices can enable the bridging of the dualisms typically found within conventional 
ethnographies, and enable a better understanding of the multiple ways in which pow er 
relations are implemented in the modern world, even as certain modes of knowledge are 
rendered distinctively powerful. 
Dualisms in organisational analysis 
The question of which methodological category this thesis fits into is perhaps a 
confusing and difficult one. though I would argue that it is closest to the 'Critical 
tradition'. 28Certainly it is differentiable from most research Into strategy coming from 
the direction of accounting, which has tended to fit into an objectivist and derivative 
stance (i. e. seeing strategy as the dominant discourse. and as 'rational planning. with 
accounting as its 'objective support system% Most of such work fits well into thel- 
28 Ostensibly, Chua7s (1986) classtfication of critical research cornes the closest. The niajor differer= IS In 
this dissertations lack of prescription with regard to change_(although why critique should necessarily or 
Immediately lead to change is Itself problematic. since an Implied prescription that critique entails change is a- 
likely way of condemning critique to fail on Its own terms. by turning it into a precipitate of change. thus 
rendering critique's independence - arguably its distinctive feature - dependent. This may be felt to be 
ethically desirable, but that Is not the same as being logically consistent as an understanding of critique. or of 
its functions. At the same time. the theoretical frame-work arguably enables resistance through its attempts to 
destabilise e., dsUng categories of understanding. though this may proceed in unanticipated as well as 
anticipated ways. 
III - 
framework developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979)29, in which they identify two 
dimensions about which research appears to revolve. 
They argue that the subjective/objective and radical change/regulation dimensions 
encompass the spectrum of researchers' assumptions, and so provide a fundamental 
basis for distinguishing types of research. Even though the adequacy of their model 
has been widely debated, one significant effect of their categorization has been to 
destabilise the automatic privileging of functionalist or objectivist research approaches 
within strategy and accounting. 7bis has therefore helped redress what they see as the 
imbalance towards 'objectivist assumptions operating within, and thus supporting, the 
status quo7.30. In this way Burrell and Morgan have helped to redefine the mainstream 
approach as one among a number of competing claims, helping to move thinking away 
from a dogmatic and one-dimensional approach to research. However, while Burrell 
and Morgan's (1979) framework helps challenge the totalising tendencies of 
functionalism. it does little to overcome modernist forms of dualism. For a researcher in 
their typology remains either objective or subjective, for radical change or regulation. 
The first of these dualisms is of particular importance for this study, given the 
questioning posed to the categories of the individual and the social under the approach 
via practices. But it is not clear that this study can begin from the paradigmatic 
dichotomy as proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 1), where they propose that: 
'Social scientists.. are faced with a basic ontological question: whether the 'reality' to be 
investigated is external to the individual - imposing itself on individual consciousness from 
without - or the product of individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective' 
29 See Hopper and Powell (1985) for the application of this framework to the accounting literature. 
30 The functionalist quadrant of Burrell and Morgans framework. 
112 
nature, or the product of individual cognition-, whether 'reality is a given 'out there' in the 
world, or the product of one's niind. ' 
For the whole relation of the self to itself and of the self to the world comes under 
question once the category of the individual as undivided or undividable (as the Latin 
in-dividuus signifies) is not taken as primary. The relation to the social is firstly not 
definable in terms of a standing outside of the social world by the self. getting things 
objectively' in perspective in a supposed view from nowhere'. Secondly it is equally not 
wholly definable in terms of a world that is prior to the self. a social totality that 
therefore leaves the viewing or knowing self as essentially subjected to the world7s 
don-driance and able to view and know the world only from a partial perspective. Ibis 
would be to render the self subjected, and so irredeemably 'subjective'. through the 
theoretical priority of the social. 
Under an approach that sees the individual and the social being co-produced out Of., 
practices, this kind of 'cuC through the world is destabillsed. if not ruled out, ab initio., 
Recognising this is essential if we are to grapple effectively with the ontological and 
epistemological issues which are raised by approaching strategy and accounting 
research from the direction adopted here. 
Thus, under the approach I shall adopt here, the basic ontological question' as posed 
by Burrell and Morgan dissolves. But It would be naive to pretend that the question as 
they pose it has not continued to be implicit and significant within the much work 
undertaken in the management and accounting research traditions. The 
objectivist/subjectivist divide has been perpetuated as an issue within the debate over 
paradigm incommensurability (cf Jackson and Carter 1991). The agitation over this 
supposed incommensurability has helped to maintain the dichotomy as a significant 
point of difference, arguably frustrating constructive dialogue (cf Kuhn 1970). So until 
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recently we still find the choice as being posed between 'the problems of objectivism and 
the relativist quagmire of subjectivism' (Johnson 1995, p491), or, as Parker fears (1995, 
p. 561). between 'saying nothing and saying everything'. Why then is this 'paradigm 
mentality' (Wilmott 1993) adhered to, or indeed defended? 
In answer to this, it is perhaps important to appreciate the mood of the period in which 
Sociological Paradignis and Organizational Analysis was published. Silverman's The 
Theory of Organizations (1970) had provided an extensive and insightful critique of what 
he identified as a rampant functionalist imperialism within organisation studies, 
clearing the way for a recognition of the validity of previously non-orthodox approaches 
(Wilmott, 1990). Within this context, Burrell and Morgan produced a seminal mapping 
of a range of potential analytical stances, which helped to redefine views of the 
mainstream and advance a more pluralistic understanding of organisational study. 
Thus the battle over subjectivism/ objectivism itself became an Integral part of the 
discursive field we can name as 'Organizational Behaviour'. So it is not surprising if 
even now some look to maintain a separation of paradigms, to defend against the 
marginalisation and domination of weaker positions which commensurability is seen as 
inducing (Jackson and Carter, 199 1). 
Meanwhile others (e. g. Donaldson. 1985) have maintained a separation wherein 
'classical' organization theory is simply presented as superior, with other possibilities 
ignored. So Donaldson continues to assert that *(t)he intention of social science is to 
examine social phenomena in the scientific way' (1985, p76), as if there were no 
alternative paradigms. and indeed no tradition of work destabilising the claims of 
science to be purely dispassionate/objective. through the study of science as a social 
phenomenon (see for example Feyerabend, 1993). The continuance of this sort of 
oppositionalism re-emphasises the continuing value and importance of Sociological 
ParadWms, and not only for studies of business organizations as such. 
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For instance, the dualisms Identified within the work of Burrell and Morgan can be seen 
within many prominent ethnographic texts, which remain permeated with forms of 
relativism even as they aim for a social realism to their analyses. So Hammersley has 
pointed out that a distinguished Chicago sociologist like Herbert Blumer may draw on 
realist metaphors to drive forward the cause of ethnography, notably 'lifting the veils' 
and 'digging deeper'. thereby proposing that 'the superiority of ethnography is based 
precisely on the grounds that it is able to get closer to social reality than other niethods' 
(Hammersley, 1992: 44). At the same time, Blumer's approach adopts a form of 
objectivist detachment, as he proposes that 'the social world should be studied in its 
. natural'state, undisturbed by the researcher. '(Hannnersley and Atkinson 1995: 6). 
In such a naturalist / realist approach, the researcher remains authorised as outside 
the social reality investigated, a laudable aspiration given a would-be scientific agenda, 
but one doomed to prove unscientific in its execution. For it would seem that the 
researcher cannot maintain this separation, either at the level of data gathering or at 
that of interpretation and narration. since all these remain as 'social' and 'human' as 
the activities of the people studied. No essential separation can be drawn that is not 
undermined by the author's own location and action in the social world. 
Of course, against this realist slant, there Is in practice a strong constructivist, impetus 
within much ethnographic work, which argues that in understanding the world one has 
to acknowledge that one is inside it, even if one is not totally of the social grouping (and 
In that sense 'the worldl of those studied. This approach recognizes that the researcher 
in being different disrupts the 'natural' social world just by being present. He/she then 
can only represent what is there, including this disruption, In a textual narrative that is 
necessarily other than (and perhaps less than though in some ways more than) the 
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world represented. Thus the constructivist process in a certain way re-constitutes a 
reality that Is already constituted for the subjects of research. 
However, constructivism in itself does not necessarily resolve the dualist problem, so 
long as it clings to a realist epistemology as the means of providing a scientific edge to 
its ethnographic research. For such a strategy will continue to fail the reflexive test, 
insofar as it grants the researcher a special interpretational privilege as producer of a 
distinctive 'real knowledge'. On the other side, if it maintains a constructivist position 
consistently, then it runs the risk of falling into a relativist epistemological stance. As 
Harmmersley points out: 
'What may seem to follow is that in their work ethnographers create a social world (or worlds), 
rather than merely representing some independent reality (more or less accurately). And, it 
may be concluded. this world is no more nor less true than others: for instance than the 
perceptions and interpretations of the people studied. In this way, ethnographic 
constructivism seems to result in a relativism that is In conflict with ethnography's 
commitment to realism. ' 
(Hammersley 1992: 45) 
Thus in both cases a dualism putatively evaded re-emerges strengthened by its 
apparent essentialised innocence. 
Dualism as a block to reasoned thinking is of course a problem long recognised within 
the philosophical tradition. Sociology, anthropology and such spin-offs as classical 
social ethnography are not alone in being brought into question over such problems as 
what are the categories for dividing up the world (the individual versus society, self 
versus other, action versus structure) and where the dividing lines should be located 
between key categories (rationality / irrationality, masculine / feminine, Inside / 
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outside, etc. ). 31 Within the western tradition of reasoning, the central importance of 
having a coherent and stable standpoint from which reasoned thinking can proceed has 
long involved some distinctive form of dualist separation, certainly from Descartes and 
back even to Plato. 
In Descartes, the search for a ground whence truth and illusion can be distinguished 
within the world we occupy leads him to the separation between res cogitans, and res; 
extenscL Here the problem of radical self-doubt about the possibility of occupying such 
a ground is resolved (or at least held in reasoned suspense) through establishing, via 
reason, that there is one allowable self-knowledge that is not dissolved in self-doubt. 
This Is the 'I thinIC (for reasoned self-doubt is itself a manifestation of the res; cogitans 
at work). So, when In his Second Meditation, Descartes asks 'What am 1'he can with 
reason come to the conclusion that he is 'a thing that thinks'. This then is a ground on 
which he (and reason) can stand, even as he realises (through reason) that the res 
extensa beyond the cogito remains an uncertain and shifting domain only accessible via 
the fallible senses. 
Importantly, as Chia (1996) stresses, the Cartesian form of dualism needs to be 
understood as one depending on a certain sense (fallible in itself but at a level of the 
invisible not necessarily so) of visual representation (cf. Jay, 1993). Descartes' version of 
the self as res cogitans is very much a self that in thinking aright gets things 'in 
perspective'. and so sees the world as it really is, through correcting for the 
uncertainties and fallibilities necessarily associated with utilising the senses to perceive 
the res extensa. As Jay and Foucault have in different ways explicated. there is a new 
way of thinking and seeing engaged with here, one possible given the development / 
invention of geometrical perspective as the means of representing the visible world 
31 See literature review chapter. 
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supposedly 'as it is', and which therefore 'sees' true thinking as mirroring the (internal 
and external) world (cf Rorty, 1980). 'Ibis new form of thinking, representationalist 
thinking in Foucault's terminology, inverts a prior emphasis on 'natural' resemblances, 
and constructs a new kind of arbitrary space, within which a new order of signs as 
signifier/signifleds can operate, Le. as representattonal signs that comprehend as if 
transparently both the representation and the referent. 32 
'Mis form of dualism has in turn Its own earlier history, in which the most significant 
predecessor way of seeing is Plato's division of the phenomenal world from the world of 
'ideas'. In this first sustained western dualism the 'ordinary' thinker / seer (who cannot 
see beyond the illusions of this world) is differentiated from the true thinker / seer who, 
informed by dialectic, sees the true ideas behind the phenomenal appearance. 7bus the 
truth of 'being becomes, for Plato, understandable through thinking aright in a way 
apart or abstracted from the visible world. Within the subsequent post-perspectival way 
of representational seeing, this abstractionist, tendency is If anything intensified. So for 
Descartes, the brain as site where perceptions are received and processed is a site of 
imperfection, one which often obscures the 'natural' geometric correspondence between 
the mind and the world (Jay 1993). But the mind sees truly. So in much of subsequent 
philosophy, the mind is seen as a mirror (Rorty 1980), its proper functioning requiring 
an ontological separation between language and the material world it designates. 
It is thus possible to delineate Cartesian rules of thought as completely distinct from 
tribal rules (ef Garfinkel 1974). While the latter may have a rationality to them, in the 
32 It should be noted that the analysis developed here concurs with Chia (1996) against Foucault (1970) that 
the representationalism of the Classical Age has continued its incisive career into the Modem Age, without 
diminishing In significance despite the advent of a new 'historical'or historicising consciousness, and the 
emergence of newdisciplinary knowledges'of and about 'the human'. 
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way that they are determined by social agreement. the former can be seen as 
constituting (or attempting to constitute) their own a2domatic rationality, so long as the 
visualist division between viewing self and world viewed is accepted. 
This is perhaps particularly likely within a literate world dominated by alphabetic 
writing, and within the alphabetic tradition, by Latin-derived languages which have a 
grammatical tendency towards a subject-verb-object format. Here a form of writing that, 
given the letter-syllable-word format developed in ancient Greece. always presents 
signification as built up through the combination of 'self-evidently' rational units, 
extends that illusion significantly. As Bohm (1980, p29, quoted in Chia 1995, p592)) 
observes, this format 
implies that all action arises in a separate entity, the subject, and that in the cases 
described by a tentative verb, this action crosses over to the space between them to another 
separate entity, the object. ' 
So meaning easily presents itself as being already-there, frozen within the signs 
representing discrete entities and events, at the expense of the verb (Chia. 1995). Such 
a meaning is what can then be recovered, beyond the illusions of the world or the brain, 
by the true-seeing disembodied 'mind's eye' (Jay, 1993). 
It Is this way of seeing, so embedded in the Western tradition, that has now come in 
various ways Into radical question. At one level it is a matter of getting movement back 
into thought, reprivileging the temporal alongside the spatial, something that has 
become particularly apparent in the post-Newtonian scientific world. particularly in 
'extreme' fields such as particle physics, or conversely at the level of cosmological 
analysis. Here science as an art of knowing rediscovers its pre-Socratic affinity with 
poetry. So Chia can observe: 
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'Both FenolloSa33 and Bohm demonstrated unequivocally that the modernist tendency to 
reify, invert and then forget and deny the reification and inversion processes is a 
consequence of the logical structuring of the English language. Both emphasized the 
significance and importance of thinking in terms of a1anguage of movemenC. (Chia 1995. 
P593)34 
This kind of approach, which can now claim its own form of sclentific Justification, has 
in recent years opened up its space within traditional Anglo-American social science, for 
the appropriation of other strands of thinking within the modem Western tradition, 
where a questioning of objectivism and other versions of nalive dualist thinking has 
been more strongly maintained. The roll-call of thinkers includes those in the German 
and French post-Kant, post-Hegel traditions (e. g. Nietzche, Marx, Freud, Bergson) and 
inheritor work In this century, down to that characterised In recent decades as post- 
structural and post-modem. 
If there is one path which has marked out the concerns over objectivism more 
influentially than any other, It is perhaps the path of thinking that leads through 
Husserl's questioning of the social/ individual divide to Heidegger's radical return to the 
33 The poet Ernesto Fenollosa - circa 1900. 
34 If one moves beyond English alphabetic discourse. such thinking becomes more 'self-evident'. Compare the 
sentence 'it is raining'to its Chinese fonnulation Ifatling rain'(cf Bohm 1980). 7be Chinese language forsakes 
the freeze-frame effect of English, as the sign 'falling rain' varies In sense depending on the temporal modifler 
it is linked to. Mius, given a period of wet weather a Chinese weather forecast might be 'yesterdayfalling rain, 
todayfalling rain, tomorrowfalling rain'. while a English counterpart might be: 'it rained yesterday. we have 
rain today, it will be raining tomorrow'. Loy (1988) contends that English nouns act to objectify time, placing 
objects in time by construing them as nontemporal or self-e. Nisting. 7bis creates a 'delusive 
byiircation.. between time and 'things" generally'- things which then include the self. For the '"objectifIcation" 
of time is also the *subjectification" of self (1988, p220). 
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question of 'thinking being* (abandoned in his opinion since Plato), through a re- 
thinking of pre-Socratic thinking. From Heidegger, and his questioning of whether the 
ontological question is even thinkable, comes am ixed and vexed legacy. However. the 
role of raising such questions in the shaping of radical new approaches to thinking the 
human world and human being. and to rethinking long-accepted 'categories of 
analysis', within the 'social', or perhaps better 'human'. sciences, is manifestly now 
highly significant. Much of this has been discovered 'second hand', so to speak, via the 
French existentialists, phenomenologists and structuralists, of the post-1945 period, or 
the generation beyond. Here Foucault and Derrida frequently become seen as founder 
figures, wrenched from their own tradition in becoming rallying-points for anti- 
objectivism in the Anglo-American world. 
So for instance Chia (1996) identiflies pervasive presence of the LsIts not doublet witihin 
our terminologies as still maintaining representationalist epistemology, privileging the 
freezing of time as 'presence' and so giving a concreteness and stability to our terms 
and concepts that flies in the face of our experience of the world and our selves. In such 
ways. It remains easy to maintain a desire for the human sciences to mirror the 
natural, hard sciences and to succumb to the lure of objectivism. 'Ibis illustrates the 
tendency of the dominant side of a dualism to marginalise or silence its partner (Derrida 
1978). 35 
-35 The essence of dualistic thinking asfalse distraction has long been recognised in EaSteM philosophy, as the 
ancient Vedantic text The Avadhut Gda (Dattatreya 1934) puts it. 
'Verlly the one Self is aH. free from differentiation and non-clifferentlation. 
Neither can it be said 'It Is* norlt is nol:. What a great mysteryl (1-5) 
Free from subject and object am 1, 
How can I be self-reallsable? 
Endlessness is my nature, naught else exists. 
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Beyond the objective-subjective dualism: using 
deconstruction 
One particular inheritor of Heidegger's thinking is Derrida, whose work has continued 
and extended the study into how we are still not thinking, as well as how deep-seated 
the contradictions are in what he describes as 'logocentrism'. Drawing on Derrida. 
organizational theorists such as Chia have looked to use his deconstruction method to 
re-think the tenacity, even under radical questioning, of such organizational terms and 
constructs as 'control' and 'planning' (and by extension 'accounting). It has long been 
understood in radical critiques that such terms are seen as technical-neutral and 
representing technical-neutral practices. But a deconstructive approach may help us 
see how contestation and contradiction cohere within the terms themselves, by making 
visible otherwise hidden contradictions in the texts of organizational analysis. Insofar as 
the practice of 'doing accounting has been so widely understood via the metaphor of 
accounting as mirror, reflecting economic reality, deconstruction may help to destabillse 
Truth absolute is my nature, naught else exists. (1.29) 
I am the eternal principle. 
Free from attachment and aversion, 
Free from imperfections am 1, 
Fate and providence exist not In me. 
Eternally free from the sufferings of the world, 
Verily space-like immortality-giving 
Knowledge am L' (3-13) 
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this view, and so better understand the powerfully constitutive effects of accounting 
practice in contemporary life. As Chia puts it, in attempting to help us to see beyond a 
representationalist 'perspective': 
'Representation, from a postmodern reading, turns out to be not the attempt to reflect or 
mirror an external reality, but instead, an attempt to'condense what is remote, obdurate and 
intractable into a form which facilitates control and manipulability. ' 118 
(Chia 1996) 
So if the objective-subjective dualism is usually perceived as being composed of two 
separate terms, divided from each other, an alternative is to focus on the 'division 
boundary between the terTns' (Cooper 1990, p173). thus beginning to see how the 
. essential' separation is an outcome of boundary-production. From this perspective, the 
meaning of 'objective' is fundamentally dependent upon the meaning of 'subjective', and 
vice versa, creating the possibility of viewing the terms as joined as well as split (Cooper 
1989). Each is parasitic upon the other in a continual process of redefinition. 
This coherence of opposites is the sort of unity that is open to Derridean 
deconstruction. Ibis kind of doublet is what exposes for him most clearly the way in 
which signification in general is produced via a process of diff6rance. Diff6rance as a 
term combines two meanings of the French verb 'diffdrer'. usually kept apart: differing 
as a spatial term and deferring as a temporal one. Derrida's term is also a neologism, 
being written with an 'a', a distinction that in French is only discernible in writing, since 
in speaking French it is imperceptible. [Thus it is has been suggested that it should be 
written in English as 'differance', since only this form replicates the original paradox 
Derrida had in mind. ] 
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In any event. the neologism is one way in which Derrida signals how meaning-in- 
general is only possible because all signing, spoken and written. depends on 
differentiation, in space and time, so that speech as much as writing is only in principle 
possible as an expression of an 'arche-writing (Derrida, 1976), which coming before and 
outside of time and space, is the sole guaranteeing of the possibility of meaning, 
Instituting the possibility of timing and spacing and so, without prejudice, the 
possibility of signifier and signified coming into conjunction in particular systems of 
signification, oral and written. There is therefore for Derrida no original 'true writinir of 
signs, no originary plenitude of meaning which is captured in particular signifleds and 
transmitted through 'arbitrary' signifiers (which is Saussure's error, in his view). 
Instead, as Chia (1996, p 19 1) explains: 
'Diff6rance.. implies an active and ongoing process of differing in space and time in order to 
enable terms to achieve some (albeit precarious) stability of meaning. Meaning is. therefore. 
the outcome of a violently enforced demarcation which is continuously at work within the 
text. ' 
One attempt to apply a Derridean approach and explain the Inadequacy of objective- 
subjective dualisms is Frugs (1984) 'deconstruction' of bureaucracy theories of 
organisation. 36 These can be conceptualised as drawing their strength from their 
attempts to distinguish and maintain an objective-subjective split. Ordered coherence 
through the construction of a perceived stability is a fundamental strategy employed by 
the theorists, attempting to deny the preceding stages of representation through 
diffdrance. This order Is created out of disorder (cf Cooper 1990). Picking the 'most 
objective' theory as an example, the formalist model is the classic machine formulation 
(cf Morgan 1986). Technical means-end rationality is dominant, with objective goals 
paramount, In line with .a doctrine of shareholder supremacy. Within this framework, 
36 As used in Cooper (1989). 
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subjective aspirations may flourish, but they are always distinguished and separated 
from the functioning of the bureaucracy. Frug (1984) Identifies this separation as not 
only misleading but, In fact, a critical condition of the theory's success. The imperative 
for the achievement of objectivity turns out to be the exercise of subjectivity. The 
supplementary effect (cf Derrida 1978) of the subjectivity is both necessary and 
threatening to the Identity of objectivity. The real-life competence of the bureaucracy 
walks a precarious and unstable tight-rope between an impotent objectivity and a 
dysfunctional subjectivity. The former arises from a lack of subjectivity, with inaction 
and Indecision strangling the flow towards the desired objectivity. The latter stems from 
an overdetermination of subjectivity, with arbitrariness and chaos restraining any 
. objective' form. Frug (1984) concludes (p1291) 'Indeed, I suggest that we should 
abandon the attempt to understand the world in terms of the subjectivelobjective 
dichotomy; we should deal with the Problems of human association in other ways. ' 
The problem however is what other way can enable us to go effectively beyond the old 
dualisms without relapsing back into them at some level or in some way, however 
delayed, that ultimately proves fatal. One may recall Wittgenstein's reflections on the 
paradoxes concerning the T and the world. 
The I makes its appearance in philosophy through the world's being my world. (12.8.16) 
Here we can see that solipsism coincides with pure realism, if it is strictly thought out. The I 
of solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and what remains is the reality co-ordinate with 
it. (2.9.16) 
At last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one side nodiing is left 
over, and on the other side, as unique, the ulorIcL In this way idealism leads to realism if it is 
strictly thought out. (15.10.16)' 
CWittgenstein 1961 a. quoted in Loy (1988), p204) 
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Any reflection on the objective-subjective dualism raises a number of important issues. 
Most apparent should be this chapter's insistence that a 'choice' between objectivism 
and subjectivism is, in fact, no ctwice at all, If research is attempting to delineate the 
complexities of reality. On the one side, positivism is chained to the agenda of scientific 
method, offering comfort through coherence and rigour but ultimately remaining an 
abstraction. On the other, subjectivism locks experience into the mind of the individual 
agent, tearing the ground away from the establishment of truth as other than relative. 
As Wittgenstein shows us, the very intransigence of solipsism brings alignment with 
that which it most detests. Neither polarity therefore provides a defendable 
epistemology by itself, while each proves to be locked in a fatal embrace with the other. 
What we therefore need is an approach that respects that embrace without being 
throttled by it, an approach that accepts and celebrates the paradox of living. As 
Burawoy formulates the problem: 
'Objectification of work. if that is what we were experiencing, is very much a subjective process 
- it cannot be reduced to some inexorable laws of capitalism. We participated in and 
strategized our own subordination. We were accomplices in our own exploitation. That and 
not the destruction of subjectivity, was what was so remarkable. ' 
(Burawoy 1985, plO, quoted In Wilmott 1993, p694) 
The question that arises is perhaps, what are we as 'the subject' here? How are we to be 
theorised in this dilemma, or equally to theorise ourselves, as participants in and 
strategisers of our experience, and equally as accomplices In the objectification of (our) 
work? It is at this point that an approach developed in and from the later work of 
Foucault can, I suggest, be helpful. 
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Of discourses and practices 
In the attempt to understand our selves as subjects and objects, actors and 
accomplices, it was Foucault: s massive yet simple contribution to turn our attention to 
practices. Recognising that it is futile to begin either with the individual or the social as 
constitutive ground, he began from the level of this category that is neither reducible to 
a Social nor an individual property. Practices are that through which we become 
individuals, and equally that through which social regularities are produced. Practices 
(including communicative practices such as those of talking and writing) are that 
through which 'discourse' Is generated, taking discourse as 'what at a given era is said. 
written, thought out of all the things that could be said. written and thought (Hoskin, 
1994: 67, paraphrasing Foucault). Foucault can be seen undertaking an analysis of 
practices, such as that of examination, in works such as Discipline and Ainish (1975). 
Examination is identified there are the practice that brings together the two disciplinary 
principles of hierarchical surveillance and normalising judgement, thus bringing power 
and knowledge relations into a close and 'disciplinary' relation. 
Extending Foucault's work, Hoskin suggests that examination is just one of a small 
number of usually overlooked 'secondary practices which together enable us to become 
our selves within a given historical world. These practices, whose interplay proceeds 
below the level of conscious focus, are those involved at any given historical moment in 
our communicating, our learning and our valuing. For the modern 'disciplinary' era the 
significant forms of these practices are those of writing, examining and grading, this 
being the first era in history when people in general have learned to read and write, 
have undergone constant (written and oral) examination, and have been subject to 
numerical grading, the quantifying of qualities. These practices, far from being natural, 
are instead the architects of our much more significant 'second nature'. The discourses 
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of modernity show over and again the Impact of these practices, none more so than 
those of modem management. But more generally, what thanks to Foucault becomes 
visible in the range of what gets said and written at any given moment is the influence 
in general of secondary practices. 
Thus from Foucault we may in Hoskin's view extrapolate a new theory of practices. 
'What the approach via discourse and practices offers is a new and reasoned way of moving 
beyond the old futile oscillations, since both practices and discourse are located in between 
the traditional langue/parole, material/ideal and socW/individual oppositions. Discourse is, 
for each of us and all of us, what is historically given as the previously-said, but then in our 
own histories (social and individual) it is shaped and developed to say the previously-unsaid. 
Practices similarly are technologies which socially we cannot avoid yet which individually we 
internalize in varying ways. with effects that are both socially regular and personally 
differentiated. Together, the operation of practices and discourse is what enables the 
construction of us as differing Individuals in historically specific contexts: it is what makes 
possible the production by us (whoever we are) or both the ideas and the material realities of 
our time (whenever that Is). ' 
(Hoskin. 1994: 78) 
I 
Much of this way of seeing is discernible In works as early as Foucault's 'The Order of 
Discourse' (1970/1981). It is here that Foucault elaborates the thesis that 'discourse' 
refers to that communicative 'order' which is neither reducible to the structure of 'a 
language' (langue), nor to its surface speaking/writing (parole). Instead, he argues, it is 
that prior communicative level out of which such constructs as langue and parole 
emerge, that historically specific communicative context into which we happen to be 
born and which we then shape and turn as we speak and (in literate cultures) write. 
7bis sort of understanding has a particular value in studying the way in which a 
construct such as 'stratee gets talked about and acted out In a given organizational 
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context. Studying strategy as a discursive category (or indeed 'practice'. insofar as 
discourse is a product of communicative practices) enables the 
management/accounting researcher to avoid beginning investigation from such 
problematic metaphysical categories as 'the economy', 'the state' and the 'global marker 
(though such categories remain objects of fascinated enquiry). Instead one looks to 
focus on what is said and written in particular settings (whether at the top of 
organisations or in their hidden interstices), and on what one may call the 'apparatuses' 
and 'practices' which shape what is said (and not said), and who speaks and who 
remains silent. 
A certain primacy is therefore given to identifying the rules and regularities which 
govern the discursive practice of strategy, and so set its current boundaries (while also 
recognising how the transgression of given boundaries, the reconfiguration of the 
currently 'sayable', is itse! f always one of discourse's regularities). If one will be 
identifying certain ways of speaking and writing as powerful, and certain kinds of 
knowledge as privileged, this is not to hypostatise 'power'. It is to recognise that 
relationally some people have more 'right to speak' than others, that edicts with the 
imprimatur of the Managing Director or other authority as 'authoe will command an 
attention (even where they fail to command respect or belief from other organizational 
members). 
Certain 'cycles of exchange' can then be described, e. g. between privileged knowledge, 
practices of management and 'discursive regularities'. We can observe knowledge being 
intemalised and acted upon by subjects (whether as strategizers or accomplices) and 
thus giving discourse a specificity, which then In turn acts back on and shapes 
knowledge (c. f. Said, 1974). Equally one may observe the operation of the exchange 
cycle between privileged knowledge and the exercise of power, and how a specific form 
of discourse such as that we know and name as strategy is constituted in this cycle. In 
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such ways one may reflect, in a rather distinctive way, on how strategy gets constituted 
as a particular 'regime of truth'. At the same time, discourse analysis may underscore 
the contingency of the various approaches to doing and conceptualising strategy 
current at a given moment, thus reiterating the limits which befall any attempt to 
inscribe knowledge as 'objective' within the field of the human sciences. 37 
But this kind of discourse analysis can only be undertaken via the approach through 
practices, as particularly articulated and theorised in Foucault's late works. As Starkey 
and McKinlay put It (1998: 237): 'Foucault's fitnal emphasis is very much on practice - 
taking care of rather than knowing the se[f... '. 
Ibis is perhaps best articulated in the slightly mysterious article (Gutting, 1994) which 
first appeared in the Dtctionnaire des philosophes, edited by Denis Huisman and 
purportedly written by one Maurice Florence. This piece shows In condensed yet 
sophisticated detail how practices and discourses are distinct, yet inextricably inter- 
related. As Gutting (1994: viii) points out, the spirit of the piece is very in tune with 
Foucault's last published works and there is no trace of any Maurice Florence at all 
within French philosophical writings, which suggests that the piece is In fact by that 
other MF, Foucault himself 
37 'On the one hand. all knowledge is the effect of a specft regime of power and on the other hand, forms of 
knowledge constitute the social reality which they describe and analyse. 'power and knowledge directly 
imply one another. ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitutton of afLeld of knowledge, 
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relationsý (Foucault, 
1977: 27). 'The effects of the power/knowledge complex are relayed through different discourses: 'it is in 
discourse that power and knowledge arejoined togethee (Foucault, 1978: 100, all cited in McNay. 1992: 
27). 
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What is immediately apparent Is the emphasis on practices, and the refusal to allow 
them to be reduced to being a 'property' of the individual or a manifestation of the 
. socially given'. They operate as a category which functions at both levels while being 
reducible to neither. 1bus, in the 'break introduced by Michel Foucaulf: 
'It is no longer a question of basing philosophy on a new cogito, or of developing a system of 
things previously hidden from the eyes of the world, but rather of interrogating the enigmatic 
gesture-through which true discourses ... are constituted, with their familiar power. ' 
(Florence, 1994: 314) 
Instead, it is a matter of determining what the human subject 'must be-in order to 
become the legitimate subject of oneform of knowledge or another. In short it is a matter 
of determining its mode of 'subjectivization ...... (1994, p. 315). But this entails equally 
determining 'under what conditions something can become an object of possible 
knowledge .... of determining its mode of objectivization ... '. Yet this objectivization and 
subjectivization 'are not independent of one another, it is from their mutual development 
and their recýprocal bond that what v-v might call "truth games" arise'. As the article goes 
on, for Foucault the particular interest was 'those truth games in which the subject itself 
is posited as an object of possible knowledge'. And in this study of the relations between 
the subject and truth, it later goes on (1994, p. 317). there have been certain 
methodological choices. First 'a systematic skepticism with respect to all anthropological 
universals' (i. e. invocations about 'human nature' or social regularities such as 
*delinquency' or 'sexuality'), so as 'to interrogate them in their historical constitution'. 
Second a refusal of 'the philosophic procedure back toward the constitutive subject, thus 
denying any priority to the sovereign rational individual, Cartesian or Platonic. What 
then is the positive step that potentially wards off the relapse into one or other pole of 
this unproductive dualism? '... [A] third methodological principle ... that of appealing to 
"practices" as a domain of analysis, of approaching one's studyfrom the angle of what 
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"was done*... ' (1994, p 318). The study is of practices 'that are more or less regulated, 
nwre or less conscious, more or less goal-oriented. ' Such practices 'understood 
simultaneously as nwdes of acting and of thinking, are what provide the key to 
understanding a correlative constitution of the subject and the objecf. 
Now as MF then observes, via this analysts of practices one can study power relations. 
Such study will involve 'studying the devices and techniques that are used in ciffferent 
institutional contexts to act on the behaviour of individuals taken separately or in groups; 
to shape, direct and mod! fy their behaviour, to impose limits on their inaction, or to 
inscribe it within overall strategies that are thus multiple in their fo, sirts and 
zones of enactment' (1994: 318, emphasis added). For Foucault this was seen 
particularly as Involving procedures of 'governance' (319). but another way of naming 
the same constellation of practices, particularly in this modern era, is as 'management'. 
or indeed taking up the term he himself Invokes here, 'strategy'. 
The work of Hoskin and Macve has argued that accounting has an integral role to play 
in the production of this kind of power relation. where governance or management is 
put in play. In line with the MF analysis, they are concerned with accounting as 
practice, and therefore look to develop an approach that sees accounting practices as 
contributing to the constitution of a regime of truth which Is therefore very precisely not 
relativistic. For there are ways in which numbers can be erroneous and falsities 
produced, and so the constitution of accounting as 'true discourse' requires first getting 
beyond such errors, to gather together and record transactions properly. Accounting 
then operates as a form of truth-as-correctness through naming and counting entities 
properly, in the particular ways of inscribing of a given era (from stewardship accounts, 
to double entry, to electronic spreadsheets). Via accounting practice, specific and 
precise values are constituted (and at a more general level the possibility of valuing is 
continuously enabled and confirmed). 
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Accountings familiar power is experienced where people accept what accounting is 
saying in the idiom of the time, and then operate in terms of what the numbers 'report:. 
It is thus as 'secondary practice' that accounting has its effects, as people focus on the 
primary task of valuing some entity, and so overlook how the valuing practice they are 
using is using them. This is perhaps one reason why the close study of accounting 
practice is left to one side by so many management researchers. Yet this does not mean 
that accounting practice does not have significant effects on the doing of strategy. 
Budgets and targets are, for instance, familiar ways of undertaking the practice of 
accounting which have long been absorbed into the discourse of strategy, and now 
operate as part of strategic 'truth games'. Such modes of accounting turn managers and 
workers into accountable subjects, and as such the objects of accounting truth. thus 
exemplifying a central feature of the MF thesis: 
'... not the discovery of true things, but the rules according to which. with respect to certain 
things, what a subject may say stems from the question of truth and falsehood. * 
(Florence, 1994: 315) 
A Foucault-influenced critical study of the interrelations between accounting and 
strategy. in their historically specific modern forms, will therefore study how humans 
are constituted as subjects and objects by the relevant secondary practices. It therefore 
will be undertaking a disciplinary analysis, insofar as we are formed through secondary 
practices (such as those of writing, examining and grading) which are the means to 
generating disciplinary knowledges and the disciplining of action and thought. Such a 
project follows directly from the work of Foucault, not purely because it takes up on the 
insights in Discipline and Punish (1975) about the modern mode of power being 
'disciplinary power'. but because it contributes to his project in the'human sciences'. 
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According to MF, one may distinguish three types of study as falling within this project. 
There are the studies such as that in The Order of Things, into the historically different 
ways in which humans approach the understanding of the 'nature' of words, work and 
life. which therefore have put at centrc stage 'the question of the speaking, working, 
living subject... ' (Florence, 1994: 316). Secondly, there arc the studies into the 
historically changing ways in which such doublets as madness/reason, health/disease 
and justice/correction have been construed. undertaken in works such as Madness and 
Civilisation, The Birth of the Cliný and Discipline and Punish, which have brought into 
focus 'the constitution of the subject as ... an object of knowledge... ' (Florence, 1994: 
316). Thirdly, through his unfinished multivolume History of Sexuality, Foucault raised 
the refle. Nive issue of underscored the history of subjectivity as one of: 
the constitution of the subject as its own object: the fonnation of the procedures by which 
the subject is led to observe itself. to analyze itself. to decipher itself, to recognize itself as a 
domain of possible knowledge. ' (Florence, 1994: 316) 
Here the approach via practices confronts the issue of truth and its relations to error 
and falsehood on the ultimate slippery ground marked out by Wittgenstein as the place 
of solipsistic aporia, where the self attempts to reflect, via reason, on the self. 
The genius of Foucault's break with tradition is in not attempting the self-defeating task 
of studying the self as such, but instead studying the secondary practices through 
which the 'care of the self is undertaken by the self. Thus he sets out to observe how in 
different eras, depending on the particular set of practices of self-care in use, we 
historically situated subjects have succeeded in making the self a particular kind of 
object of and for itself. Here the power/knowledge interplays will change as the 
practices change, and so as the relation of the self to the self is altered. However if the 
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exercise of power is therefore contingent in the same way as the construction of 
knowledge (including self-knowledge), power, like knowledge, never disappears. It 
remains In play in some way that is always 'to be determined'. In other words, power Is 
never omnipotent, with the subject impotent. The subject, though produced via 
practices, is never determirted by them. 'Ibis is perhaps one reason why Foucault 
insisted on the active and positive dimension to conceptions of power and stressed the 
dimension of choice and freedom as an aspect of being a subject within power relations. 
Choice may never be totally 'free choice, unconstrained. but choice is integral to our 
construction, via practices, as subjects - in the first place and last analysis. 
'One must observe also that there cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free. If 
one or the other were completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an 
object on which he can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be 
relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least 
a certain form of liberty. ' 
(Foucault. 1988: 12; quoted in McNay, 1992: 67) 
***** 
That 'certain form of liberty' is an integral feature of the subjects observed In this study. 
They are not 'cultural dopes', even as they are not sovereign rational subjects. Instead 
they are both historically situated and refle. -ý: ively aware. It is here that Hoskin's 
extension to Foucaults approach offers additional Insight to the attempt to 'make sense' 
of such subjects as they 'do stratee and/or act out strategic imperatives. Hoskin 
(1994) has suggested that an approach via practices needs particularly to focus on the 
key secondary practices through which we act and think as subjects, those involved in 
communicating, learning and valuing. Picking up on Foucault's identification of the 
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modem world as suffused by 'disciplinarity', he suggests that the distinctive modem 
forms of these practices are writing, examining and numerical grading, and that this Is 
one particular reason why the age-old practice of accounting has gained such a 
prominence over the past century. Here he suggests generalising Derrida's paradoxical 
observation (1976) on the 'logic of the supplement', that certain secondary supplements 
(such as writing in relation to speech) become central, so that the supplement of writing 
supplants speech as the means to establishing truth and running the world (and the 
selo. So more generally, the interplay of key secondary practices manifests the logic of 
the supplement. 
'... to understand speech, we find ourselves investigating its apparent supplement, writing (in 
writing): but also. to understand knowledge, we may look at modes of learning and 
pedagogies: to understand texts, we look at their contexts and margins. ( ... ) ... Now we would 
stipulate particular kinds of practices playing this secondazy but central role: namely, those 
communicative practices which happen to shape modes of discourse at a given time, those 
pedagogic practices which similarly shape modes of learning (and 'learning to learn'), those 
counting and accounting practices which shape modes of measuring and valuing. ' 
(McLean and Hoskin, 1998: 520) 
Here a special significance is accorded to the historically specific conjunction in the late 
eighteenth century of writing, examining and grading as the means through which 
humans learn (and thus learn to learn). Ibis is seen as the break through which the 
modem obsession with disciplinarity is constituted, in the sense of the pursuit of 
disciplinary knowledge as much as in the exercise of disciplinary forms of power. It is 
this kind of double concern with disciplinarity which is taken up here, as appropriate to 
studying the way In which disciplinary expertise, as much as disciplinary control, Is put 
to work in developing, executing and appraising strategy. 
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Now Hoskin is not alone in this kind of gloss on Foucaults work. Townley for instance 
has also observed the double aspect of disciplinarity today. 
'For Foucault, it is disciplinary practices that make possible the 'disciplines' of accounting, 
personnel. engineering, management science. (... ) ... An analysis of the 'how' of power, 
practices rather than intentions, allows for a recognition of the negative and the positive in aff 
practices and an evaluation of their effects. Through this we can begin to understand the 
simultaneous production of empowerment and repression, commitment and control. An 
analysis of practices that bury deep, not only into social spaces but into the individual. their 
notions of individuality and integrity, is the only basis on which we can begin to consider. and 
seriously debate, the ethical issues involved in such practices. ' 
(Townley, 1998: 207) 
Similarly in Starkey and McKinlay's view, Foucault's late work on practices offers two 
major thrusts for a critical organization theory - although note the (mis)definition of 
Foucault as a 'social' theorist and deconstructionist: 
'Foucaulfs major contribution to social theory is his unrelenting attempt to deconstruct 
modem definitions of what it means to be a subject. ... the political manifests itself in an ethics 
of practice, in technologies of the self through which individuals and groups define 
themselves. Through these practices, individuals and groups embody forms of action that'free 
themselves from what they consider intolerable in their current situation and thus define their 
own new limits... ( ... ) ... Foucault advises us to create a critical ontology of our selves, which 
should be conceived not as a theory, doctrine or an accumulating permanent body of 
knowledge but as ethical practices. 
(Starkey and McKinlay, 1998: 238-9) 
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One could doubtless multiply such examples in the past few years. 38: But the main 
issue for this project is that there is now a way, drawing on this kind of theory of 
practices, to re-think what It is one is doing in undertaking an ethnographic study in an 
organizational setting. For the issue becomes: how far does what gets done and said by 
the subjects observed in the field study manifest the operation of the secondary 
practices identified as such central carriers of modern disciplinarity. 
On justifying an ethnographic approach 
It is accurate therefore to describe my empirical research as an ethnography/ social 
anthropology which holds in suspense many categories and concepts of the kind of 
conventional ethnography discussed above. While it is located within a business 
culture, which is informed by a sophisticated and elaborate business discourse, it is not 
38 At the same time. there arr still works circulating that misconstrue Foucault's project, either through a 
general distaste for this continental work (as in Merquior's contribution on Foucault to the Fontana Modem 
Masters series), or through ignoring the late work, even well after his death. In favour of earlier formulations. 
in one such example, Fairclough (1992) harks back to the Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) to make the case 
that Foucault fails as a theorist of practices. So he asserts that there is 'an absence of a concept of practice in 
Fo-icault's analyses. including the absence of text and textual analysts. By 'practice' I mean real instances of 
people doing or saying or writing things. Foucault (1972) does refer to practice. when he introduces the concept 
of 'discursive practice', but he defines it in a confusing way as 'ndes' which underlie actual practice: a 
discursive practice is 'a system of anonymous, historical rules'(p. 117). In other words, practice is being reduced 
to its converse, structures, using that term in the broad sense of the resources which underlie and are necessary 
for (as well as being a product oJ) practice. It appears to be always structures that are in focus, be it the rules of 
formation of Foucault (1972), or techniques such as the examination in Foucault (1979). Yet Foucault is of course 
claiming to talk about practice: hisfocus upon structures is intended to accountfor what can and does actually 
happen' (Fairclough, 1992: 57). Why and how examination is a structure rather than a practice remains 
unexplained. 
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concerned, in its study of events and acts with uncovering certain structures or rules of 
management, in the sense of uncovering generalisations about such structures or rules. 
The only generalisation that it sees as derivable at such a level is a principle of 
difference (or perhaps differance) ensuring that in business no rules or structures are 
ever carved in stone. Nonetheless, this study remains within the ethnographic tradition 
in terms of the observational and participative methods of investigation followed. That 
therefore still requires me to comment upon my own multiple location, but in this case 
as subject who is himself a product of disciplinary practices, and who then enters into 
the narrative generated here both as actor within, and reflector upon, a web of such 
practices. On that issue. I am looking, as much as any other ethnographer, to present 
my approach in terms that are coherent and non-contradictory, adopting a stance that 
can justify itself on its own terms. These are the final issues that I wish to address in 
this chapter. 
Re-Posing the Critical Question of Generalisability 
To reiterate, the approach via practices and discourses looks to produce insights about 
the way in which secondary practices operate in an organisation and across its 
constituent units. It is through the shared if generally overlooked operation of such 
practices on and in individuals in those units that discursive regularities are generated, 
regularities that can be extrapolated to the experience of other individuals in other 
organisations, where the same practices are at work (albeit In different ways). So 
generalisability is to be looked for at the level of practices, not at the level of 
organisational structures or events. Such an approach remains justifiable if one posits 
the organisation as an unit of analysis. Then one will continue to look to discover 
regularities at the level of such conventional metaphysical constructs as 'the 
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organisation', 'the manager'. 'strategic planning. But that is not the case here, since 
such constructs are precisely what are for destabilisation, possibly even deconstruction, 
via the focus on practices. 
Here perhaps one may recall Foucault's focus on the 'human sciences' as a field where 
traditional kinds of regularity are necessarily subverted because both the subject and 
object of analysis are subjects who are correlatively constituted as subject and object. 
More conventional treatments of generalisability tend at some point to evade the full 
implications of that reflexive problematic in favour of a solution that reintroduces the 
researcher as sovereign rational subject. 
For instance, Schofield (1990) presents the question of generalisablility as solvable 
through a three-dimensional yet inherently realist strategy. Looking at 'what is' focuses 
attention on studying the typical, and performing multisite studies to gauge the extent 
of variations and uniformities. Examining 'what may be' brings forth studies of the 
leading edge of change, probing factors likely to differentiate the present from the 
future, thus allowing consideration of the life cycle of a phenomenon. Finally, 'what 
could be looks at unusual sites, thus focusing on generalising from atypical to more 
typical ones, generating a more speculative type of insight, but one that potentially 
sheds light on future possibilities. Here the coverage is broad, but the posited viewer 
seems indistinguishable from the perspectivally rational subject. 
Hammersley (1992) distinguishes two types of generalisation strategies, labelling one as 
relevant and one as unrealistic. He defines 'empirical strategies' as those where 
'... generalisation from a study of a single case ... to a larger population is a legitimate 
means of making ethnographic findings generally relevant. ' (1992: 9 1). He distinguishes 
these from 'theoretical strategies' which appear to be those which are 'good in theory'. 
But '... if neither deterministic nor probabilistic laws are available, then attempts to 
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justify ethnographic work as a basis for theoretical inference do not seem to be 
realistic. ' (1992: 93). 
Hammersley's appears to be a slightly more complex realist thesis, as it rejects 'the 
existence of universal, deterministic, sociological laws', but respects the 'general 
relevance of ethnographic studies in the case of both descriptions and explanations. ' 
(Hammersley, 1992: 93). Thus ethnographers can claim relevance for their findings 
beyond the local contexts of their particular studies. However, we still have to confront 
the problem of how 'the realistic' is known to be so, and how far the sovereign rational 
subject is again supplied as guarantee of that being knowable. 
Donmoyer (1990) takes a rather different approach, which at one level is more in line 
with the Foucauldian one, as he attacks the concept of generallsability as being 
appropriate only to the natural sciences. 
Traditionally social scientists have viewed the social universe in a manner similar to the way 
physical scientists, before Einstein, viewed the physical universe: Both the physical and social 
world were thought to be places where lawful regularities eldsted between causes and effects. 
The role of research-was to discover and validate generalizations about these regularities. ' 
(1990: 177) 
But his point is that it Is of limited relevance for the study of individuals in speciflc 
contexts. 
'For policy makers who are interested only in aggregates. not individuals, and for whom 
questions of meaning and perspective have been resolved, the traditional notion of 
generalizability will do just fine. ' (Donmoyer 1990: 197) 
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Thus his approach retains that dualism between the social and the individual which is 
now in question, for the subject as subject/object is not necessarily comprehended or 
comprehensible via this split, particularly not as organizational subject/object. So even 
this refusal of 'generalizability' retains a naturalist/realist (and thus dualistic) vision of 
ethnographic practice. It also forecloses on the possibility that one may want to retain 
some form of generalizability, but located at a non-traditional level, such as that of 
practices. So it is not clear that this form of revisionism achieves any great distance 
from traditional notions. 
On the other hand, however, if the question of gencralizability is not addressed at all, 
the danger is that ethnographic studies plunge back into relativism, or remain open to 
that charge, being purely concerned with the local and particular. 
Some may be happy to accept that limitation. Knights (1995). for example, rejects the 
idea that his case study findings should be generalised, and instead explores how the 
management of IT in Pensco is fIrst andforemost .. a process of organizational and extra- 
organizational politics, responding to, and acting upon, perceived imperatives that are 
generated through, yet serve to reconstitute 'markets', 'technologies', and 'organizations' 
as socially constructed phenomena... ' (246). Hence his investigation is Into a world 
which lies beneath the surface of positivistic models of independent and dependent 
variables, and is content to leave the case as having particularistic signiflcance. 
However, while this avoids the hazard of extrapolating an easy totalising synthesis from 
case studies, treating them as 'atomic business situations' would seem to underplay the 
potential insight that can be derived from a Foucault-derived approach . 
142 
Crisis of Representation/Legitimation 
There remain issues for resolution, for instance the extent to which turning experience 
into text, and engaging in the authorial role alongside that of recorder of, and 
participant In, that experience constitute a manageable and legitimate account. Here 
the status of 'text' In relation to the world, and of the subject as actor within the world, 
are two significant general problems. Concerning the first, under the approach here, the 
issue is not one of world versus text, nor of world as text, but of world which is context 
for texts, and therefore, as what is alongside ('con-I texts, as what is affected by them 
even as it affects them. In the 'grammatocentric' world, as pointed out above, we are 
formed in how we learn, think, act and speak by writing in multiple ways. Text is part of 
our world, seamlessly integrated into and means of reproduction and extension for, the 
grammatocentric culture of modernity. Concerning the subject as actor within the world 
as grammatocentric world, occupying what Foucault described as the 'author function' 
is again an integral activity. The disciplinary subject, having learned to learn via the 
practices of writing, examining and grading, is 'naturally' constituted as one who WTItes, 
alongside being one who acts in disciplinary ways (i. e. as vehicle of disciplined action 
and exponent of disciplinary expertise). Thus, at the level of practices, these difficulties 
dissolve. That, of course, does not end debate on these matters. A poststructuralist 
approach may suggest that there are crises of representation and legitimation to be 
confronted still. So for Denzin and Lincoln, the move away from scientisin is a linguistic 
turn, with the following consequences. 
'Ibis linguistic turn makes problematic two key assumptions of qualitative research. The first 
is that qualitative researchers can directly capture lived experience. Such experience, it is now 
argued, is created in the social text written by the researcher. This is the representational 
crisis... 
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The second assumption makes the traditional criteria for evaluating and interpreting 
qualitative research problematic. This is the legitimation crisis. It involves a serious rethinking 
of such terms as validity, generalizability, and reliability ... ... How are qualitative studies to be 
evaluated in the poststructural moment? ' 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 11) 
Here (leaving aside the definition of text as 'social'), the linguistic turn is seen as 
bringing danger by moving away from 'realism'. So perhaps the resolution comes from 
resituating the ground of validity within the world of text (and so as text). 
'By the authority of the te-xt we reference the claim any text makes to being accurate, true, and 
complete. Is a text, that is. faithful to the context and the individuals It Is supposed to 
represent? Does the text have the right to assert that it is a report to the larger world that 
addresses not only the researcher's interests. but also the Interests of those studiedT 
'A poststructural interpretive social science ... interprets validity as a text's call to authority and 
truth, and calls this version of validity epistemological. Mat is, a text's authority is established 
through recourse to a set of rules conceming knowledge, its production and representation. 
These rules ... establish validity. Without validity there is no trutf4 and without truth there can be 
no trust in a text's clainis to validity. ' 
(Lincoln and Denzin 1994: 578) 
The problem is that rules begin as text and are only rendered articulable and stable 
through circulating as text, therefore closing the circle of truth within text. So while it is 
no doubt the case that the writing of a text is an epistemological strategy in itself, that 
strategy and the role of the subject as author is not exhausted or properly defined 
within the textual frame. Or not unless that frame includes the world as necessary 
'con'-text. The task must therefore be to attempt to understand the interplay between 
the ethnographic text and the social-historical position of the researcher (Atkinson and 
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Hammersley 1992: 13). This move must be beyond the text to the world and to the 
interplay with other subjects. 
It has been noted. for example, that ethnographers' writing is a medium which draws 
on rhetorical strategies of other genres such as journalists or novelists (Atkinson and 
Hammersley 1992: 14). Thus such other subjects populate the ethnographic text (and 
become ob ects for identification within it). But more generally, this subject-object j 
relation is a major issue for study in the 'new ethnography' essayed here. It is In play in 
the world studied, in the text of that world, and equally within the authoring of the text 
which derives from the experiencing of that world and not from the experience of that 
world alone. The wider personal history, and the tacit knowledge which is brought to 
bear on the business of doing research, are all aspects of the subject-object relation as 
constituted within the self, aspects which contribute to how one approaches 
generalisation. In this respect. Donmoyer's observation (though directed to 
extrapolating a different mWe of generalisation) is precisely apposite. 
'I believe I underwent a process similar to my son's when I moved from a Harlem school to 
schools with very different populations. The sort of generalization that characterized my 
movement from one school to another was not primarily mediated by working hypotheses 
transferred from one setting to the next. Rather. the mediating mechanisms are better 
characterized as cognitive structures that could only partially be coded into language and 
that. in fact, often functioned at the level of tacit knowledge. 
It is important to note that when generalization is thought of in this way, the diversity between 
school settings becomes an asset rather than a liability: When diversity is dramatic, the 
knower is confronted by all sorts of novelty, which stimulates accomodation; consequently, the 
knower's cognitive Structures become more integrated and differentiated, after novelty is 
confronted and accomodated. he or she can perceive more richly and, one hopes. act more 
intelligently. ' 
(Donmoyer 1990: 19 1) 
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If there was one 'environmental' change that was not directly 'part' of my research but 
which added an unanticipated diversity (or differance), it was at the end of my second 
year in my Doctorate, when I changed from UMIST In Manchester to Warwick Business 
School as my supervisor changed jobs. In the decision to move, there was far more than 
just a rationally planned process of transition. As I wrote in a subsequent article for the 
WBS Doctoral Newsletter: 
... Despite my Initial shock at the news, 
I very soon came to the realisation that there was only 
one possible decision - to make the move. Given the choice between keeping my supervisor or 
staying at the same university, my supervisor comes first111 Once this became absolutely clear 
(about five hours later in a nearby bar). I very quickly rationalised the other factors involved to 
support this decision. Yes I was bored of Manchester anyway... going to a campus university 
would do a City Boy like me much good... change of scene is always beneficial... blah blah 
Being at Warwick now feels perfectly normal to me. But thinking back to that moment In 
my supervisor's office. I realise just how aberrant this apparent non-nality first, seemed. Shit 
what does that say about the rest of my life??? 
Formally, the experience of changing university would perhaps be captured through a 
weighing up of the pros and cons of both universities, an ex-post rationalisation 
process. It is this fake objectivity which I desired so strongly to avoid. I was far keener 
to provide a sense of how I felt at the time, underscoring the irrational and impulsive 
processes which surrounded my decision-making. The article reveals both me and my 
supervisor as subject-objects doubly involved in the oscillating process that I name as 
'my decision-making7. By the end I had constructed VVBS as a desirable place to 
research, thus re-affirming my identity as rational and pro-active even as I struggled to 
erase the traces of my post-rationalising. Tacit knowledge, it has long been recognised, is 
integrally involved in the explicit coherent narratives that we construct as explicit 
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knowledge. In ethnographies, particularly of the participant-observer type, the tacit is 
perhaps more likely to be brought systematically into awareness because the 
conventional/ scientistic boundaries between observer and observed are transgressed at 
so many points in, or in so many aspects of, the subject-object relation. So in general, 
as Altheide and Johnson put It: 
'Good ethnographics display tacit knowledge. ( ... ) Contextual, takcn-for-granted, tacit 
knowledge plays a constitutive role in providing meaning. Social life is spatially and temporally 
ordered through experiences that cannot be reduced to spatial boundaries as numerous rorms 
of communication attempt to do. especially those based on textual and linear metaphors. More 
specifically, experience is different from words and symbols about those experiences. ( ... ) Good 
ethnographies reflect tacit knowledge, the largely unarticulated. contextual understanding 
that is often manifested in nods, silences. humor. and naughty nuances. (Altheide and 
Johnson, 1994: 492-493) 
But if all this Is true. in this kind of 'new ethnography' the tacit will always be on the 
brink of becon-dng explicit. whether from within the author's self-relationship as 
subject-object, or from beyond the authorial boundary. For the very secondary practices 
that are the object (subject) of generalisability here are themselves, in general, tacit. In 
this new ethnography, therefore, the whole task is to render the tacit explicit, to enable 
it to speak. So Altheide and Johnson's subsequent conclusion, that '... (b)y and large, 
tacit knowledge is nondiscursive, whereas textual and many other symbolic forms of 
communication are discursive' (1994: 493) comes into question. Ever since Nuchael 
Polanyl brought the idea of *tacit knowing into circulation in his Personal Knowledge 
(1958). it has, as a construct, moved from the nondiscursive into being part of 
discourse. Now in the historically specific discursive field of ethnographic research. the 
tacit circulates promiscuously. But then that is to be expected, discursively, as just one 
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more manifestation of how discursive regularities are never frozen, but always on the 
move. 
Summary 
The objective of this study is to contribute to posing the question of generalisability at a 
new level, and one which will not degenerate, hopefully, into a totalising order of 
explanation. It Is at this level which my thesis is methodologically poised, as it looks to 
redefine the conception and perception of the single case study as means to 
generalisation. As research text, as contribution to the discourse of research, it is 
capable of generating generalisation about disciplinarity and its effects on the strategy- 
accounting relation, since, as Hoskin (1999) argues, the case study Is in itse! f a 
manifestation of disciplinarity. The practices of writing, grading and examining which 
are argued to operate so powerfully within the subject and the world are translated into 
the text as the means of its production as 'proper' research text. Since those practices 
are also so embedded in the business world in general, where they constitute the 
apparatus of Chandler's (1977) 'administrative coordination', this case study, as 
contribution to the 'new ethnography, is in a sense condemned to the generation of 
generalisation. 
Such a case study is therefore not to be read as an atomised version of reality. At the 
same time, it is not generating generalisations at the level of 'the organisation', about 
organisations-as-such, which could be generalisable to a whole population of 
organisations. Instead it sees how what is so comfortably seen within a certain 
dominant form of social/human science as a population is a series of sites where 
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differance plays out. In this respect, Chia's desire to reconstruct through 
deconstruction is exemplary. 
Tostmodern thinking epitomizes the insistence on moving inexorably upstream as to 
problematize self-evident (black-boxed) evocative terms such as 'reality'. 'truth'. 'knowledge', 
'representation' and 'organization' with a view to situating these terms differently and to 
thereby reveal their constitutive nature in shaping modernist discourse. .... Adopting an 
emergent and processual approach in social analysis enables us to avoid the problems of 
reffication of social entities such as 'individuals' and 'organizationsý and, instead. directs our 
attention to the underlying organizing processes which create these effects that are then 
subsequently taken to be concrete existing entities in their own right . .... (Me need to think of 
. organizations' not as 'things' whose properties such as unity, Identity, permanence and 
structure can be explored and described, but rather as loosely emergent sets of organizing 
rules which orient interactional behaviour in particular ways within a social collectivity. ' (Chia 
1996: 149-50) 39 
Procedures of investigation 
Finally, let me make it clear that doing what is hopefully a 'new ethnography' at the 
theoretical level, and at the level of its self-understanding, does not entafl abandoning 
the procedural methods of ethnography. The study is instead part of the ongoing 
39 Warning: It appears, however, that there is a flaw in Chia's anti-dualistic writing as his work has the effect 
of creating an incorm-nensurability thesis between representationalism and anti-representationalism. the clear 
beginnings of (yet) another dualisrn. And as Zen continues to teach us: 
'A nwnk in all seriousness asked i6sh&- 'Does a dog have Buddha-nature, or notr J(5shfi retDrted: * WO" 
(taken from Loy 1988: 205) 
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process in which researchers use e., dsting instruments to focus in new ways on what 
humans do, say and think. 
So I have used a primary focus on interviews, in which the object is to enable subjects 
to describe what they do and reflect upon it. I have complemented this with attendance 
at management meetings where possible, as well as spending non-interview time In the 
office. Part of this has been taken up, as participant, in undertaking work tasks, and 
being part of 'office life', which then leads to 'bumping into people' or going to their 
desks for a chat where the participant and observer/recorder roles intermingle. 
The objectives have been to construct opportunities, more or less formal, through which 
people can speak, act and reflect on their office experience, but in particular with a 
focus on how strategy and accounting, whether apparently as separate or as somehow 
Interlinked, enter into that experience. This has entailed constructing a schedule of 
questions around strategy and accounting, made up of questions both 
general/ theoretical and specific to the company, as a means to digging deeper into 
specific issues while helping me to establish the limits of my knowledge of Teleco at a 
given moment. while also looking to discover or reveal more. One tactic I have utilised is 
to give hints that I already know what is going on in the organisation, drawing on prior 
interviews and information, thus establishing a level of shared understanding that 
enables subjects to 'open up more freely. Given the theoretically-informed concern with 
making visible the tacit, it was these informal occasions which enabled me to develop 
credibility inside the organisation as I began t6 become familiar to those in Teleco, and 
therefore a more acceptable person with whom to share all forms of knowledge. 
Concerning my approach to setting up and undertaking interviews, I drew on the 
principle articulated by Potter and Weatherall (1987: 160), that '.. (p)arffcipants' 
discourse or social texts are approached in their own right and not as a secondary route 
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to things 'beyond' the text like attitudes, events or cognitive processes. ' in order for the 
tacit to become visible, it was the 'talk itself that had to remain the focus within the 
discursive interchange. As Potter and Weatherall continue: 
'... interviews in discourse analysis differ from conventional interviews in three ways. First, 
variation in response is as important as consistency. Second. techniques which allow diversity 
rather than those which eliminate it are emphasized. resulting in more informal 
conversational exchanges and, third, interviewers are seen as active participants rather than 
like speaking questionnaires. ' (Potter and Weatherall, 1987: 165) 
As part of my approach, I emphasised letting the interviewee speak his or her own mind 
as far as possible, even digressing widely from the main topics of strategy or accounting 
practices to enable him/her to feel relaxed. In such digressive tactics, there is a certain 
level of dissimulation on the interviewer's part oust as there is in interchanges 
generally, and within business specifically), as a means to establishing a rapport and 
thus creating more potential for confidential or politically sensitive information to be 
released. Against the conventional focus on consistency, therefore, these interviews 
encouraged diversity, not least in the attempt to avoid the forceful categorising or pre- 
selection of discursive constructions. 
Recording of interviews was undertaken whenever possible, and transcribed from the 
tape to the screen. Being aware, however. that the presence of a tape recorder can 
prejudice or shape discussion adversely for my purposes, as the interviewee would be 
overly careful with his or her opinions, I often made informal notes instead. Where the 
interview was treading on extremely sensitive ground, even note-taking activity would 
be stopped as a sign that the information was being treated as confidential. However, I 
would make notes on this as soon as the interview was completed. 
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'The idea that transcription is 'simply putting the words down on paper' is very far from 
reality. Transcription is a constructive and conventional activity. The transcriber is struggling 
to make clear decisions about what exactly is said, and then to represent those words in a 
conventional orthographic system... ' 
(Potter and Weatherall, 1987: 165) 
Transcription is not only a very detailed process of listening and making sense of the 
pauses and omissions as well as concentrating on what is said, it Is always 'after the 
event'. In circumstances like that just described, it may even be delayed beyond the 
event completely. It also changes in nature over time. At the beginning of the research 
project, I found it important to transcribe interviews in their completeness, as apparent 
irrelevancies were likely subsequently to prove non-irrelevant and even become part of 
key research questions as the project developed. Latterly, as research questions 
hardened and discursive regularities appeared, transcription became more selective, 
with digressions increasingly ignored. This was of course a 'subjective' decision, but one 
informed by the researcher's own increasing Immersion in the project and. Telecos 
organisational world. Thus it was not capricious. 
In addition, I supplemented interview material with collection of documents, reports, 
records, etc., wherever possible, not only to check on what I was being told but to 
replicate the immersion of employees in the variety of information sources available, on 
the grounds that this itself would shape discursive regularities. I would pick up such 
documentation in a range of ways, attending presentations, asking people directly for 
materials, going to published sources, extracting data (internal and external) from the 
Intranet. In this way I built up an archive of key documents for a range of departments 
within the organisation, helping me to develop a broader perspective across both the 
operating company and International. 
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In this way, I felt that I was able to establish not only discursive regularities but to 
build a picture of the similarities with other telecommunications firms, and the 
distinctive features of Teleco. Analysing industry magazines. (e. g. Teledotc=4, business 
magazines (e. g. Fortune), analyst & stockbroker reports, conference proceedings, etc, 
helped significantly in this regard. The longitudinal nature of the study in itself enabled 
further validation through generating predictions and explanations which could then be 
checked and revised over time. In particular, the sustainability of certain practices and 
discursive regularities could be evaluated over time. One final distinctive feature of this 
process was the requirement put on me by successive Managing Directors to submit 
annual management reports. 'Ibis was proposed as a condition of granting me access, 
and initially I was unsure whether I would be able to generate anything of value to the 
firm. However, the feedback was positive, and one consequence over time was the 
production of a set of texts that would not otherwise have been produced. but which 
provided me with a distinctive set of authorial reflections on the work I was doing. As 
such, it proved an invaluable part of the 'evidential loop'. 
Thus armed, theoretically and with a set of working practices. I was prepared to work 
through the experience of fieldwork. 
Appendix 
Finally, to underline the historicity of this project, I feel it would be helpful to provide an 
Idea of how my research questions developed and shifted over time. In 1997, during my 
MSc, I was interested In questions based around the concept of strategic control. I 
defined this for management as follows: 
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'Strategic control refers to the formal and informal systems of accountability ejasting within 
the organisation, which co-determine the correlation between performance and strategy. 
Formal systems include budgets and management compensation schemes. Informal systems 
are social factors, such as culture and group pressures, which form an intangible 
counterpart. ' 
My quest at this point was to uncover the practices of accountability which formed the 
strategic control within Teleco. without necessarily seeing the significance of accounting 
practices as central to accountability. 
In 1998,1 expanded this to focus more on the interactions of strategy and accounting 
practice. My questions were now based around the following headings that I set down. 
* Strategy & Planning - so how far can strategy be accounted for? 
9 Strategic Control - so how far should strategy be accounted for? 
Department - so how far is strategy accounted for? 
9 Personal level 
9 Contacts & research opportunities 
9 What is the strategy of the different departmentsT 
In 1999, as my research began to explore the extent to which strategy operated to have 
effects both as presence and as absence and the role of accounting practices within this 




* Strategy within the International/ Global perspective is a dyadic, capital-centered 
discourse which presumes to affect both internal and external control using 
financial numbers. Power and knowledge revolve around the careful distribution 
of performance targets which are kept separate from their strategic rationale. 
9 Strategy within the UK opco is discursively denied/ scomed/despised (perhaps 
jealously seen as a top management-only practice) as practices of accountability 
remain fragmented and activity is re-active. 
* Accounting acts to enforce an exclusion whereby only merger and acquisition 
activity or director-level directives are perceived as strategic, and centralised 
control of resource derives from the logic of its discourse. Conversely, the 
inclusive power of the numbers directs the opco towards an autonomous identity. 
Predictions 
* As the need for clearer and more controlled business processes becomes 
apparent, practices of measurement and discourses of shareholder value 
infiltrate organising. Accounting once again emerges hand-in-hand with strategy 
except critically this is now experienced at a variety of management levels. 
* Mie exclusivity of the strategy discourse thus implodes as employees buy-into the 
wider availability of accounting practices. made visible and attainable through a 
discourse of accountability. ' 
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(IV) Empirical Study 
Introduction 
'The point of Hoskin and Macve's analysis Is to reveal the power of accounting as 
'grammatocentric organization' to create a specific form of knowledge (knowledge-power) which 
subjects individuals to a fixed and determinate visibility. ( ... ) 
However, these studies lack the deconstructive cast that Derrida brings to the analysis of 
writing, and without this they are liable to give the impression that the formalized writing of 
the professional is firmly founded and largely unproblematic' 
(Cooper 1989: 500) 
In writing this chapter, I begin from a certain suspicion of an over-linear structuring of 
the events that occurred. 'Ibis is not just in Burrell's sense (1998, p 135) that 'Minearity 
kills'. I also have a particular concern over how to preserve the difference in the voices 
with which I necessarily speak within an empirical chapter - not just as narrator after 
the event, but also as subject involved in the events In two ways, i. e. as actor 
participating in them and as researcher recording and reflecting on them. Preserving 
the right of each voice to speak, while avoiding a simple relativism where each is 
supposedly equal is what concerns me here. The narrativevoice must carry a certain 
priority through coming chronologically last. Yet it must so far as possible be restrained 
from drowning out those earlier voices, or explaining them away. Hence a certain 
linearity of time is Inescapable, reinforced by the linear nature of textual narrative. At 
the same time (sicl), a heedless linearity needs to be resisted. First, within a complex 
and geographically dispersed organization, people are not necessarily in 'the same time 
all the time' in any event. There are always lags and gaps in what people know and 
when. The smooth image of change as 'evolving', which fits so neatly with the linear flow 
of textual narrative, erases or denies that temporal fragmentation. It equally runs the 
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risk of collapsing the multiple locations occupied by the researcher/author into a 
seeming unity. 'Ibus if linearity does not exactly kill, It too easily defaces and displaces 
what happened and how. In such ways, perhaps, the pressure to derive a generalised 
model or conclusion from case study data can lead to a loss of general applicability 
through erasing the local and specific. . 
This is perhaps one methodological concern that can be raised over Smith and 
Zeithaml's recent study, 'Contemporary International Expansion Processes of the 
Regional Bell Operating Companiesý (1999). They are analysing a very similar topic to 
mine. and the beauty of their research, at least from their point of view. is the way the 
complex dimensions of strategy practice can be captured within a three phase model, as 
evolving over time. They are able to derive, via their evolutionary approach, an 
Interactive' analysis wherein over time, the processes they observed became, firstly. 
more strategic and secondly. more costly. As such. the relationship between strategy 
and accounting follows a logic of mutual dependence. During Phases 1 and 2 of their 
model, Opportunism and Experimentation and Growth and Commitment. while a general 
direction 'to become a global playee was made clear, 'a strategy had not been identi Lecr 
(1999: 60). 'Mis is, within the analysis, inextricably tied to the level of spending. which 
while growing, remained low. But in Phase 3. Strategic Growth, '[aLfter a large deal had 
given them more than $1 bn in international commitments, top managers broke the 
trajectonj of frenzied deal making, surveyed their current commitments and, with some 
input by international managers, identifted a strategy. ' (1999: 60). Hence. strategy and 
accounting walk hand-in-hand, side-by-side, in what may appear as an 'evolution'. If 
one were to posit such a logic, the evolution is presumably towards an ever more costly 
but rational planning regime (beyond which would lie a continuing future of more 
accounting and more strategy, in a mutual and generally positive reinforcement of these 
two key forms of modernist reason). 
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Against the approach of Smith and Zeithaml, I wished to highlight the interpenetration 
of events within my case study, creating a more temporally and contextually sensitive 
picture of strategy and accounting within Teleco. I therefore begin with some more 
detailed reflections on the way that various voices get to speak in the context of my 
ethnography. This I see as necessary in order to enable my data to realise my 
theoretical concern of seeing how far accounting and strategy Intertwine as mutually 
constitutive, thereby promoting their conjoint study as fruitful both in a theoretical and 
practical way. 
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, in terms of the subject as object, the question 
of how to be self-reflejdve as a participant observer has been variously posed, with 
particular concern about avoiding the realist trap posed by forms of naturalistic and 
unrefle. xive ethnography (cf. Hammersley 1992). But the counter-tendency is to lapse 
too easily into an Infinitely regressive but self-defeating relativism, where no voice is 
supposedly privileged, but where in consequence either solipsism, or some kind of 
deauthored narrative voice, reigns. [lbese are perhaps two versions of the same thing. ] 
My proposal, grounded in my post-Foucauldian approach, is to attempt to articulate 
this narrative, recognising that I speak, or write, as a situated Individual, who comes to 
the task of writing with prior ideas and beliefs, and who has, across time, occupied 
various roles or identities in the process of doing, and reflecting on, this research. I 
write as one who has been continually learning and revising his ideas along the way, yet 
who has by the point of writing amassed an archive of materials which implicates me in 
different ways, under the guise of these various identities. So I have been variously 
student and researcher of, and contributor to, what gets said and done in the names of 
strategy and accounting. I therefore suggest that I now come to the event of vriting-up' 
my empirical data as some kind of *change-master'. For I am as author, in the action of 
narrating. via my narrative voice, producer of a narrative that, in mastering the mass of 
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data collected, changes it. The data is given status as a 'data sef through the act of 
exception and exclusion-, it obtains a previously invisible coherence not so much 
through theorising as an 'act:, but through the excisions and decisions that are imposed 
on the data through beginning to turn it into narrative. The authoring of the narrative 
in turn affects what gets articulated as theory (and not just as 'evidencel. through this 
Janus-faced process of exclusion and Inclusion. In such ways the process of narrating, 
and the narrative voice, are privileged in a crucial way (but not be it noted through the 
sovereign act of 'theorising, for that is itself only one thing that 'falls out: from the 
narrative practice). But then, what becomes equally Important is maintaining a proper 
status and place for the other voices carried along within the narrative. 
Enabling multiple voices to speak through but therefore also beyond the narrative voice 
has a major methodological importance here. Where an objectivist stance can too easily 
decline into a kind of 'god's eye' narrative, delivered by an 'omnLscient narrator', 
following Hatch (1996: 367), 1 hope to promote a narrative that recognizes how the story 
being told from out of the data set is 'both subjective and objective as well as reflexive 
and nonreflexive, and treats the boundaries between these positions as penetrable. ' It is 
through this uxiy of telling that I wish my tvay of seeing to be reflected, hence building a 
bridge between my epistemological position and narrative style. 
'Ibis empirical part of the thesis traces the events that I experienced over the period of 
1997-2000 within the U. K. based part of a global telecommunications company. 
Teleco4O. For narrative coherence, it has been split into three, not necessarily 
chronological chapters. The first, Apr-Mgy 1997: the U. S. and the U. K.. traces my 
beginnings at the tip of the U. K. operating company ('opco' for short), the Sales 
department. Discovering very quickly the sales-led nature of Teleco, I was thrown 
40 All names used within this thesis are pseudonyms to disguise the Identities of those involved. 
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simultaneously to the core of U. K. strategy practice , while at the same time being 
personally marginalised by my lack of contacts within the wider, non-sales 
departments. At this time, a large merger was being undertaken, throwing the sales 
department into apparent disarray. This chapter focuses, however, on pre-merger 
practices still very much in evidence within opco discourses, attempting to excavate 
interactions of accounting and strategy which pre-existed the beginning of my study. 
The second, MU 1997-October 1999: the Rise of International, begins from practices 
emerging during May 1997, being perceived by interviewees as stemming from the 
merger. Extending my study into 1998/99,1 then entered the broader opco functions to 
find that strategy implementation was structured around the practice of a revenue 
target. The clarity of this was being clouded by the rise of an International overlay 
function (covering Europe and Asia). I focus here on observations of International as 
they began to practice strategy by taking over the accounting practices of target-setting, 
thus precipitating the removal of the 'doinW of strategy from the opco. without wholly 
erasing eidsting strategy-related practices and discourse. Thus both opco and 
International began to experience strategy in a new way as both presences and 
absences, as something done both here and elsewhere (though more elsewhere for 
opco). So observations in both opco and International are incorporated here, to attempt 
to give a more two-sided account of International's rise, i. e. In terms of strategy as both 
presence and absence. The culmination of this study of International activity was when 
I experienced strategy-making first hand as I finally became an insider to the strategy 
process, joining International Strategy on two detailed participant observation projects 
in Summer 1999. 
The final chapter, Jan 1999-May 2000: Structural Changes in the Opco, sees me return 
to a focus on the opco, viewing how U. K. employees attempted to solve the problem of 
strategy absence through a new focus on measurement practices. Marketing embraced 
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Sales-type hard accountability objectives. I then watched the increasing relevance of 
other numbers, e. g. the Comparative Performance Indicators generated by OFTEL (the 
U. K. 's telecommunications regulatory body), to certain parts of opco management. and 
the decreasing focus by the areas run by such management on the corporate target of 
revenue numbers. This divergent and potentially dysfunctional measurement obsession 
was then complicated (and made still more potentially dysfunctional) by a growth in 
senior management's awareness concerning the problems posed in attempting to 
measure revenue. In part because of the endemic accounting problem over the timing of 
revenue recognition, there was a range of target-hitting and revenue-smoothing games 
played within sales, which were seen as seriously affecting the validity of revenue 
measurement figures. 'Ibis awareness led management to establish a new department, 
Business Analysis, to 'solve' the revenue problem. But this department was therefore a 
solution to what was increasingly the wrong problem, since management failed to notice 
how far many parts of the organisation were no longer keying on revenue as the 
important measurement for them. As I was then personally involved in the planning of a 
Balanced Scorecard performance measurement system and so involved in the capture 
of financial and non-financial performance measures, ,I was able to observe this 
strategic use being made of accounting practices within the UK opco. and the extent to 
which the opco therefore got back into strategy even in its absence. 
I begin, however, with an introduction to practices within the telecommunications 
industry as well as the background of Teleco within that. To enable the reader to trace 
my odyssey through Teleco, I also present a diagram of my chronological path through 
the various departments, from 1997-2000. 
161 
Practices of the telecommunications 
industry 
Telecommunications has historically been a thoroughly monopolised environment, 
exhibiting a perceived stability in both markets and competitors. Widespread 
deregulation, and a combination of Incremental and discontinuous advances in 
communication technologies have revoked a perceived stability in both markets and 
competitors, as monopolies have been uprooted and competition intensified. Being 
instrumental in the perpetuation of information networks. telecommunications is 
perceived as especially characterised by an indeterminacy in its boundaries, 
precariously perched amidst a 'simultaneously converging and disintegrating` (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1994: 41) collection of other digital industries (e. g. computer software 
and hardware, broadcasting). It therefore appears to have become accepted by industry 
watchers (non-academic) that the concrete analysis of strategy is increasingly fraught 
with impossibility. When the very boundaries of an industry are so visibly subject to 
change, Porterian discussions of sustainable competitive advantage are treated with 
scepticism within business magazines and analyst reports. Tracing the development of 
this discourse over the past few years, I have seen a consensus emerging In the analysis 
of strategy. This unashamedly places accounting at the forefront of the judgement of 
success, even as the instability of accounting as predictor is accepted. For, as Castells 
has observed: 
'Financial capital. acting directly through financial institutions or indirectly through the 
dynamics of stock exchange markets, conditions the fate of high-technology industries. On the 
other hand, technology and information are decisive tools In generating profits and in 
appropriating market shares. ' 
(Castells. 1996: 472-473) 
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Stock market pressures have been constituted as a systemic feature of contemporary 
capitalism, and the very existence of many contemporary ('up-start: ) 
telecommunications organisations is exemplary of the creative vitality of capital flows. 
Births as well as continued expansions rely heavily on both capital and stock markets, 
this eternal becoming characterising so well this high-technology industry, with CEOs 
playing the public game of disclosures and guidance to finance investments and 
acquisitions. As the Castells quote indicates, the survival of capital is inextricably tied 
to the survival of high-technology industries, their continued enistence being mutually 
dependent. This may explain the almost fevered praise lavished. during some periods at 
least, onto the telecommunications industry by stock market analysts. Their (implicit) 
awareness of the productive relationship between capital and technology has helped 
ensure that the funds have continued to flow during 1997-2000, enabling the 
expansion of capitalism, even as worries have increased during the latter months of this 
period, bver the sustainability of this 'new economy' of Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications (TNM companies. 
A recent colurrm in The Guardiarfs Finance section offers one example of the frankness 
now being displayed within the stock market over the shifting nature of value within the 
U. K. telecom sector: 
*-Mis, could be the year of reckoning". one analyst warned privately yesterday. "After two 
extremely strong years for telecom stocks some valuations are looking dangerously high and 
the truth Is with some of the newer companies no one really knows what they should be. ' 
Mather, 2000: 26) 
While at any given moment such doom-saying may prove to be whistling in the dark. 
the apparent separation between new and old economies is one which has raised 
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serious questions over the valuation of companies. While old economy stocks have 
continued to be primarily valued on their price/earnings ratios, new economy stocks 
have been valued more on non-earnings bases, looking into revenue growth figures, 
numbers of customers, or other approximations to future growth. Within the stock 
market, the role of accounting practices has therefore become more visibly complex, 
acting to create as well as measure success. The new/old economy distinction may not 
be a clear or stable one, but it is indicative of the differing bases on which success can 
be achieved. On the one hand, success is something to be measured through these 
instruments. However. on the other, in the case of the 'new economy', it can be seen 
that success is also created through them, particularly since they are so central to the 
construction of stock market discourse which disseminated and circulated between the 
business press, investment analysts and senior management as they discuss the 
strategy of a given telecoms company. While this way of seeing may have originated from 
within a United States context still as telecommunications networks have become 
increasingly transnational, this preoccupation with financial performance figures has 
spread throughout the Western world. 
What is fascinating, therefore, from an accounting standpoint, is how far the base upon 
which the circulation of capital rests, in these highly developed markets, is both 
calculative and yet fundamentally indeterminate. Me truism about accounting giving 
you whatever valuation you want Is regularly borne out by the fluctuations in value of 
telecommunications companies, where following investor or market trends becomes 
more important than predicting any kind of 'fundamental' value. Thus, the study of 
accounting practice as constitutive of any would-be successful strategy becomes of 
major significance within both business and acaden-dc discourse. 
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The strategies associated with finance control are not necessarily profit-nia2dmizing, but 
rather those which financiers have managed to promote as the accepted way of doing business 
in American culture. ' 
(Whittington, 1993: 118) 
Whittington can now be interpreted (and extended) by arguing that accounting and 
strategy exhibit practices that are mutually constitutive. Conventionally of course, in 
the telecommunications industry as in others, strategy is viewed as coming first, 
creating an overview knowledge about the company's intentions. and one that can be 
viewed optimistically or pessimistically. Accounting then comes second, as the means of 
quantifying the previously stated strategy. Meeting or failing to meet targets is then the 
sign whether the strategy is right or wrong. However, this ignores the way accounting 
itself can subsume strategic intent. The achievement of financial performance, being 
itself a sign of success, becomes the primary sign that strategy e? dsts and works. The 
supplement therefore becomes central, constituting a strategy as successful over and 
above any alternative judgement on its effectiveness. 
Now, at one level, this is just a specific version of a general measurement phenomenon 
in modern corporate management, where You get what you measure' and where 
managing by the numbers becomes the means both of coordinating and rationalising 
management action. The measuring of success is therefore going to be seen in a general 
way as integral to strategic discourse, a constructed 'need' which enables corporate 
activity to be graded in terms of varying degrees of success (cf. Knights and Morgan. 
1991: 263). But there is a spectj'Lc significance to accounting measurement Oven the 
centrality of valuation to the measurement of strategic success (cf. Ezzamel, Hoskin & 
Macvc, 1990). It Is typically the level of accounting-derived measured success which 
drives Investors and analysts to favour a company in making investment choices, and 
so to help drive up the stock price and re-affirm management's 'right' to be in control. 
165 
The stock price thus continues to be a self-fulfilling measure of management ability. As 
the recent Vodafone-Mannesman and AOL-Time Warner deals both confirm, stock 
prices are highly instrumental in the carrying out of strategic intentions. High stock 
prices affirm management prowess, at the same time enabling this prowess to continue 
to be demonstrated through a strategy of acquisition. In the first of these cases. 
Vodafone were able to promise a higher stock swap value in the merged entity than 
Mannesman could offer through its own achievement. In the second. AOL, riding the 
wave of the Internet, consolidated their stratospheric valuation through the merger with 
(purchase oo a major 'old-world' entity. 
It is at such moments that the indeterminate (and two-way) relation between strategy 
and accounting becomes more clear. Accounting-derived projections of present and 
future value in general define strategies as successful. In a fast-changing world like 
telecoms, where mould-breaking Is seen as the most effective and fashionable type of 
strategy, the indeterminacy of accounting numbers and of the particular type of 
accounting-based valuation chosen makes it increasingly difficult to evaluate, in any 
accounting-Uidependent way, exactly what a type of strategy is saying, let alone how 
effective it will be. At the same time, this double indeterminacy is likely to reinforce the 
principle that strategy Is essential, while doing nothing to undermine the perception 
that a high stock price is the result of effective planning. 
This, I suggest, is a major reason why, as Knights & Morgan have suggested: '(m)istakes 
and failures are relegated to the status of minor tactics and attributed to weaknesses in 
the organisation that can only be eradicated by invoking the discourse and practice of 
strategy' (Knights and Morgan, 1990: 480). Through a better understanding of the 
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centrality of the accounting supplement, we can begin to appreciate better just how this 
hierarchy of success over failure has been naturallsed within strategy. 
As a demonstration of how accounting value forms the bottom-line of strategy, as a kind 
of 'final judgement! by the business world on whether strategy is leading the company 
in the right direction, I would refer to a 1998 article in Business Week. This presented 
an 'Investment Scoreboard', detailing a variety of ratios which attempt to capture the 
value of major U. S. organisations. If this in Itself is unremarkable in our calculating 
accounting world, what really struck me was the way the article concluded: 
'Remember that the information in the tables and the Scoreboard should be the starting point 
of your research, not the end of it. But analyze the numbers; while you might invest in a 
company that has a good story, Ws the numbers that will ultimately determine whether that 
story has a happy ending. ' (Jespersen, Dec 28 1998: 87) 
The corollary is that figures can equally sound the death knoll for corporate 
management, presenting a strategy (or its execution) as having failed to achieve 
promised performance. Yet clearly, as Knights and Morgan point out (e. g. 1990,1991). 
discourses of strategy are set up to privileg6 success over failure: 
'Failure can be explained away because some factor was insufficiently appreciated, but now it 
has become incorporated in the next round of business planning and so we can look forward 
to the future with confidence. ' (Knights and Morgan, 1991: 263). 
Hence it is not strategy itself which failed in principle. it is the particular application of 
the principle which was faulty, leaving open the possibility that this ran be rectified in 
the future. 
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. ys a 
double role, being critical in the constitution of both Accounting practice plia 
success and failure, even as strategy discourse downplays the likelihood of failure and 
talks up the aura of success. 
But accounting practice arguably has a further effect through its creation, as metric, of 
an apparent distinction between measurability and value. Value is the 'Holy Grail' of 
Investment analysis, being tied inextricably to long-term success. Ibis is more and 
other than simply market value, which is 'impure', being too affected by short-term 
fluctuations. 'Pure' valuing attempts to get to grips with the fundamentals of a 
company, and to value for the long-term (e. g. defined as discounted net future cash 
flows) and thus to translate into gains for analysts and investors who can locate and 
define imperfections in market valuations. Ibis 'pure valuing is therefore conceptually 
distinct from the kinds of measurability which are directly derived from market values, 
e. g. by enabling approximations to be calculated from such values using various ratios. 
The paradox of course is that there is no simple opposition between the two sides of this 
equation. Impure valuing is in a sense 'pure' because it is grounded in a more purely 
'market' transactionality, being extrapolable from some direct and current 
supply/demand relation. Pure valuing is impure insofar as it introduces a greater 
dependence on accounting-dependent numbers and projections, including the future 
cash flows and the appropriate rate for discounting them. And both valuings, in 
practice, carry within them estimates derived from past, as well as future, accountings 
of performance. Value-in-general is thus in a certain respect accounting practice 
hardened to such a degree that it takes on the appearance of a characteristic that is 
intrinsic to the corporation. 
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Certain distinctions between different forms of Valuingý may not therefore be as 
fundamental as they are often taken to be. Currently in telecoms, value is being 
appraised through a combination of sector growth and peer-group performance, as 
analysts move away from earnings as a measure of value. Tbus, conventional 
'fundamental' evaluation, ie. through price/earnings ratios, is being discarded. But, 
from the perspective adopted here, this is to discard an 'old-world' accounting model of 
profit-ma)dmisation as the means to 'pure valuing, and replace it, for this 'new-world' 
hi-technology industry, with a model of pure valuing focused on revenue growth, 
deferring the concern with earnings until some later (as yet unspecified) date. But this 
is equally measured through accounting. In the last analysis, then, success remains 
inconceivable (because unmeasurable) without accounting, and financial performance 
as measured via accounting or accounting-based derivatives (e. g. the various forms of 
'value added' measurement) continues to form the bottom-line of strategic activity. 
Miis is not infrequently a cause for concern to commentators, or worse: 
"Most people focus on what's measurable, not on how value gets created. and thaVs a dead 
end. " (Colvin, 1999: 168) 
Ihis is a Chief Financial Officer, critiquing the way that he sees measurability standing 
in the way of real value. But the CFO thereby leaves open the question of how value 
itself is measured, thus overlooking the centrality of accounting to strategy, even as he 
reinforces it. This is one of the key paradoxes concerning accountings power in relation 
to strategy. At one level, accounting is seen as diverting attention away from strategy or 
value-creating activities, but meanwhile, at the level of the practice of doing strategy, 
accounting is kept in place, a secondary practice that constantly proves to be central. In 
a sense this is acknowledged in statements like the above. But it tends to be seen as a 
counsel of despair, or a fatalistic recognition of 'the way things are'. 
169 
'... the simplest, most visible, most merciless measure of corporate success in the 1990s has 
become this one: Did you make your earnings last quarter? " (Fox, 1997: 77, quoted in 
Macintosh et aL 1997: 15 1) 
'When it comes to judging any industry's health, the bottom line Is exactly that - the bottom 
line. The communications industry is no different. Its health Is measured in terms of past, 
current and projected revenue. ' (Salak, 2000: 46) 
The despair (when it is present) is perhaps out of a recognition that the representation 
of value has thus become identical with its object, as measurement is all. This of course 
means that the object can never be stable, for what is to be accounted for, as strategy, 
and how it is to be valued, via accounting, will both never be pregiven or fixed. Rational 
planning is thus destabilised from two directions: from without by the patterns of 
events and from within by the modes of measurement. In such a quandary, the Ironic 
outcome is that the sole thing that remains invariant is the way that accounting 
practice becomes strategy discourse. So Fox in 1997 emphasises earnings, and Salak in 
2000 underscores revenues. And further, whatever the 'bottom line' target chosen, 
analysts will be backing or critiquing corporate strategies on the basis of the numbers 
predicted and achieved. In such ways the tightness of the loop from accounting practice 
to strategy discourse is increasingly ratcheted up. Given then a backdrop of extreme 
perceived environmental uncertainty, accounting practice becomes the one 'sure' means 
to provide the reliability that more qualitative strategy statements omit. 
Telecommunications is of course such an industry, and as such one where it has 
become the norm to see the route to value as being through growth (and thus 
globalisation) rather than earnings. This is not untypically seen as changing the 
paradigm of business, as in the following excerpt from the industry journal tele. coaL 
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'For entrenched telecom providers, this will require creating an entirely new business model 
that thrusts them in the role of growth companies rather than value (or earnings) entities. 
This will not sit well with many shareholders. They originally bought giant telecom company 
stock based on its ability to deliver steady if unexceptional dividends and earnings growth. 
Nonetheless, the switch is necessary if these companies expect to be meaningful players. They 
need to develop a growth-driven mindset that provides powerful leverage on Wall Street. 
.... New providers, not surprisingly, often enjoy a big advantage here. Their shareholders have 
already bought into the growth concept, which often makes it possible for a hard-charging 
upstart to engineer a multibillion-dollar merger with an established giant. ' (Bonocore, 1999: 
60) 
Still more recently Katz (2000: 23) discusses how conceptualisations of value are 
moving from price/earnings ratios to Peg, price-to-earnings growth and illustrates the 
shift in reality engineered through the case of Intel, the dominant global producer of 
semiconductors. A broker's report from Credit Suisse First Boston argues for a 
revaluation of Intel since, while during 1999 it significantly underperformed the Nasdaq 
(the technology stock market where it is listed), strong performance is expected in 2000. 
Katz's point is that this revaluation is not based on traditional earnings to price figures, 
even though, based on predicted earnings, Intel's p/e ratio will double that in force at 
the date of the report. Instead the focus is on Peg, as 
'... (t)he dramatic growth in the technology and communications industries ts encouraging 
analysts to make share price valuations based on sector growth and peer group performance, 
and research which recognises that investors cannot fight the ticker and must be taken 
seriously. ' (Katz, 2000: 23) 
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Of course, in this new world, even being a 'new age business' is not an absolute. In the 
context of the expansion of stock-market trading with the coming of the Internet, and 
the growth of phenomena such as 'day trading', where individual investors can trade 
on-line using real-time stock prices and the information sources of the Internet, 
volatility becomes ever more of a given. Short-term share price growth arguably 
becomes even more necessary than it was just a few years ago when quarterly earnings 
figures were the ruling obsession of Wall Street analysts. In this context, telecoms 
become subject to the vagaries of being defined as 'fashion stocks', and during the 
recent 'Internet bubble' they began to look like 'old age' businesses when put alongside 
the perceived opportunities of Internet stocks. Even if, at the time of writing, the upside 
of the Internet bubble has been joined by a downside, the underlying volatility that 
accompanies being seen as a fashion stock remains. Such volatility forms the backdrop 
of my study of Teleco. 
Initial perceptions of Teleco 
It is the growth concept. I feel. that enabled Teleco to establish a strong reputation 
within the telecommunications industry as owning a strategy powerful enough to allow 
it to compete effectively within the global marketplace. At the same time, companies like 
Teleco were part of constituting this new model of shareholder value. Here value is 
achieved through capital growth rather than dividend yield, with the promise of future 
earnings being deferred in favour of using capital growth to finance investment for 
further return through growth. Such a model of using share price value as a source of 
capital has stimulated a seemingly virtuous cycle of value creation, which has led the 
market to subordinate the need for profit to the need for revenue. 
As this has become a general strategy among telecommunications companies, the 
industry has become enveloped in a strategy discourse focussed around revenue 
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growth. 'Iberefore for individual firms within the industry, the importance of meeting 
analyst expectations comes hand in hand with the Importance of owning a competitive 
edge within the market that can sustain future expectations. 
Turning to Teleco itself, its birth was at first of apparently little consequence, springing 
as it did from the messy mergers, acquisitions and divestitures which so characterised 
the post-monopoly U. S. telecoms environment. Within a few years, however, Teleco grew 
Into a leading player on the stock exchange, through demonstrating high growth in 
share price and market share. Its particular strategy of expanding network capacity 
through purchase, lease or alliance was also validated as appropriate to highly 
competitive conditions. The niche of Teleco was in its ability to engineer products for its 
global business customers, packaging bare fibre into business services constituted as 
essential for organisations today. Growth was thus organic, through alliances as well as 
merger and acquisition activity, forming a complex mesh of 'internal' and 'external' 
growth. 
Strategy therefore seemed clear. Or more specifically, the extemal strategy validated 
through accounting practices appeared clear. Competitive advantage through network 
coverage and technological edge was stated and constantly repeated. I was particularly 
interested, however, in the relationship between stating a strategy and reallsing a 
strategy. Teleco managed to sustain a clarity of strategy within the perceived turbulence 
of the telecommunications industry. Through the support of the continuous 
achievement of financial performance indicators, the stated strategy appeared to 
constitute the realised strategy as a success, as well as through the contextual truth of 
its position. The details of the realisation, Le. the particular way customers were 
marketed and sold to across Europe, were not treated with the same Importance in the 
financial press, however, as the results. In other words, the strategy seemed to be 
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evaluated both through accounting as well as within the conventional confines of its 
own discourse. The latter can best be described as a shifting yet normalising formation 
within which investors can appraise the validity of strategies, made specific through the 
context of organising global telecommunications. The sheer uncertainty surrounding 
the telecommunications industry has meant that this formation does not encourage 
detail, being confined instead to a mission statement type level. 
Teleco's results demonstrated to the marketplace that the CEO had a tight control over 
a strong strategy. The strength of that strategy was, however, indeterminable without 
the 'proof of the numbers. Against Mintzberg's argument, therefore. the boundaries 
between stated and realised strategies became blurred as a result of financial success. 
Within Teleco, the expansion into Europe was the stated strategy, through a mixture of 
careful network purchasing and leasing strategies, as well as mergers and alliances. 
This was realised through local-level strategies such as customer segmentation but at a 
stock market level, the practices of realisation were seen as far less important than the 
revenue growth achieved. As such the realised strategy itself became obscured (at least 
at this level). 
This critical synopsis is drawn from an analyst or business magazine perspective. one 
which relies on knowledge propounded as relevant within their discourse. I have tried to 
unravel the play of accounting with strategy within the stock market. What becomes 
apparent is the very selective way in which this play unfolds. While the stated strategy 
is qualitative, the realised strategy is almost entirely quantitative. Neither, however, 
begin to explore the perceptions of strategy found within Teleco itselL As I moved in my 
position as observer from the outside to the inside, I was to discover that the external 
reality of Teleco bore little resemblance, in fact, to that found within. Reading Porter 
(1980,1985), it appears that his discourse promotes a focus on both the external and 
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the internal workings of corporations. The demonstration of competitive advantage is a 
practice which has been accepted by the markets as a constituent of strategic success. 
The value chain is Porter's means of achieving and sustaining this competitive 
advantage, and there is a neat extrapolation of the external into the internal. It is clear 
that Porter sees the internal as indistinct from the external. In fact, the challenge he 
heralds is one of streamlining the internal into the external. 
Coming into Teleco for the first time, I found myself in the middle of a most troublesome 
merger situation with Manumit. As a means of market dominance, the acquisition made 
strategic sense to stock market analysts, increasing both scope and scale. Within 
deregulating global markets, scope is viewed as critical to meeting the needs of Multi- 
National Corporations, currently the biggest spenders, and therefore the most 
important customer segment for any strategic directive. Hence, to the external viewer, 
the discourse of strategy was present, playing an Important role in constructing and 
s ustaining Teleco as a one-stop shop for telecoms products. 
Having a clear strategy at this level did not, however, necessarily lead to a wider 
organisational, or internal, perception that a unitary strategy was actually in place, as 
the two merging organisations and their respective strategies had come from two quite 
different directions and traditions. 
'Manumit: s strategy was to build company value ... not necessarily profit or contribution 
but 
company value. Teleco was driven by the US and was aiming at share value. ' 
(Jim, U. K. Marketing Director: April 1997 ) 
This raised for me the question of the role of the discourse of strategy. I found that the 
business press propagated generally similar views on the differences between Manumit 
and Teleco. intriguingly, there appeared to be a clash in the stated strategies of the 
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companies. Teleco was, however, the acquirer, and at a CEO level at least, the aim of 
share value continued to be the formal aim. I was in the fortunate position of being able 
to watch how these differences would be translated into practices within the companies. 
Inside of Teleco, after the merger, what was striking was the scepticism whenever 
discussion turned to the subject of strategy. both as a vision and, perhaps more 
concretely, in terms of its practices. Rationalist concepts of planning and control were 
generally found to be unhelpful or inadequate for management practice, discursively 
excluding the pro-active generation of a strategy. Only at top management level could 
there be found an expressed desire for such practices. Processualist theories of strategy 
as emergent provide a more promising agenda, and yet it would be premature to fit 
Teleco into such models. 
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Investigating Teleco 
Taking the critical approach of viewing strategy as a changing set of discourses and 
practices (cf. Knights and Morgan, 1991; also Hoskin, 1994) appeared to be the most 
appropriate way of acknowledging the chequered face of strategy within Teleco, thus 
enforcing a de-essentialised and more liberated notion of organising. But in addition my 
thesis differed from both the rational and processual schools of strategy in following 
Inkpen and Choudhury's (1995) call for a research question of strategic absence, to be 
investigated through the study of practices. While the critical school (cf. Knights and 
Morgan 1991,1995) is strong in its relinquishing of essentialism, their approach is not 
wholly embraced here, insofar as there has been little focus on the role of accounting 
practices within strategic discourse. In addition, using an analysis of strategy absence 
as well as presence potentially brings out intriguing new inconsistencies in strategy 
practice. 
At the same time, the approach attempts to recognise the subjects who are the objects 
of its study as reasoning, reflective subjects, no different in this respect from the 
author. Far from being the 'cultural dopes' of some critical studies, I found my 
interviewees to be generally reflective on the work that they did. not in an academically 
informed way certainly, but still in ways that made me reflect In turn on how or how 
much theory adds to practical understanding. The approach was to take informant 
opinion seriously, not naively and unreflectively, within the context in which it was 
given - to a researcher investigating strategic management In the telecommunications 
industry. 
Conducting interviews and spending time within Teleco, it took me over a year before I 
stumbled across the idea that perhaps I was framing both my research and interview 
questions in the wrong way. This was when I realised that I had been presuming the 
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presence of strategy, and thereby both naturalising and obscuring the full role of 
accounting within that, thereby re-committing the very 'crime' that my literature review 
had condemned. I had been too concerned with how strategy as presence had been 
formed, was communicated. and how it had evolved over time. Looking primarily at 
planning and control processes, I had been looking to discover the 'hidden depths' of 
Manumit, the underlying sense of coherence which drove the organisation's success. To 
prepare myself for my interviews in the Summer of 1998, for example, I had framed my 
inquiry into accounting practices within three loose categories - 'how far can strategy be 
accounted forT, 'how far should strategy be accounted forT. and 'how far is strategy 
accounted forT. While these questions provided only a very sketchy outline of my Ideas, 
especially in the context of the serni- to un-structured style of the interviews, they 
suddenly, as I 'saw things differently. served to epitomise my presupposition of strategy 
as pre-existing and thus discoverable 'presence'. 
At first, as I felt something was awiy in my conceptualisations, I was not able to 
articulate it in the way I have just done here, as my Field Notes reveal. 
'Struggling at the moment to really keep focus on my ethnography. Most of It is slipping 
dramatically out of my mind 'how the hell can I capture it? I now feel most disembodied as I 
am neither the 'telecoms researcher' nor the 'academic theorist' but in some netherland 
Inbetween. " (Field Notes, 1999: April 28) 
I can now see this inability to compare and contrast the philosophical and eýdstentlal 
discrepancies between them as a manifestation of a shift in my tacit level of knowing 
that had not yet surfaced discursively. I was in such a state of mental discomfort In 
part because of what I had begun to 'know' but did not yet 'know that I knew'. At the 
same time, there was another dimension to this quasi-schizophrenic state I was In. For 
there was a real difference in the ways in which I engaged in being a 'disciplinary 
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subject', in my respective academic and business 'subject positions% As academic 
disciplinary subject, the practices to the fore were those involved in rigorous reflection, 
e. g. the critical examinatorial reading of events in the hope of deconstructing strategy 
(at first as presence, then as presence and absence). Meanwhile to fit into Teleco, I 
needed to prove myself as a disciplinary professional, a subject position where I 
undoubtedly drew upon my Chartered Accountancy training, in terms of exercising the 
application and demonstration first of accounting and financial expertise, and then of 
an appropriate self-discipline and professional self-presentation.. So. as Munro (1999) 
found during his ethnographic research: ' ... L. -moved constantly 'in-between" the 
identity of researcher and that of a member. ' While doctoral research was the primary 
initial aim, once inside the company, corporate discourses began to make far more 
sense to me than academic-theoretical ones. I was reading business magazines and 
spending my time engaging with pragmatic aspects of business-focussed disciplinary 
practice. Perhaps it was inevitable or at least understandable that more abstract 
questions of the existence or otherwise of strategy tended to recede or escape me. Yet 
this is a question to which this empirical chapter will return more than once. as it 
attempts to articulate a theoretically-informed understanding which draws together the 
insights developed during direct practical experience with those derived from readings 
of the critical and other literatures. 
The diagram below emphasises these movements in my position, as I crossed back and 
forth from student to researcher to strategist to theorist and so on between 1997 and 
2000. variously enmeshed In constructing the respective subject positions. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, I found that my interviewees conceptualised strategy in ways that 
differed from any of those I developed, given that they had less (or different) transitions 
to make. At the same time, their views varied in quite systematic ways, first depending 
where they were located within the different hierarchical levels but second also, 
critically. over time. This difference remains intriguing. For while the range of views 
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discovered across the levels may be explicable in terms of a lack of communication of 
strategy from higher to lower levels of organisation, the temporal variation may point to 
a more intriguing phenomenon, that of strategy being centric, making localised 
appearances and disappearances in accordance with particular enabling conditions and 
circumstances. There may be an interesting difference concealed here, with breakdowns 
in communication being a manifestation of a shared belief that strategy must exist, the 
quest that I would now see as ultimately misguided. The second type of phenomenon 
may manifest a more realistic relation to strategy by organisational subjects, insofar as 
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Length of ethnography 3 years 
Time spent on-site 23 weeks 
No. of formal interviews 97 
No. of interviews taped 62 
No. of interviews transcribed 43 
No. of meetings attended 8 
In addition, there were many more informal chats in offices, corridors, lifts, restaurants 
and pubs, as well as emails, phone-calls and letters. 
INVESTIGATING TELECO: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
183 
Teleco made up of: 
U. K. 'opco' or operating company 
International organisation 
U. S. parent 
Manumit Multi-national, U. S. based telecommunications company 
Alpesh Adviser to U. S. Chief Executive Officer 
Noel International Chief Executive Officer 
Colin U. K. Managing Director (1994-97) 
Alex U. K. Managing Director (1997-98) 
Robert U. K. Managing Director (1998-99) 
Ian U. K. Financial Controller 
William U. K. Finance Director 
Michael U. K. Sales Director 
Gilbert U. K. Wholesale Sales Director 
Dennis U. K. Retail Sales Director 
Damien U. K. Retail Sales Director 
Simon U. K. Sales Manager 
George U. K. Sales Manager 
Martin U. K. Sales Operations Manager 
Don U. K. Salesperson 
Pete U. K. Salesperson/Sales Manager 
Rick U. K. Salesperson 
Jarvis U. K. Sales Ops Analyst 
Kate U. K. Customer Service Director 
Craig U. K. Sales/Network Director 
Kieron U. K. Marketing Director 
Anthony International Marketing Director 
Noff is U. K. Marketing Director 
Jim U. K. Marketing Director 
Katz U. K. Strategic Marketing Manager 
Ruth U. K. Customer Quality Manager 
Rowen International Network Vice President 
Nicholas Operations Director 
Dave U. K. Service Delivery Manager 
Raj U. K. Technical Service Manager 
Kevin U. K. Fault Manager 
Tarkan U. K. Customer Site Planer 
Roger International Network Manager 
Marcus International I. T. Director 
Raymond I. T. Director 
Shan International Vice-President of Strategy and Planning 
Vincent International Strategic Analyst 
Ravi International Director of Strategy and Planning 
Barry International Senior Strategy Manager 
Lance International Senior Strategy Manager 
Demi International Strategy Analyst 
INVESTIGATING TELECO: GUIDE TO PSEUDONYMS 
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April-May 1997 - the 'U. S. ' and the 'U. K. ' 
It must be noted that mz 4 ethnography began in the midst of the emergence 
of International. Thus the situation ofjust the U. K. and U. S. and how they 
inter-related was constructed through discursive evidence that was part- 
historical and part-contemporary. 
April 1997 was the month I first entered Teleco, and my research soon cohered around 
the sales department of the pre-merger U. K. opco. There were a number of reasons for 
this, primarily concerning physical and personal access. My point of contact was 
Simon, a friend of my father's. Simon was a sales manager and had been with Teleco for 
3 years. The majority of Teleco was based in one building, although engineers were 
spread around various hotspots In London. Through Simon, I found myself integrating 
naturally with the salesforce, the desk that I was allocated being within the office of 
sales management, and so my networking of research contacts began with sales. 
I was at first concerned that my study would need to migrate outside of the space 
provided by Sales, even for the purposes of my MSc dissertation. Obtaining an 
organisational structure chart was the first step and this in itself proved extremely 
difficult. I was later to discover that the eidstence of 'up-to-date' charts was near-on 
impossible, the lack of relevance of paper representations of the organisation being 
discursively shared by management and their secretaries alike. My route around this 
frustration was to ask interviewees to construct their perceptions of how the U. K. was 
organised. This led to the breakdown provided In the previous section's diagram. To 
avoid the potential over-emphasis on Sales, I Interviewed directors from all the major 
functions. And yet, the prominence of sales in the discourses of directors soon 
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convinced me that a focus on Sales for the purposed of my MSc was in fact the most 
sensible choice. 
Within Sales, interviewees conceptualised success as defined through country 
autonomous targets as revenue growth, being communicated and enforced from the 
U. S. parent company. Their recollections of how this had arisen made me realise that 
this inscription had been re-affirmed yearly since Teleco's genesis, placing sales 
departments firmly at the 'front' of the organisation. As such, this coincided with the 
stock market's desire for revenue growth. The discourse of success drew on 4 years of 
achievement of revenue growth targets, creating a source of pride for those within the 
U. K. as well as a legitimation for their activities. Quickly, I found this focus on sales 
was not limited, as I initially expected, to the sales employees. 
The fact is, this is a growth company, and is 3-4000 miles away from head office. We're pretty 
much left to direct our own affairs with the handshake being that the numbers are where they 
need to be. ' 
(Colin, U. K Managing Director (1994-1997): May 1997) 
'GL: What is the role of budgets within Teleco? 
Ian: The problem for 1997, budget revenues and operating costs... originally operating costs 
were budgeted to be 25% of revenue... The Americans have said we can't have 25%, we can 
only have 20%. 1 know this is impossible. [ ... I The U. S. will ask me to explain variances on a 
monthly basis and I'll say they are due to growth. They know we won't achieve the SG&As 
[Sales, General and Administrative expenses] that they want to impose on us. 
GL: What other financial controls or restrictions do you face? 
Ian: Other?? I don't see the operating cost limit as a restriction... 
GL: What financial targets does your parent set? 
Ian: None. They are trying to get us to grow as much as we can, at the same time achieving a 
low operating cost, which is difficult... impossible to achieve. ' 
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(Interview with Ian, U. K. Finance Director: May 1997) 
The above two excerpts from my interviews are indicative of higher-level management's 
acceptance and perpetration of revenue as the means of communication and thus 
negotiation with the parent, the U. S.. I became aware that the achievement of sales 
targets formed the front-line of Teleco's activities, being the most talked about and thus 
visible aspect of financial performance. While operating costs were important, the 
Finance Director was clear that growth formed the primary means of appeasing the U. S. 
parent. 
Throughout this time, I was made aware of the importance of the on-going merger with 
Manumit. Sales management were extremely concerned as to the ways this would 
impact upon both their practices and their jobs. Sales was the first department to be 
integrated with that of Manumit. This, however, was far from resolved and In the writing 
of this section, I draw on interviewee perceptions in April 1997 of how Teleco practised 
strategy, in the context of the pre-merger Teleco as well as in the face of the forthcoming 
merger. Clearly, memories of the pre-merger days would be tainted by the fears the 
merger encouraged, and I treated answers with a certain degree of scepticism. My 
intention here is to begin to explore the ways in which the opco is discursively 
constructed, setting the scene for the later developments by exposing discourses of 
Teleco's historical practices, being concerned as to the multiple meanings of what 
organising inside of the opeo meant for its members. Focusing on the difference 
between the opco and the U. S. help me to appreciate the practices which Teleco sales 
management were so proud of and were therefore so reluctant to relinquish to 
Manumit. 
Higher-level management that I interviewed were adamant that the U. S. took financial 
and strategic decisions, this domain being constituted as separate from the U. K. 
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activity. Nobody made a claim that strategy at this level could be affected from within 
the U. K.. I was taken aback at this and as this sat uncomfortably, in my eyes, with the 
espoused opco management strategy of a flat organisatiorf. It was the reconciliation of 
these two positions which was so productive in my empirical investigations. I discovered 
that higher-level plans were constructed financially. and revolved around the 
achievement of revenue figures. As such, these were effected in a top-down manner, 
with little scope available for localised input. These figures had to be achieved. And yet 
this appeared to form the limits of both planning and control directives issued by the 
U. S. to the U. K. 
Strategy through Financial Numbers 
While control practices were nominally effected on a P+L basis from the U. S., the 
discussion with Ian demonstrates how the importance of growth achievement was 
constituted as far surpassing the need to control operating expenses. Certain externally- 
focused accounting calculations were made hard and immutable (cf. Munro, 1997) 
while other, more internally-focused numbers, were allowed to dissolve through a 
process of Interpretation. Indeed, discussions with the senior management created the 
impression that the U. K. and U. S. were joined through a cycle of capital allocation and 
revenue generation. This appeared to be the primary mechanism of communication, 
producing a structure that was both visible and Justifiable to the U. S. stock market. I 
began to conceptualise the U. S. perspective as exercising strategy through the numbers. 
The following diagram is my representation of how the opco directors talked to me 
about their relationship with the U. S.. 
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TELECO (1997198): REPRESENTATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U. S. AND U. K. 
It is important to understand the role of the U. K. within the wider context of Teleco. The 
U. S. parent was growing fast in its domestic marketplace, building and consolidating its 
network reach through a combination of partnerships and purchases. Revenues were 
high, dwarfing those being achieved within Europe. At the same time, however, the 
importance of becoming a global operator was being constituted through business and 
stock analyst discourses as being a potentially critical strategic objective of any 
purported major telecommunications operator. Thus, establishing a presence in 
Europe's main cities was seen as important. What to do beyond that remained highly 
unclear. This appeared to manifest itself within Teleco through a lack of specific 
internal direction. 
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Piecing together the perceptions of the U. S. in the opco, I came to reallse that there 
were very significant similarities with stock market practices, as espoused within 
analyst reports and business magazines. Control at a distance appeared to be 
manifested through the very spectacles of the stock market, satisfying U. S. Directors 
that their investment in the U. K. was sustainable. Strategy at this level appears to be 
defined through a cycle of stated strategy, financial expectations and results. I found 
that this intertwining of strategic intent and financials was characteristic of the 
mutuality of strategy and success. I was thus able to analyse the discursive 
construction of the opco from the twin perspectives of how Teleco communicated with 
external parties, such as analysts, as well as how the U. S. communicated with the U. K. 
What was fascinating to see the similarities which emerged, with financial numbers in 
both cases becoming the vehicle by which strategies could be built, appraised and 
communicated. 
Within Teleco the circulation of global capital, however, appeared to specifically exclude 
the participation of top U. K. management. This was demonstrated most clearly through 
my questioning of their participation in the merger with Manumit. 
'of course [we weren't consulted], not in terms of should we do this, shouldn't we. It was a 
financial and strategic decision. 
(Colin, U. K. M. D.: May 1997) 
In terms of non-U. K. decisions, strategic decisions, Teleco displayed a hierarchical 
notion of structure4l which meant that the merger with Manumit was always a decision 
which would be made entirely by the U. S.. despite the ramifications for local operations. 
41 7bus, the U. S. practice of financial control was one which constrained rather than enabled the organic 
development of the discourse of strategy within Teleco. 
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I found, therefore, that the financial numbers which were taken as delineating the 
success of the U. K. also formed the limits of the U. K. 's involvement in global strategy. 
What was intriguing was the double-effect of these practices, and it is ability of the 
limits to be enabling as well as constraining that I turn to next. 
Strategy within Financial Numbers 
As detailed earlier, the external strategy of Teleco was growth, a strategy which was 
interpreted internally as attracting a certain class of investor. 
"The type of investor that we have had in the past were people who get in and get out and 
make a profit on the shares, not people who sit and wait for the dividends to come every year. 
So we looked for rapid growth. rapid expansion and generated share value. The view has been 
short term... all about growing and winning business now. ' 
(Jim. Marketing Director: April 1997) 
The translation of the external strategy Into Internal practices Is captured neatly in 
Jirn's comments to me. As a Marketing Director within the U. K. opco, he was very well 
aware of the importance of shareholder value, In the context of the particular investor 
which Teleco attracted. 
'Development of the network is... to support the revenue growth of the business. ' 
(Nicholas, Network Director: May 1997) 
I spoke at length to Nicholas about the concerns facing the operation of the U. K. 
network. His concerns were clearly different to those of Jirrfs, being focused on the 
capital rather than the operating cost budgets available to him. The development of a 
technically advanced and customer-serving network was prominent in his discourse. 
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However where this most clearly joined with the other discourses of the directors was in 
his acceptance of the ultimate measure of his department's success: the revenue growth 
of the business. 
Financial control had, however, a double effect which enables a paradoxical answer to 
the question of who owned strategg. The strength of U. K. performance, rationalised in 
terms of analysts, investors and reporters, appeared to be the means by which opco 
management contributed to the existence of a successful Teleco strategy. However, on 
analysing interviews further, this simultaneously created the conditions for the U. K. 
management to derive a sense of separation from the U. S.. Over time, achievement of 
financial indicators seemed to mean that interference from Head Office was kept to a 
minimum, being largely confined to discussion of capital and revenue, earnings and 
expenses. As Colin said to me, commenting on the difference between Teleco and 
Manumit: 
'... Americans, as long as Ws telephone, it's sensible and it means growth. would put a tick in 
the box. ' 
(Colin: May 1997) 
Speaking to salespeople and management who were present at the entrepreneurial 
genesis of this U. K. subsidiary, I found they took pride in the way little else existed. 
except for a sales department. A significant number still remained within Teleco, 
helping to sustain and nurture discursive practices on organising. Ibis historical- 
cultural pressure was both stimulated and reinforced by the yearly legitimation of 
success as revenue-drivem this being the route to capital allocation and thus survival. 
'One of the nice things about working for Teleco, when it was small was the ability to have a lot 
of self-determination. It was a free-wheeling and f1mible environment.... 
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The strategy process has always been very informal especially when we were smaller... 
cornmunicated through day to day conversations and involvement on specific projects. This 
"owed identification of what the specific strategies of the business were.... 
With growth. we're now in the stage where we need to think about fonnalising the approach... 
the knowledge that is held within the directorship here is very great and whenever you get the 
opportunity to speak to them you suddenly see the clarity with which they see the task in 
hand and sometimes the lack of formal structures leads to this being diluted or not being as 
forcibly put to people because it happens on an 'on demand' basis. ' 
(Pete, salesperson: April 97) 
My chat with Pete was most enlightening. As a fast growing company. managers did not 
feel that the establishment of procedures was important. With the rhetorical support of 
their continuing achievement of revenue targets, this constituted the success of their 
practices, further strengthened by the lack of U. S. intervention In these organisational 
issues. The control by the U. S. of 'strategic' decisions had been translated through the 
organisation and was interpreted within the Sales department, an area where U. S. 
control should have been most prominent, as an informal strategy process. I later 
realised that this was strong evidence as to the different meanings of strategy in 
different contexts. The 'strategy' talked about by Colin was different to the 'strategy' 
talked about by Pete. As a salesperson, Pete appeared to be constructing strategy as 
'the ways In which flnancial targets would be achieved'. He alluded to an emergent 
model of strategy, one similar to Mintzberg's, and one distinctly at odds to that implied 
by external reports. Analysts were not describing Teleco's strategy as emergent. Quite 
the opposite was occurring. The external perception was that Teleco had initiated a 
daring strategy, the success of which was being substantiated by the financial results. 
Pete's comments on the role of the directors is striking. It appears to Indicate some kind 
of schism between practices at that level and those beneath. I felt compelled to conclude 
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that the directors and other 'top management' were not passing on a hierarchical notion 
of control, since the 'flatness' of the organisation seemed so celebrated at the local level. 
,... one of the points about a flat organisation... you expect and rely on people to get their own 
shit done... so a lot of freedom is given ... more experimentation ... move forward by trial and 
error ..... 
(Colin, U. K. M. D.: May 1997) 
'... the salesperson has total freedom. One of the things we do here is to have a very open and 
fle, )dble organisation. There are no real disciplines... there are unspoken disciplines, you get in 
at a certain time, do an eight hour day, should go to sales meetings ... find new opportunities... ' 
(Michael, U. FL Sales Director: May 1997) 
Persisting from the early days, therefore, was a very informal organisational structure, 
circumscribed by a discourse of a fle., dble and ad hoc management process. 
I found that the presence of accounting concepts within salesperson discourses was a 
taken-for-granted part of their everyday discourse. Talk of 'costs', 'margins' and 
'revenues' formed the cornerstones of salesperson achievement and conflict, since these 
factors were seen as what led directly to the calculation of commission payment. This 
brought up a peculiar conjunction, in their discourses, of the subjectivity of selling with 
the objectivity of accounting practice. The measurement of a salesperson was through 
the numbers, demarcating the bottom line beneath which salespeople could not fall, 
establishing critical benchmarks for year-to-date and year-end targets. Meeting 
accounting-derived targets was therefore the imperative for a salesperson's identity (c. f. 
Knights and Morgan, 1990a), yet concurrently celebrating a spirit of individualism and 
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entrepreneurship was seen as complementary, rather than contradictory42. 'The 
dominant discursive formations generated a fundamental reliance on targets which 
were in themselves the sole form of accountability that were perceived as being 
necessary, pointing to an apparently imbalanced mixture of objectifying and 
subjectifying knowledge, yet one which was perfectly sustainable within a sales- 
dominated environment So long as the 'what' of sales was concretely determined 
through accounting practice, the 'how' did not need to be further specified over and 
beyond the generallsed mission statement of the U. S. parent (which required a focus on 
targeting the business rather than residential market segment). 
GL: 'In terms of your time as a salesperson, what did performance appraisal mean to you? 
George: (laughter) 
GL: How did your sales manager appraise your performance? 
George: em.. 
GL: Anythingi 
George: Here is a target, this salesperson has to reach that target... if that salesperson reaches 
that target, that guy is ok... as simple as that. 
(Conversation with George, sales manager: May 1997) 
The disconcerting pauses in George's replies to my line of questioning gave me reason 
not to discredit management's claims that practices of control which expanded on the 
basic target mechanisms were non-existent. Selling at Teleco did not appear to be about 
the enforcement of procedure or the building of structure. The image of the 'successful 
salesperson' was constructed through the achievement of results and not through the 
means by which they had been achieved. Indeed, any talk of a wider net of 
42 A recently appointed sales manager even had difficulty grasping the theoretical rationale of control through 
accountability, and I realised that the whole concept was rather alien to the prevailing discourses within the 
sales department. 
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accountability was discounted as unnecessary and even counter-productive, 
representing a stand against the apparently sweeping force of instrumentalism within 
modernity. While Sales members of both ground and director levels expressed the 'need' 
for increasing formalisation, I found that little progress had been made. Ibis is at least 
partially explained by the fact that it was the proximity of Manumit, with its different 
practices, that accentuated the whole question of formalisation. 
'GSL: in the merger with Manumit, is it the Manurnit structures and procedures that are 
emerging as the way to organise the business? 
Michael: I don't think it is the way to organise the business. I think you'll get a lot of 
concurrence with that. however, it is the way we are structuring the business, and in that 
there will be difficulties. It is difficult at this time to see if it is completely the right way or the 
wrong way. We have acquired Manurnit but Manumit senior hierarchy has come into place in 
Europe. certainly it doesn't fit with the way Teleco was managed. or our philosophy, and some 
of it is superfluous. Manumit has set the pace. although Colin is In charge of UK. Manumit is 
structured on a international and European as well as operating company level. So. matrix, 
not a very good management, which doesn*t give clear lines of responsibility or clear directions 
in terms of ownership of issues. For example, we as the old Teleco operated the UK perfectly 
well. We had Finance, Customer service, billing, Sales etc... if sales were being hurt by an 
operating or engineering issue, we had one person in control of that. if billing wasn't correct, 
one person. Now, sales is part of the operating company, but the overall sales figure for 
Europe is the responsibility of somebody else. If something goes wrong in operations or 
engineering, only part of that is under Colin's control. billing resides in the international 
environment. So if we really wanted to take somebody to task. Nicholas as UK network 
director would have to go to somebody else, whose priorities aren't dictated by the priorities of 
the operating company. it is the same old thing about central structures vs broad structures. 
We're always going to have those debates but Manumit have come from this side. ' 
(Michael: May 1997) 
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Implications 
Being positioned at the leading-edge of the opco, within Sales, I was able to investigate 
the practices circulating around discourses of strategy, both with respect to planning 
and Implementation. While I was at the relative margin of proceedings, and my access 
was quite limited, I could see the interplay of accounting and strategy which was 
occurring at this place where strategy should have been most present, Le. within the 
Sales department of a sales-led organisation. What I found was a displacement of 
strategy presence by accounting practices, as a doubled yet differentlated presence was 
constituted within the opco and the U. S.. Furthermore, the presence of calculability and 
accountability within the Sales department was partial or sporadic, in comparison with 
-standard business practice', being driven through practices of revenue targets, rather 
than any attempt to move towards notions of rendering subjects more generally 
calculable or accountable. 
Interdependencies as well as similarities could begin to be drawn between practices of 
accountability for individual salespeople and opco performance. Sales management can 
be read as perpetuating the discursive formation into the sales function that they 
themselves are subjected to. Few non-financial constraints were placed upon action, 
with ownership practices of strategy constituting the flnancial present as 
representational of future success. In the search for capital, stock market performance, 
translated at this level into revenue performance, appeared to construct a reality that 
out-bid the quality or relevance of other information. I later discovered that this ethic 
was to continue to spread throughout the opco, until a 'critical moment' was reached in 
1999, when the revenue focus was supplemented by a range of non-financial numbers, 
which formed the second kind of accounting practice to gain prominence in Teleco. 
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May 1997-October 1999: the Rise of 
Intemational 
'If International win their battle to take away U. K. 's higher level of negotiations-it will mean 
that people like myself .. will be going round as prostitutes, with a cheap price that people will 
see and buy off us. Well just be whores, they'll be whores. raping each other to see what we 
can get. ' 
(Rick, Salesperson, May 1997) 
Whilst interviewees were reluctant to disclose explicit details. it became clear during 
May 1997 that battles were being fought behind closed curtains. Despite the clarity of 
strategic vision from an external persp ective, employees felt a significant amount of 
contusion and disorientation as a result of the merger. At the time I believed this was a 
temporary phase, seeing the merger as the cause of the disruption. It was only later, as 
my research extended into a longitudinal study, that I found that this was far from 
unusual and began to search for deeper and more underlying rationales. I continued to 
explore here the question of how externally represented success was being translated 
into internal practices. While the merger signalled a new level of strategic power for 
Teleco to the financial press, Colin appeared far more concerned with the task of 
attempting to combine two previous rivals, trying to synthesise their different structures 
and processes, and most of all, the political games that thereby ensued. 
It is the effects and outcomes of the merger to which I now turn, focusing on the 'battle' 
between the company value ethic of Manumit and the share value ethic of Teleco. For 
this perceived 'value difference' appeared to have a real significance in shaping how 
employees and management made sense of everyday activity. During May 1997, sales 
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employees were expecting significant changes to their department. Tbeir expressed fears 
were of tighter job descriptions and procedural controls, described by them as starkly 
opposed to the entrepreneurial culture they were previously exposed to. There was 
much talk of increasing 'structure', 'process' and 'bureaucracy'. with Teleco often being 
portrayed as now becoming a large company. I found in particular. as noted earlier, a 
growing discursive separation between 'old' and 'new' ways of working. Formalisation 
was seen as contrary to the freewheeling enterprise that had previously granted such 
success within Teleco, but I found most salespeople articulating the need for this. This 
was, however, supplemented by rising insecurities. 
'... there are two things that you have to give to any salesman, in terms of information. one is 
to tell him what his job is. te what his target is and where he's supposed to get It from, and 
two what he is going to get paid. Don't mess about with a salesman with respect of what he is 
supposed to get paid... again we didn't even know what packages we were on, backdated until 
the I st Jan, until March, we only got our commission plans last week in the sales meeting. 
what uxLs the atmosphere like at the sales meeting? 
It was one of we're going to pin these bastards to the wall, ie the management, the people that 
were going to present the commission plan. but in reality, couldn't do that, couldn't mount an 
argument. because again. sensibly. they distributed these personalised commission plans at 
the end of the meeting. cos if they gave it out at the beginnning, no-one would be hearing what 
they were saying, and they would be like I'm not having this. 
consequently, very cleverly, they said we want you to go away and look at these, and come 
back and report via your managers if there is a problem, and then review all of that and set it 
in stone.. by next week , we'll resolve all the issues and no more discussions about 
commissions or about reasons why people aren't doing their job, that is one of the 
fundamentals of managing any sales organisation. don't give salespeople excuses for not doing 
their job, and the biggest excuse is I don't even know what I'm getting paid for this why am I 
doing it. 
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they accept all of that. but this is where it stops, 'we' cannot accept anymore of these sob 
stories or excuses which is tacitly accepting responsibility for what happened before that. so 
they knew that they were missing in those areas, but of course it is all about prioritisation. it 
is a massive merger, and these things can take years to be completely resolved, but at the 
same time, let's try and pull two fairly substantial organisations together. they have to keep an 
eye on the numbers... 
(Don, Salesperson: May 1997) 
Don's outburst above indicated the dissatisfaction over revenue targets and commission 
plans. This appeared to stem from Inadequate communication from management to 
employees, although this was drawn solely from the employees' point of view. There was 
a perceived lack of clarity which salespeople used as an example of managerial 
incompetence, offering It as an explanation as to why motivation and performance levels 
dropped noticeably in the first quarter of 1997. This, in conjunction with the merger, 
appeared to form the expressed reasons for dissatisfaction with management. 
Confusion over the calculation of the commissions was seen as unacceptable, causing 
distrust to spread amongst the salespeople. I discovered that there was widespread use 
of the antagonistic terminology of 'us' and 'them' both within Teleco, to denote the 
employee/management split, as well as between Teleco and Manumit. 
In the context of an external perception of continued success, internal changes were 
surprisingly uncoordinated, being filtered across from Manumit, relying on emails and 
memos, rather than as a result of a systematic or even management-guided 
implementation. The speed of the merger was blamed as the cause of the disruption, 
and I found interviewees portraying events as chaotic and disorientating. Politics was 
often mentioned, and many seemed to feel that the infighting was on a scale not 
experienced within Teleco until this merger. This led to a level of uncertainty, a feeling 
accentuated by the lack of communication between management and employees. 
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Cultural breakdown seemed to be in evidence, and while salespeople were keen to talk 
avidly about the family atmosphere of 'old-Teleco', as captured in the last chapter, the 
future was envisioned with some dismay. 
The Aftermath of the Merger 
Colin, the M. D.. had been in charge of the U. K. opco since its genesis. Given the sales 
led culture, it was not surprising to me that his personal performance was inscribed 
through practices of accounting within the success of the opco. conferring power and 
deferring knowledge to his leadership. Perhaps not unusually for the size of company, a 
paternal discourse of leadership was disseminated around Colin's figurehead. as many 
6old-timers' appeared to both remember and respect the authority and guidance 
represented within. An additional influence, however, was that Teleco was in the midst 
of a full-scale merger, the most ambitious that the U. S. parent had ever attempted to 
achieve. I was quite touched at the strength of feeling for Colin. who arguably had 
become the icon for legacy practices. Loyalty to him appeared to be constructed in the 
face of widespread denial of contrasting practices from Manumit. Indeed, I began to find 
myself empathising with Teleco employees against the formality so strongly represented 
by Manumit. This was later to change quite dramatically. 
Upon contacting Teleco for a routine chat in late Summer 1997,1 was shocked to find 
that Colin had resigned. Shocked because his position had seemed previously strong. 
Shocked also because this meant I no longer had a case study company for my PhD. 
Colin had agreed to let me extend my MSc study into a full-time PhD. The reasons for 
the resignation were, at the time, not clear. What was of paramount importance to me 
was meeting the new M. D., Alex (ex-Sales Director Manumit) and securing his 
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permission to extend my research. This took a whole series of phonecalls, letters and 
meetings, coupled with support from Simon, who had kept his position as Sales 
manager. Upon meeting Alex, I discovered that Michael's (old-Teleco Sales Director) 
predictions, as quoted earlier, were right. Manumit's International structure had come 
formally into place above the U. K.. The second development which I had been unaware 
of was that Manumit directors had been appointed within the opco executive team 
itself. So. while Teleco was the acquiring company, Manumit had effectively taken over 
the International operations of Teleco. 
Throughout 1998, the scope of my ethnography grew into the broader functional 
activity of the U. K. opco, as well as beginning discussions with non-opco management. 
Following a genealogical approach (e. g. Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and Napier, 
1993). 1 was keen to analyse the persistence (or otherwise) of the practices I had 
uncovered within my MSc, with the intent of following the prohibitive logic of their 
operation, looking at what was excluded as well as included within their constructed 
notion of 'strategic' activity. Most noticeably, the upheaval in the opco and the 
introduction of an International reporting layer had not diminished the focus on top- 
line growth. 
'High margin and profitable ... low cost... but revenue is the primary driver * 
(William, U. K. Finance Director: Jan 1998) 
While there was increasing talk of numbers below the top-line. revenue continued to 
dominate talk of success, with this still seen therefore as bringing into focus the means 
by which capital and operating allocations were set. 
'At the end of the day... London is given a number from the U. S. which Alex owns. and passes 
down to his sales directors, that number they have to turn in. Everyone under them is paid a 
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salary and also being commissioned against that number. Ultimately, if London doesn't make 
that number, things like the amount of budget we get next year, not just for Sales, but also 
the other functions such as Network... and people get asked to leave. So lots of pressure on 
doing that number. So we don't give a darrm about Frankfurt or Paris, our first commitment 
is to London. Doesn't mean to say that we are Little Englanders and we don't appreciate the 
bigger picture, we are paid on a number that is focused on London. ' 
(Craig, joint Sales and Network manager: August 1998) 
Craig referred to the revenue figure as the 'number', demonstrating just how important 
it had become. I was constantly made aware of the prevalence of the number, with 
senior management in particular fixated upon its importance. As Craig explained. sales 
and non-sales functions had stakes in the achievement of the number. 
'Ibis was a major moment of 'seeing things differently'. as the strategic power of 
accounting practice was suddenly extended for me into a whole new area. For I now 
learned that while the sales functions were measured on sales achieved, the non-sales 
functions had their operating budgets for the following year set. based upon the relative 
success of the opco's in meeting their revenue targets. Suddenly I could see why senior 
non-sales management had such a keen interest in 'the number' for the year. As the 
opco revenue number was the starting point in negotiating future allocations of 
operating spend, this was the practice by which revenue pressure, and thus stock 
market pressure, was spread throughout the organisation. Under Alexs command, 
therefore, the evaluation of the opco through an apparatus derived from financial 
reporting perpetuated, thus critically sustaining the sales-led structure of organising 
and fuelling the discourse of sales autonomy, which fitted in anyway with Aleles sales 
background. 
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But in addition I could now see how all senior management could share in adopting a 
hard-line attitude towards financial results and in having a shared 'national opco' 
focus. 'Ibis shared focus was to manifest itself later in a shared opposition to the growth 
of the International organisation. In the meantime, it made for a striking and shared 
visual metaphor of the opco as organisation. 
'Any strategic plan ... is numbers rather than mission statement and how we are going to get 
there ... we revolve around the [revenue] number for this year... like a rocket... 
Like a rocket, you have a number at the top, the sales divisions that can make that happen, 
then Customer Quality that will support. then next level down. Network Operations. which 
provide the services which we implement to the customers. then underpinning Network 
Operations are I. T., Finance and H. R. ' 
(Robert, U. K. Customer Director [ex-Manumit]: Jan 1998) 
Robert was the new Teleco Customer Director. His background in Teleco is highly 
relevant. I first interviewed him in May 1997 when he was Customer Director of 
Manumit. This follow-up in 1998 was after his transition into the equivalent position in 
Teleco. The continuity here is of paramount importance as he was to become Managing 
Director of the U. K. opco, in December 1998. The metaphor of the rocket that he 
expressed to me here was one which I found particularly valuable in analysing Teleco 
over this period. Turning his metaphor around slightly, I could visualise the revenue 
number as the fuel that powered the rocket of performance, with all the subjects in the 
different departments and at the different levels of the organisation being brought on 
board the rocket and aligned In their actions and perceptions by that fuel. Ibis was how 
the targets were to be met. 
Within the rocket, the departments were variously disposed, along the lines that Robert 
indicated. Nearest the pointy end were Sales, with behind them Customer Quality. as 
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these were bound to be seen as the key teleconi nu ii iicat ions activities. sc. r1lakirly Ihe 
sale and providing the service. Behind them were the more capital-intensive 
implementation and support functions, Network Operations and I. T., plus Human 
Resources and Finance. The following diagram indicates the broad divisions. 
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If the rocket was therefore characterised by the leading edge of sales targets and the 
heavy base of capital -h ungry functions such as 11ctWOFk and IT, it is tuAct-standable 
that frequently the functions in between were. caught in the tensions that cmfld arise 
between the short-term revenue focus ofthe former and the more non-litiancial focus of 
the latter. This was increasingly the case as on(, went away fi-orn top non-"'ales 
management within the opco. I typically found network employees primarilv coucerned 
about capacity issues, and 11' employees concerned about the upgrading of trclinologýv 
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platforms. The unresolved nature of this debate was to prove critical throughout 1998, 
most visibly in the context of the differing discourses of opco, and International. 
At lower levels of the opco, there appeared to be a strong emphasis on functional 
activity, particularly as old-Manumit departments were amalgamated into Teleco in the 
U. K. and, also to an extent, through matrix organising, Into new cross-opco non-sales 
departments. Within the opco, however, the continued dominance of the practices of 
revenue accumulation meant that Sales could construct and sustain a position ahead 
of'supporir and 'networIC functions. 
'IAke all sales people in different companies, they operate as gods, and there's very little we 
can tell them. ' 
(Raj, U. K. Technical Service Manager: 1998) 
Through sales-led ma,, dms such as 'the customer is king, which were both legacy- 
inspired and given a new emphasis by the Customer focus of Robert, the criticality of 
revenue continued to penetrate and dominate discussions. The unpredictable demand 
stemming from customers was fed into the opco itself through the power granted to 
Sales practices. This constituted a perceived level of uncertainty, which far from 
diminishing the authority of sales, seemed to grant salespeople an aura of knowledge, 
as they were positioned at the very edge of the organisation, able to feed off the 
marketplace and listen to customers' changing expectations. A chain reaction was 
frequently alluded to within the discourses of management as possibly the best way to 
characterise the interrelationships between departments, with apparent second-tier 
functions such as Customer Quality and Network Operations doing their best to keep 
pace with the demands of Sales (and the emerging Marketing) group. Robert's metaphor 
of a rocket, with its accelerating (revenue) growth, seemed highly appropriate to 
characterise practices of organising within the U. K.. 
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Constantly chasing revenue targets appeared to have the impact of de-structuring the 
opco, as formal business processes were subordinated to immediate Sales concerns. 
The structural changes occurring in the wider Teleco organisation thus failed to impact 
upon practices of internal accountability, as embedded communication practices 
appeared to coalesce with memories of entrepreneurialist cultures (from both old-Teleco 
and old-Manumit) to keep at bay the forces of managerialism. Measurement practices 
within the opco were far from consistent when compared across the functions, with 
Sales the only department with hard accountability practices in place. 
'My view is that ... every department ... should have measurable performance criteria. My 
difficulty is that sales is the only part of the business that Is truly performance related. ' 
(Dennis, Sales Director, January 1998) 
This view was substantiated by Marcus, the MIS director, who quite seriously pointed to 
the email system as an indicator of how well he was managing. 
'in the end, we can quantify it, in its simplest form, by how few emails I get. If I don't get an 
email, everything is going ok. It is as simple as that. Or taking it out another step. if I go out 
into the user corm-nunity, the amount of reaction I get regarding the systems, or bad bills, or 
improperly priced calls, or anything like that is the measure of our success. It's all pretty 
simple. ' 
While this was a 'number, it was very different to the numbers driving Sales, and was 
not linked in any formal way to performance evaluation. What was of concern to this 
functional manager was the projects he was involved in, and therefore the status of 
such projects. 
GSL It seems that rnost of yourfeedback is qualitative and not quantitative. 
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That's correct. 
GSL- Is that quite unusuatfor an ISfunctton? 
No, at this stage of the game, I think not. It is quantitative as well, I get numbers out of the 
system too but they mean less to me than the other issues that I brought up here. My boss.. 
actually none of the people that I deal with are concerned about numbers. They are 
concerned about status of particular projects. There is a group obviously ( ... ) finance that is 
concerned about all the numbers and when we don't feed them the numbers then it becomes 
my problem again. So somebody else is watching the numbers for me which is a good thing. ' 
(Marcus, International IT Director (UK responsibility). Jan 1998) 
This disparity began to make far more sense when compared on a external versus 
internal basis. Internal accountability within all the functions appeared to suffer from a 
lack of performance indicators. with activity dislocated from formal reporting 
structures. Initially, I was rather taken aback at why this was occurring, and I fell 
victim to the espoused management rhetoric that this lack of performance 
measurement was merely a temporary setback. 
Over time, however, three explanations emerged as dominant within interviewee: sý 
discourse. The first two pointed to the growing split between opco and non-opco and 
demonstrated a circular logic of blame and counter-blame. The IT department had. ever 
since the merger, been reporting directly to International. I should thus have realised 
that the opco members I was interviewing at that time were joined by their frustrations 
at being unable to enforce their own demands through local channels. IT management 
were concerned with practices of standardisation and globalisation, being largely on 
secondment from the U. S. organisation. (I noticed that all but one of the directors, for 
example, were American: this was not Interpreted positively by London-based employees 
within IT. ) The local concerns of the U. K. were thus seen as quite insular (and not a 
little arrogant) from the perspective of the global strategy. It was not surprising that IT 
management were seen as unresponsive to U. K. cries for more dedicated IT support. 
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The outcome of this was that many opco members who were primarily driven by the 
revenue targets began to blame system inadequacies for the lack of performance 
indicators. This formed the first potential explanation. 
'Right now, our management information is probably of very little use because the systems 
that we have in place to produce that information are woefully inadequate. Due to not enough 
investment in the systems, changes in strategy and management and personnel direction, the 
business has grown against the background of an infrastructure that has not grown to 
support it. ' 
(William, Finance Director: 1/98) 
'We know where we want to be. May not have the tools to go there, but still maintain a vision 
of where we want to go. Still maintain our strategy. ' 
(Norris, Marketing Director: 8/98) 
The new IT director, coming in January 1998. was adamant that the informational 
problems stemmed from a lack of co-ordination within the opco. the 'business'. itself. 
The rocket of the opco, driven by the perennial obsession with revenue, was preventing 
systems from being developed in a structured and coherent fashion. 7bis formed the 
second potential explanation. 
'we ... feel that the business has not prioritised Its work, requirements or requests from IV 
(Marcus, International IT Director (UK responsibility): 1/98) 
The third explanation was that management, especially within the opco, simply did not 
support perfon-nance measures that were produced simply for internal use. This 
hierarchy of the external over the internal was to persist throughout 1999 as the next 
section details, proving most interesting in terms of implications for practices of 
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strategy. Fascinatingly, while this is clearly at odds with the processual logic of the 
internal needing to be managed alongside the external, it echoes the Porterian stance of 
focusing purely on the external. I thought this was a rather ironic twist on the often 
taken-for-granted progression of strategy from rational to processual. Furthermore it 
seemed to illustrate the constitutive power of strategy discourse, producing a practice 
that is not only counter-intuitive but counter-theoretical. 
Against the discursive backdrop of incoherent business processes, salespeople were 
enabled to propound a discourse of business perfonnance as distinct from the 
intangible and thus less worthy activities of other departments. The apparent tightness 
of this link from the internal to the external was a practice which seemed to establish 
power relations as deriving from this hierarchical rocket tip, as well as drawing from the 
imperative of opco performance. While these micro-techniques pushed back the 
frontiers of calculability, I began to notice that the same techniques allowed back In a 
disciplinary power of a different kind, that claimed by those able to articulate the 
discourse of strategy. I felt that employees themselves desired the security which 
practices of accountability can provide; with revenue practices confined to Sales, other 
strategic practices were being sought. Indeed, the power conferred by the name of 
strategy was to prove most important within the U. K. opco. As International's 
discourses spread, the rising inability of opco, management to claim ownership over 
strategy led to alternative practices being substituted as a means of retaining a sense of 
purpose and thereby identity. 
Measured through the institutionalised practices of accounting, the opeo continued on 
a trend of successful strategic execution, and I was now able to confidently deny that 
the experiences of the internal organisation. in any easy or homogenous way mirrored 
the structure and clear strategy of the external. The commotion erupting within Teleco 
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set against the backdrop of the external strengths was not the picture conventionally 
painted by strategic discourses of succeSS43. 
'We're on a one-way ticket, heading to wherever' 
(Robert, Customer Director, January 1998) 
Drawing on and critiquing extra-organisational discourses of strategy, Robert 
emphasised to me that strategic practices within Teleco were fle)dble and contingent, 
drawing on the volatility of the telecommunications industry as a cause. Planning 
beyond numbers was not, at least historically, a feature of Teleco's activity. Conjuring 
up the image of a constantly changing market-place, Robert visuallsed Teleco as being 
in a perpetual catch-up situtation, 'a roller-coaster ride' with few continuities. Hence, 
planning played only a guiding role, to be drawn on or discarded as the situation 
demands. 
43 Through accounting, we can now begin to make sense of this paradox, as the 
respective constructed meanings of strategy and success start to unravel and 
differentiate. As foretold by the struggles in the aftermath of the merger, International 
rose to play a major part in the structuring of the global organisation, In a way which 
underscores the explanatory importance of a discursive approach to the study of 
strategy. 
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Assembling of International Structures 
The following diagram indicates the way management portrayed the structure of Teleco 
in the aftermath of the merger. 
1998/99 
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TELECO (1998199): REPRESENTATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U. S. PARENT, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONAND U. K. OPERATING COMPANY 
'We have a certain degree of organisational structural problems in terms of who is accountable 
for delivering information. We have individual opcos across Europe, with M. D.. sales force, 
operations dept, customer quality, all the basic business functions. There is then a layer of 
support functions which span all of those countries that don't answer to the M. D. s of the op 
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cos, and then a separate set of functions that are also present within those countries that 
answer up a different management line straight up to the parent co in the U. S.. 
(William, U. K. Financc Dircctor, 1/98) 
'For the most part, this structure and the inter-relationships are understood. ie your sales 
people are doing that, so I need to do this. The Network Operations director Is very clear 
about what we need, although currently his reporting line is different to the U. K. M. D. , he Is 
accountable as part of the exec team forum. The only areas which are out of step, certainly 
I. T., who are still pursuing their own objectives. and not trying to support the business 
objectives, which is dangerous. For the most part everyone else has bought into that, even 
marketing, so I feel there is a very good fit. Only I. T., and maybe some of the engineering 
functions are not as accountable as they should be. There are moves afoot on an 
International basis. given that I. T. isn't even accountable to them but to U. S., there is a desire 
from a high level, Liam Strong down. to say this is what we want, if you can't deliver it, we'll go 
somewhere else. This is too serious to mess around with. 
(Robert, U. K. Customer Director [ex-Manumiti: Jan 1998) 
The comments above by senior management reveal just how complicated the picture 
had become. The vision of the UX as an autonomous entity had been undermined by 
the introduction of International support functions, even while the focus on country- 
revenue targets continued. Tbis was to sow the seeds for the growing power struggle 
between opcos and International over ownership of strategy. The U. S. continued to 
measure the U. K. using revenue targets but International was now taking control over 
functions that were seen previously as critical to opco achievements. As well as the 
logistical difficulties of communication with International, U. K. management now found 
themselves competing with other opcos for allocation of central resource. They 
expressed to me their frustration that despite the U. K. being the highest revenue 
earner, it was not being prioritised first within the support functions such as I. T.. While 
I. T. fonnally reported to the U. S., the majority of the I. T. directors at any time during 
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this period were on extended secondment from the U. S.. This coincided with the 
growing constitution of International as an apparently complete overlay function. 
Being a (relatively) long-time observer within Teleco, I was able to watch as the terrain 
between U. K. and International was fertilised with the seeds of direct conflict, as the 
practices of matrix and country accountability clashed and failed to get resolved, being 
constantly driven apart by the political call of country revenue targets. The strengths of 
feeling expressed to me were increasingly intense and I found myself taking the issue of 
U. K. vs International very seriously indeed. As mentioned earlier, the importance of the 
revenue number was magnified through the departmental capital and operating 
budgets, extending the network of hardened accountability. This disciplinary effect both 
sustained the coherence of the UK opco, as well as perpetuating the conflict with 
International's discourse of interdependence. The tri-partitc pressures of sales, network 
and departmental operating budgets, stemming from the continued primacy of revenue 
targets made it particularly difficult for International to establish its own operating 
space. It was ironic that Colin was the casualty of the power struggle between U. K. and 
International but his successor, bom of the more globally focused Manumit. was 
arguably even more resistant to International discourses. My meetings with Alex soon 
taught me that he had by no means renounced his sales background and discipline. 
This in the context of the opco's continuing subservience to revenue-based performance 
evaluation was to only confirm the viability of his sales focused discourse. To enable the 
continued achievement of revenue targets, the U. K. needed as much resource allocated 
as possible to its country operations, thus raising the stakes in the debate over core or 
non-core resource. In view of the U. S. parentage's emphasis on revenue, the rise of an 
International focus was construed as directly at odds with both contemporary and 
historical practices of Individual-country success. 
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TELECO (1998/99). - INITYNAIIONA I, SIR[ ICTURE 
The emergence of the International layer led to pressures for it to establish its own 
identity as separate from Opco activity, creating a justification for its existence. 
Paradoxically, this was achieved through a mirroring of the opco organisation, thereby 
enabling the reinvention of International as the strategic centre for all non-U. S. activity. 
International metamorphosed into a giant rocket organisation which could pull together 
all the smaller rockets of European opcos. 
'It's very hard to get money. It's all revenue - driven. Authority for Expenditure is all success- 
based capital... goes back to the U. S.. So if I ask for 50 STM4s, Lhey will ask ine to justify the 
revenue for that. My answer is that Ilaughterl I had 10 yesterday, 5 today and only I by 
tomorrow. I need more! It's capacity planning. ' 
(Roger, International Network Manager: July 1998) 
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Roger summed up succinctly the revenue pressures faced by International. As the 
section below details, International embraced the accounting-based strategy of revenue 
growth and capital allocation which had for so long been the life-blood of the U. K. opco. 
From a U. S. perspective, very little had changed in terms of who owned strategy. The 
U. S. parent continued to allocate capital in accordance with revenues earned. this cycle 
of accounting transaction forming their stockmarket focused strategy. Within Europe, 
however, the prior simplicity of the respective roles of U. S. and opco functions was 
shattered through the articulation of a differentiation of core from non-core functions, 
centring this as the arena of conflict. It was noticeable that strategy discourse moved 
away from being sort of empowering for the UK opco, where management were enabled 
to practise strategy within the U. S. -imposed numbers, towards one of conflict where the 
ownership of strategy was directly contested by International. As the following diagram 
indicates, strategy presence was effectively taken over by International, by taking over 
opco functions. 








The expansion of International meant that Network and IT activities of the UK opco were 
increasingly prioritised as being within an International remit, one which allocated 
resources on rationales alien to the opco. While the U. K. remained the highest revenue 
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earner, its requirements were not prioritised in accordance with this. International 
management justified this change to me through a long-term revenue discourse, 
arguing that new European cities were demanding resource, and that this would 
eventually provide revenue growth, even though on a short-term basis, this appeared 
Ineffective. The impression for opco management was, however, that the ground had 
been ripped away from the U. K., as the rocket was politically dismantled. It is 
noticeable that throughout this battle, little mention was made of the U. S. 's role. 
International appeared to have indeed taken this role over, expanding its remit and 
engaging directly in areas previously taken to be owned by the U. K. 
'Alex has title of M. D. but he doesn't have total control over the U. FL. The M. D. should be 
expected to control IT, billing, operations-but he does not. His real role is in sales and 
marketing. ' 
(Simon, Sales Manager: August 98) 
Until one of the sales managers told me in confidence that Alex could well be leaving 
soon, I had no idea that this was on the cards. Senior management expressed to me 
how the scope of the opco, and thus of Alex's responsibility, was delimited and 
subordinated, acting to undermine for the first time the image of an autonomous and 
sales-led organisation, one which he personified and propounded. Achieving the 
numbers was no longer adequate for the U. K. to retain control over its practices of 
strategy. Ibis appeared to be construed as a 'loss of face' for the M. D. as he was 
increasingly sidelined. What was now constituted as more important were 
International's numbers, and the practices they deemed fit to achieve those numbers. 
Despite the U. K. 's continuing importance within Wall Street. the size of International's 
revenues and costs meant that ownership of strategy was now being claimed by non- 
opco management. 
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With the core functions of IT and Network being made accountable to International 
directives, the question of 'the role of the opco! became prominent in discussions. I 
chatted to Tarkan, an opco Network Operations planner during this time 
So you're.... what's your title? 
[laughter] Titles are a funny thing in Teleco. 
Custonier site planner.. 
That's what I used to be. ... the cleaner could be a network planner, to be honest 
So what is the role of planning within Teleco? 
The U. K. network planning dept doesn't do planning. I think planning is done by an 
International group.... 
Run by Rowen, Intl Network? 
Might be. I only know a couple of guys. I believe they do most of our planning. 
What do you think the strategy of Intl Network is? 
Dunno. 
What does itfeel like they're trying to achieve? 
If one pipe is full, they put the next highest, when they got no idea of how quickly that will be 
used up. 
(Tarkan: July 1998) 
There was confusion over who was doing what within opco and International. I was 
quite shocked that Tarkan had no idea who even did the planning for the U. K. network. 
His claim to be unaware of International Network's strategy could have been partly a 
practice of resistance against their increasing presence, but also indicative of the lack of 
communication between the two parties. 
Talking to International management, they referred to 'one huge revenue target as being 
the new tip of the rocket, with support functions following behind. Interestingly, this led 
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to a similar state of disorganisation within International business processes as 
experienced within the UK opco. Combined with international claiming strategy, 
however, this was experienced by U. K. management as a rising International hierarchy 
of control which made little sense on a day-to-day basis. As described earlier, the U. K. 
had grown accustomed to having priority in terms of resource allocation. This was now 
being subordinated to wider International concerns, not all of which were actually 
revenue driven. I discuss these within the section below. 
I found myself in my perennial quandary. Having finished the first year of my PhD at 
Teleco, I was most keen to continue my ethnography. My intention had been to submit 
a management report to Alex as a persuasion for continued support for access. After I 
submitted, I heard that Alex had resigned. In his reply to my report, he designated 
Robert as my senior point of contact within the organisation. In the December of 1998, 
Robert was promoted to M. D.. As I personally noted in my report, he had been 
recognised within the organisation at both senior and junior levels as a leader of 
change. acting to boost dramatically the profile of Customer Quality within the opco. 
This intensified, however, the clashes with the broader International discourses of 
standardisation, as the emerging leadership once again supported both practices of 
autonomy in conjunction with a recognition of local expertises, a combination which 
propagated an expressed desire to resist formalised and bureaucratic processes of 
accountability. As Robert explained to me, 'fylou can take a horse to uxtter, but you can't 
make it drink... ' (April 1999), making the point that people should be pragmatically 
enabled to find their own way in the organisation, rather than being decisively led. This 
in conjunction with his long-held beliefs over opco autonomy (see above) were to inflame 
the situation with International. 
Tensions rode high within the opco, as functional management became increasingly 
aware of their International counterparts. 
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'... it started off as a bunfight... now turned into a nuclear war.. 
... operating companies think they're 
being kicked around and power pulled away from them... 
International feel they have been given the power and are frustrated because nobody's 
listening to them... ' 
(Ruth, Senior U. K. Manager: July 1999) 
Opco management increasingly stated, however, the acceptance that their organisation 
was largely a 'sales and marketing adjunct' to the core International activity, and 
discourses of autonomy were dispersed and dissipated. The Integration of Sales and 
Marketing as a core initiative for this year, therefore, reflected both the curbing of the 
sales-led nature of Teleco, as well as an active consolidation and re-founding of identity. 
Sales, Marketing and Customer Service functions all achieved explicit recognition 
within the company-wide objectives for this year, a major development from the 
previous narrow focus on revenue targets. 
I played my own, "nor, part within the opco-International battle. Marcus was 
appointed I. T. director of the U. K. opco in January 1998. By the time I met him again, 
In June 1999, he had moved out of the opco and into International, with responsibility 
for Asia. Upon talking to him, I realised just how caught up I had been in opco 
discourses. Naively, my report for Alex had placed considerable blame for opco 
problems on the inability of I. T. to support the opco. The idea that I. T. would have 
different concerns was, at the time, invisible to me. 
'I found your report very disappointing. The business never made its obligations to IT clear... 
you are obviously very slanted towards the UK opco's perception. You saw me back in January 
but you never asked me about strategy... You reveal a lack of insight into the business. IS 
strategy is not fitted into the Business Strategy.... International does have a perspective. We 
are trying to rnaidirtise the utilization and leverage of core resources and processes through 
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standardisation. At times, IT is not clear, I admit, and Noel [the CEO] needs to share his vision 
more with the UK opco. However. UK autonomy has its limits - it must be restricted to a local 
Business Case presented to International. UK opco may request service but this must be 
supported by revenue and costs. I know that Feb 1998 was only the beginning of rr 
organising. Now. however, UK opco must think through the sales and marketing roles and 
their implications for the wider organisation. Against autonomy, we need global predictability. 
There is a shortage of resources worldwide. The core business is back in US and yes, 
autonomy was the problem - but this means that billing cannot occur globally. So we strip 
core processes away from the opcos and this will mean a reduction in autonomy of the opco. ' 
(Marcus, International I. T. Director: June 99) 
My report had been used to criticise Marcus' personal achievements. Ibis involvement 
gave me quite a sense of perspective on what I was doing as I realised the depth of my 
participation and hence the Importance of revealing this within my PhD. In addition, I 
realised that I had not sufficiently considered discourses prevailing within the I. T. ' 
function. I was determined not to make the same mistake this year and I focused much 
effort on Immersing myself in International as well as opco concerns. This culminated in 
my month's participant observation within International Strategy. 
International Strategy 
I watched international grow from merely a layer of legacy organisation Into a more 
fundamental part of how the global network was co-ordinated, asserting control over 
European and Asian countries, with formal responsibility for maximising, overall 
revenue. I had spent much time in both the U. K. and International organisations over 
this time. In January 1999, in conversations with Robert, I was extremely excited to 
discover the existence of a Strategy department in International. It had proved difficult 
to map out the International organisational structure, with interviewees unable to be 
223 
precise about what exactly existed at any point in time. Before Robert mentioned Shan, 
therefore, I had never pinpointed the existence of a specific strategy department. Over 
the next three months, with the encouragement of Robert, I made contact with Shan, 
the Vice-President of International Strategy. It was in April that I succeeded in obtaining 
his permission to spend a month working with his team. I had moved from the margins 
of the opco to taking up an Insider position at the center of strategy practice, within the 
new International structure. How things had changedl 
Over the Summer months, I became aware of the growing importance of International 
Strategy. I found that many opco, members, across the functions, were aware of Shan. 
but none could explain to me exactly what he did. It was fascinating to see my 
credibility rise within Teleco. In the past, I had become accustomed to a certain 
presentation of self preceding me as I was always known through my links with the 
M. D.. Now, I was also telling tnterviewees about my forthcoming project with 
International Strategy. As far as I could see, people were very Impressed by this. The 
opco was experiencing a certain amount of confusion over the expanding role of 
International. As I searched for some kind of stability in this, to enable me to make 
sense of the developments, I began to build up my hopes for what I might find in 
International Strategy. Here, if anywhere, should be found concrete evidence of strategy 
practices, especially against the backdrop of opco management complaining about 
strategy absence (see next section). After all, Shan had made it very clear to me about 
his policy towards the dissemination of strategy. 
'We don't want our strategy disclosed to outsiders ... we don't tell people what the strategy is 
even in the company... [ ... I IVs a need to know basis. Business schools in their talk of buy-in 
company wide are too simplistic.. I ... I ... how important Is it to tell every member of the 
organisation the strategy? .... it: s a need to know basis. ' 
(Shan, International Director of Strategy. April 1999) 
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It was interesting from a theoretical processual-strategy point of view to see how my 
project emerged. I was initially given a list of choices from one of the analysts, Vincent. 
He informed me that I should also come up with my own ideas. At the team meeting, 
Ravi, the Director, added his own idea. This was seconded by Shan. Over the next few 
days, I made myself busy researching alternatives of my own and presented a list of 
seven to Ravi. He made a point of always deferring to what Shan would want and gently 
encouraged me to take up his idea, as Shan had already shown interest. I went away 
with a sense of satisfaction that I had made the right decision. In retrospect, I chose 
exactly what I was meant to choose. I reflected that while I had no particular qualms 
about Shan's firmness, I could now understand why opco management referred to 
Intemational's style as 'dictatorial't 
I found that the team gravitated around the differing opinions represented by- Ravi and 
Shan. 'In the doing of my project, I met all the members of the team, finding them 'a 
danin quirky lot. Very bright and idiosyncratic' (Field diary, 18 August 1999). They 
appeared to be most excited when discussing new technologies and products, at their 
most secretive when talk of mergers or acquisitions arose, and at their most deprecating 
when talking about internal strategies. I very quickly found that there was a general 
acceptance that they were bad at communicating strategy. Through my research in the 
opco, I was very much aware of this already, and it was satisfying to substantiate this 
with admissions from International Strategy that they were indeed lacking. In the first 
team meeting I attended, I was asked what my PhD was in, and I replied 'strategy, 
focusing on implementation and communication'. 'nie laughs that ensued were most 
informative, and I remember people nodding and someone saying 'perfecf. They were 
laughing, not at mel but at their blatant need for work in that area. I began to feel like 
the 'expert in communication'. At the same time, however, I was very much aware of 
Shan's hard-line towards disclosure, one which sat rather uneasily (for me at least) with 
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the team's criticisms of the U. K. opco's Inability to carry through strategic plans. My 
feelings were that this was hardly helped by the poor communication of strategy from 
Intemational to opcos. 
'Ibinking about the week, Intl Strat is competing for position within Teleco. Their involvement 
in M&A and critical telecom issues has reduced the time they've spent looking at internal 
strategy issues. No time for execution or organisational issues. Thars why Ws becoming a bit 
functional with Lance making comments like we're not here to tell opcos or Marketing what to 
do. Shan sticks to his guns bigtime and says opcos don't need to buy in - they just sell 
(&market? ). Vincent sort of defends it and says he don't know cos not here long enough. Barry 
says the thing we're bad it is communication of issues. Ravi says what we do is get Noel to roll 
the plan out and get agreement and after that, it's law. Shan has a real authoritarian 
approach to strategy and even Lance criticises him for not driving the strategy far enough 
down. Lance on Thurs was saying how some people in [building name) don't even know which 
company they're working for... 
(Field diary: 22 August 1999) 
International therefore was positioned as tightly holding the strategic vision, 
disseminating to the opcos a numbers-ftxated plan. 'Ibis lack of qualitative detail meant 
that linkages to opco activity was made tenuous, as the 'flesh' around the numbers had 
not been shared. This, I noted, was a recipe for failure within both rational and 
processual discourses (also see Boxer and Wensley, 1986: 193). A culture of secrecy 
was intentionally imposed around strategy as the imperative of the market was wielded 
as a defence for this practice of control. 'Strategic reports', for example. are carefully 
guarded and only shown to the CEO for Europe. No-one else sees thern. Indeed. while 
admiration for Shan in a personal context was common, articulated knowledge of his 
role was scattered and incoherent. Whereas before, the U. S. parent also contained the 
discourse of strategy, this did not prevent its enactment, and geographically, U. S. was 
clearly distant from Teleco. Now, with the formation of International within the very 
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buildings that house their U. K. counterparts, barriers were permeable and differences 
confusing, thus hardening resistance and control practices as identity was challenged 
and re-sought. 
My project, as specified by Ravi, came in two parts. The first was to articulate Teleco's 
expansion strategy into Europe in a form which could be released to the European 
M. D. s as well as other functions within International. I discovered that this had already 
been done in a detailed form several montlis ago. My task was to update it and prepare 
it in a form which could be communicated out. I found myself in a balancing act 
between my appreciation that opcos wanted to know (see next section) and Shan's 
desire for need to know. This created much tension in myself as I struggled to 
understand what should be done. The second part was to write a report describing the 
way the expansion was actually currently taking place. Shan and Ravi were both very 
keen that this should be targeted at Noel, the International CEO, with the intention of 
describing the lack of co-ordination occurring. 
'To be honest, I'm not really getting anywhere with the accounting/stmtegy thing. There's 
accounting in the project work but they [the team members] feel it: s intuition which guides 
them, then numbers second. Shan is big on how it: s gut feeling and strategy as top-down. 
which is mad cos it's against the flwdble culture thing. Still got the financial engineering 
perspective driving the org almost independently of the ground level work. So information 
relied upon is all toplevel - discussions don't really take place between those at the top and 
those at the bottom, implying av strict hierarchy. And all this in a telecoms company which is 
supposed to be fast moving and uncertain and should need freer information flow. ' 
(Field diary: 22 August 1999) 
Ibis reveals the frustration that I felt with my research. I developed a table which 
showed Teleco's expansion plan in different countries, followed by justifications for this. 
'Ibrough my discussions with the team members, it became absolutely clear that the 
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primary justification was revenue potential. This was followed by very brief summaries 
of the prevailing regulation, competitor actions and 'other' factors (including current 
network presence). However, on speaking to Demi, the analyst who prepared the 
numbers, I found that the numbers were based on extrapolations which carried very 
uncertain assumptions. Through having to extrapolate further the numbers myself, I 
discovered the importance of gauging International directors' (from e. g. Network, Sales) 
reactions to the numbers to find a consensus. I was most dismayed to find that these 
numbers were so intuitively based. The poor quality of the available information was, as 
far as I could gauge from discussions with opco management, representative of 
telecommunications data In general. There simply were no up-to-date calculations other 
than what people held In their minds, taken presumably from Industry conferences, 
journals and discussions. 
The second part of my project proved extremely politically sensitive. This was, the 
hidden agenda of my Investigation into geographical expansion. I was trying to find out 
which different groups within International and across Europe were busy expanding 
withoutformal permission. The Issue from Ravi's point of view was that the lack of clear 
strategy statement from International Strategy had allowed groups too much freedom to 
determine how and where to expand. However, I could not simply demand information 
from groups if they were reluctant to disclose and so I had to present myself as acting 
in their best interests, for example through raising the profile of their expansions. 7he 
difficulty of this was quite incredible as there was no central information resource I 
could refer to. I held face-to-face meetings where possible, but had to rely mainly on 
phonecalls, conference calls and emails as the groups were based all over Europe. I 
discovered for myself the lack of formal processes in the International organisation as I 
had to constantly mention Shan's or Ravi's names just to begin a conversation with 
some people. 
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'Strategy is so well kept hidden - restrictions on info flows all over - internal restrictions, 
external to brokers, to the extent that they struggle with info adequacy 
(Field diary: 29 August 1999) 
I soon became familiar with the practice of sharing information only with those who 
needed to know. The team were extremely secretive even to each other as their work 
was often 'price-sensitive'. I felt this ethic strongly and was constantly checking whether 
I could divulge a certain piece of information, even though in my eyes this infonnation 
was often nwre political than price-sensitive. To give an example, the growing 
department of International Market Analysis was beginning to take over 'strategic' 
duties, in a way which was seen by International Strategy to undermine their authority. 
The careful containment of the Strategy team's activity was at least partially to 
challenge this. 
'Strategy wise - team meeting was fab. All about success-based capital. Discussed meeting 
with Alpesh: achieving International budgets as a means of further capital allocation DESPITE 
lack of clear rationale. The importance of the 'no. of metro loops' as pleasing Wall Street - their 
indicators count SO much. Distribution of capital follows these indicators... WM-IOUT 
strategy - or at least with Wall Street's quantitative view on strategy. ... so got Shan's team 
questioning Alpesh's Wall Street focusl II Despite their own revenue ffixation. 
(Field diary: 31 August 1999) 
At the team meeting mentioned above, I was party to a discussion about Alpesh, a U. S. 
Teleco executive who 'works closely with the U. S. CE(Y. I had personally felt the buzz In 
the air when Alpesh came to International offices in London, and it was a marvellous 
opportunity to find out Shan's team*s feelings. The strategy as agreed with Alpesh was 
simple, growth with a focus on existing countries and cities. I listened to the team laugh 
about how budget-driven the U. S. was, and how this determined capital allocation 
which was used despite the lack of 'strategic' rationale. The impact of Wall Street on 
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this process was taken for granted in their discussions, and I realised the importance of 
meeting certain indicators (such as the no. of metro loops). Shan's team appeared to 
fully appreciate the importance of revenue; indeed they took it for granted as being the 
bottom-line of strategic activity. They thus felt empowered to criticise the rationality of 
the U. S. 's adherence to Wall Street's non-revenue indicators. What struck me, however, 
was that both the U. S. and International Strategy were wielding similar accounting-type 
practices. 
'Shan spoke about how Strategy ain't involved In Capital Planning. What happens is that they 
advise Noel and then he oversees Capital Planning. Interesting eh? And combined with the fact 
that Strategy are so secretive. So where Is the f**king strategy then? It manifests itself in the 
M&A. ' 
(Field diary: 3 September 1999) 
Talking to Shan and Ravi made me realise that Noel did not defer automatically to 
International Strategy when making capital planning decisions. It appeared to be a 
political process, negotiated by International Finance, International Network and 
International Sales and Marketing. I attended the Capital Planning meeting held in 
September being the only International Strategy member to attend the meeting. I was 
able to listen firsthand to the negotiations, which fIxated around the budget revenue 
forecasts. In my report, for the second part of the project, I documented how the 
different groups were manoeuvring for capital spend. Of note is the way this apparent 
'central co-ordination'was achieved through a lack of discussion about strategy. 
'Got loads of info from a meeting on Friday with Shan and Ravi. Noel as controlling through 
ambiguity and being a yes man. They're a good team in Strategy. So nice to begin to 
deconstruct higher levels of management in International to hear the bitching just like in 
anywhere else. Also opening up the link to non-London based International people is great as 
well as emailing people in the US... 
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(Field diary: 4 September 1999) 
I found that there was a mindset within International that strategy could be practised 
through the numbers, showing striking similarities with the U. S. 's approach. 
International made claims to owning strategy but failed to communicate it to the UK 
opco over and above the financial targets. While management within the U. K. were left 
with ownership over managing, the absence of the empowering presence 'of strategy' led 
to complaints that numbers do not provide clear direction on how to manage. This is 
covered in the next section. 
implications 
While it was the U. S. parent which undertook the merger, and top management 
retained their position within the organisation, the story unfolded in quite a different 
way within Europe. Riding on the back of discourses of globalisation within 
telecommunications, Teleco's country-independent practices were confused and 
subordinated through a broader discourse of matrix organising. Power relations were 
aligned away from the legacy opco management, turning instead to the constitution of a 
new International layer of organisation, one which lay beneath the U. S. covering 
European operations. This encouraged feelings of Insecurity for opco management, and 
the institutionalisation of autonomous discourses, from which they drew much 
employee support, began to appear confounded in the wider context of a globally 
orientated architecture 'of strategy, as disseminated from International. 
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After spending a month in International Strategy, I realised that even in here, the 
numbers were driving what was being perceived as strategy for the U. S. and for the 
opcos. I found myself confronting a peculiar mix of presence and absence. Once 
produced, financial and non-financial indicators were able to constitute strategic 
presence. Yet, this presence was unlike any described in the literature, being 
constituted through numbers. Furthermore, looking up to the CEO, he appeared to now 
be in control of the practice of capital allocation, but this was left partially separated 
from those formally practising strategy (International Strategy). In addition, the opco 
was left increasingly distant from the resource allocation process, as revenue stream 
was reduced in importance as an indicator of priority. For opco management, as the 
next section investigates, this was being made sense of through the notion of strategy 
as absent. 
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January 1999-May 2000 - Structural 
Changes in the U. K. 
I met with Robert in January 1999 to discuss both his appointment to M. D. and the 
process of my research within the opco. He talked very positively about the new 
planning structures that were now in place. Marking a significant change, opco targets 
were expanded to include margin, mix and customer satisfaction. This was the first 
time formal targets had been separated out from revenue, and seemed to indicate the 
new rigour with which Teleco was being organised. There appeared to be a new sense of 
direction being received from International and I was keen to find out just what this 
would mean for the opco. 
'GSL: I'm still not sure whether you see the plan as kept for top-level management and not 
disseminated in thatform lower down or actually passed down..? 
Robert: Well there is the Intl plan which is understood and articulated to the senior managers, 
basically saying that anything we do within the opco to achieve our targets will follow certain 
criteria. The highest level plan in the UK is to make sure the individual division head's plans 
coordinate. Take the Intl progs that we are gonna pursue... what progs; have we put in place to 
make that happen. UK in the year 2000, what are the Intl things we can leverage. whafs the 
number we're expected to deliver as part of the strat plan, looking at the market opportunity, 
then from the gap. Have roll-through revenue from e)dsting customers, new initiative progs... 
then what else do we need to do to win the market share that we want. So talk to the sales 
and marketing, by sharing that info at a senior level, what will Customer Quality, HR, finance. 
what can they do to support it. That what comes into the funnel can be supported all the way 
through the business pipline. We would then take that and translate that into a series of opco 
wide imperatives. This is the number, these are the progs. Then on divisional basis, that 
will translate into a specific operational plan. So opco operating plan which the exec team are 
authors of, and they will take that and cascade it to their individual functions. So don't share 
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that information with everyone, but give them as much as they need. About 60 page 
document. . so HR.. how many people do we need, how can we keep the ones we got.. all 
aimed at doing that number. Business objectives translate down into divisional, team and 
then individual objectives. Bit idealistic to think that big figure will translate down to an 
individual, but thafs the idea. We're getting closer to it this year. ' 
(Robert, 25 January 1999, emphasis added) 
I was impressed by the practices he was discussing, as they accepted the centrality of 
the revenue number but attempted to break it down into actionable components. The 
talk of programmes, in particular, indicated that there would be a stronger control and 
co-ordination emphasis from the leadership. This seemed to be an appropriate 
management move to counteract the trend of focusing on sales without planning out 
how this would be achieved throughout the functions. The quote also demonstrates how 
the opco and International could work together. At the same time, however, political 
troubles were brewing over just how differences should be resolved. In retrospect, it is 
Interesting to note just how immersed I was within Teleco's discourse. It had become 
clear to me, as researcher for the M. D., that the organisation was too informally based. 
The solution was thus to introduce more planning practices which could implement 
reliable business processes. Upon reflection. however, the confines of the problem- 
solution mentality were limited to the 'me as disciplinary subject' within Teleco, and 
differed to the 'me as academically disciplinary' PhD researcher. 
It was during the Easter of 1999, as I prepared for the Critical Management Studies 
Conference in Manchester, that my research began to tackle the issue of strategy as 
nihilism in the U. K.. looking specifically at how it was both a loss and a gain. The quote 
below from Nietzsche captured for me the double-edge of the investigation. 
'Nihilism. It is ambouous: 
A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. 
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B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism. ' 
(Nietzsche. 1967/1901: 22) 
Claims over driving strategy appeared to have been possessed by International through 
the ownership of the overall revenue number, with International mirroring opco 
structures in their articulation of self as strategic. What appears to be the resultant 
research question44, is the effects this had on opco practices. The previous years had 
seen how accounting practices had central effects in the propagation of strategic 
presence, enabling me to understand how presence can be rightfully claimed by more 
than one party, offering an explanation to the paradox of a strategic doppelganger. 
While the U. K. could feel in possession of strategy, the expansion of measurement 
practices was not perceived as required over and above those which specifically 
measured revenue. Without the security of strategic presence, however, the expansion 
of measurement practices began to be taken more seriously. 
What is again of great interest are the multiple ways in which practices are passed 
through level by level. I was interested In how the becoming of the discursive absence of 
strategy constituted a new regime of practices within the U. K., with a different type of 
accounting at work. 
Spreading absence 
'In tenns of the strategy-I only know the financial part. Shan will articulate the wider view' 
(Robert: March 1999) 
44 Many thanks to Margaret Lamb for making this specifIc suggestion. 
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In talking to Robert, I realised that even at M. D. level in 1999, there was still little 
knowledge or participation in the 'non-financial' strategy. It was only when I penetrated 
the confines of Intemational Strategy (see above section) that I realised that even the 
non-financial strategy was expressed largely through the numbers. While the markets 
he could enter had been made clear to him, the route by which he should achieve this 
was left unsaid. Instead, it was the targets that were passed down to him as his 'need to 
know'. Ibis had made me even keener to meet with Shan. Strategy in the opco, was 
based around the revenue target, with the process of achieving that revenue left 
formally un-explicated. However, the rise of International meant that the previously 
experienced freedom was being challenged as the resource allocation process became 
increasingly opaque. 
GSL: How much input would you say you had into the strategy of the UK opco? 
Kate: Last year not a lot. But this year quite a lot. ... [... I 
Once they decide to do it. then I'm involved but it's more this is what we're doing, get on and 
do Itl So it: s not always clear what our strategy is. [ ... I 
Was brought up at the Intl Management course, from lots of people from all over Europe by 
people saying we don't actually know what our strategy Is or the direction of the company. 
GSI_- What do you mean by strategy? 
Kate: For me, I need to know where this company is going, in 1 year, 3 years. 5 years. Where 
are we getting to? What will our product set be? Are we going into this market? Or not. So 
everybody knows where to focus efforts. Acquisitions? Are we taking on another carrier? Are 
we thinking about it? Customers ask me about what our strategy is.... They need to know. I 
think the UK exec board should be looking at what's important for the UK. then see how it 
goes at International. Should be a two-way thing. Rather than just feeding down. 
Maybe Robert talks about that with other MDs but not much info tends to come out. Tends to 
be a secret huddle of MDs and Noel, and not much fed back. 
GSL- Is that on purpose? 
236 
Not sure. They must discuss at that level. So about cascading down. And Noel was told last 
year... we don't clearly tell the company where we're going. 
I've met Shan once. I've worked closely with one of his team cos working on this project. But 
don't know him personally. 
We have an extended exec board meeting once a month - someone could come down there and 
tell us about what has been discussed. Noel having an opp counsel where ideas are yes'd or 
no'd. And what they*re thinking about. 
(Kate, Customer Director: April 1999) 
Kate was from Manumit, and had known Robert for about 3 years. Serving on the U. K. 
board of directors, she was frustrated in her lack of participation in strategy. She 
alluded to a very top-down structure between International and the U. K. opco as well as 
the poor quality of information fed down. I found myself speculating that as the 
company grew, the complexities of choices spiralled out and she could not be sure -as to 
how to plan ahead. Her justification for needing this was expressed through customer 
needs, although a deeper rationale appeared to be her indignation at being excluded 
from the doing of strategy. There seemed to be a kind of inner circle developing within 
the opco directors and senior management, whereby some would have good contact 
with Shan, and others would not. 
It was early Summer 1999 when I began to hear rumours about revenue targets not 
being achieved. The figures demonstrated that the opco was about 15% down year-to- 
date. Robert mounted a set of opco briefings to spread the word that performance was 
In a critical state. In particular, he was keen to tell employees as much as possible 
about the strategy and structures of the company. Near the beginning of 1999, he was 
already very clear in his understanding of the problem of buy-in. While he also 
consistently expressed the need for self-determination In the workplace, he described to 
me how there was a danger that this became anarchic, thereby reducing any sense of 
belonging. 
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'We need some bureaucracy... we need to make sure that we understand what success is for 
the individual. Fair enough we got revenue targets ... but for the individual employee, does 
he/she feel involved? All they will be seeing is the complaints and the moans. ' 
(April 1999) 
I found that individual employees sometimes not only did not know what the strategy 
was, they did not care. Upon introducing myself as a researcher Into strategy, I would 
often find even at middle management levels that employees would shy away and lose 
interest In talking to me. I had to develop a knack for moving the conversation towards 
issues that concerned them. normally functional and 'operational' issues. The growth of 
the company had meant that it was only senior management that tended to have a 
serious opinion on strategy. I began to feel that perhaps strategy as absence only 
entered the discourse of management as those more junior barely engaged with the 
discourse of strategy at all (strategy as non-e)dstence? ). I recall the interview withan 
operations employee in 1998, Tarkan, who, in answer to my question of 'What do you 
think Teleco's strategy is', reeled out the mission statement with great sarcasm. He was 
very clear that it meant nothing to him whatsoever in his activities. A different question 
evoked a telling response: 
Do you t1tink Teleco treats its employees well? 
No. The ones who do well are not recognised, and the ones who slip arc not brought into line. 
Some guys who work hard, and need training to bring out their true potential, are not 
recognised.... at) doesn't matter what you do... whatever category you fall Into, Teleco doesn't 
do well by you. 
Is that the generalfeeling? 
I don't think many people have thought about It to be honest. 
CTarkan, U. K. Network Operations: July 1998) 
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There were clearly problems brewing during 1998. Damien was extremely frank with me 
and was scathing about the previous year's efforts at planning. 
'Last year there was absolutely no strategy which I'm sure you've already drawn conclusions 
from. But predominantly that was based around a lack of academia. This year we have a plan. 
Didn't have one last year. ' 
(Damien, Sales Director: July 1999) 
It was flattering that he had such respect for academia, I thought. It was perhaps no 
coincidence that he was just about to complete his part-time MBA. He appeared to 
interpret strategy as planning and co-ordination in a rationalist Porterian sense. 
Emergent strategies were seen by him as not appropriate In Teleco's context. I felt that 
this could be either as a reaction to the lack of strategy, as my own reports for Teleco 
emphasised the need for structured planning and control, or because processual 
concepts had not entered the discourse of business practice sufficiently to be perceived 
as viable. I mused on the possibility of processual discourse being critical in a business 
context. 
'90% of people in the company will say there is no visible strategy. We know the objective of 
Teleco... but that's not strategy-there's no meat. We know segmentation will increase revenue 
by 90%.... but there's no talk of implementation. .... 
We need a strategy. if you're clear about a journey, you know whether you'll be taking the 
train. car, bike or walk. ' 
(Ruth. U. K. Quality Manager: 8/99) 
Ruth was flercely outspoken about the way strategy absence was impeding the 
performance of the opco. She desired more formal planning procedures so that she 
could make more sense of the direction of her role. Clearly, this was occurring at the 
same time as International was asserting authority over opco decisions. with resources 
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being taken away and centralised. As Ruth said 'the problem with matrix 
organisation ... Intl tell the U. K. opco what to do but they don't do jackshit about 
implenwnting it. ' Robert echoed these concerns, asserting that: 
'We have moved from anarchic to alienated because of overbureaucracy. Remember we've had 
four years of no process. But we're now coming back to a middle... we wish to have guiderails 
for pragmatism. ' 
(Robert: April 1999) 
It was Intriguing that within the same breath, Robert complained of overbureaucracy 
yet there was a continuing lack of process. I found that the former was a result of 
International's interference in matters previously seen as owned by the opco. This 
interference was not, however, clearly structured or planned. Tbe latter point was due 
to an apparent inability of opco management to introduce measurement. practices. 
While Robert, as M. D., was clear in his advocacy of this need, Ruth. as manager 
formally in charge of monitoring these practices, was clear that nothing had been done. 
'We need measurements of success to ensure buy-in of individual people. We must emphasise 
KPIs. ' 
(Robert: March 1999) 
'Key Performance Indicators and ownership issues have not progressed... Two reasons. 
Systems have not been able to support realistic KPIs.... Big workload makes you ... ignore KPIs 
unless somebody's kicking you up the butt to do it. ' 
(Ruth, U. K. Quality Manager: August 1999) 
While KPIs were not taken seriously, what began to occur now was the 
taking on of other measurement practices, those that brought into sharp 
distinction the contrast between external and internal performance. 
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Spreading practices 
I began to appreciate how the discursive absence of strategy was having effects within 
the opco. Even as I attempted to make sense of this, management were making their 
own sense of what they were doing, by developing activities which could simulate, or 
substitute for the name of, strategy. I found a new comple. )dty of the presence/absence 
relation at the opco level and in how this was playing out under the new regime. 
There was a visible promotion of customer-related functions to Executive Team level, as 
they were now visually positioned on the opco top level organisation chart, within the 
two departments of Customer Service and Installation & Repairs. These two 
departments in any event represented a re-consolidation of the UK'opco' in the face of 
the wider Teleco reorganisation. the latter in particular structurally embracing the 
measurability of performance now formally required by OFFEL, the telecoms regulator. 
In addition, there was a new opco department, that of Business Analysis, formed to 
provide the opco with better management information, most notably with regard to the 
production of revenue figures. As Robert asserted during January, there was a 'planning 
model'in evidence this year. 
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1999 
U. K. Organisation 
Sales & Marketing Installation & Repairs i 
TETECO (1999): U. K. OPERA IING COMPA NY 
To examine the spread of practices, I shall turn here to three specific delmi-tinents: 
Marketing, Installation and Repairs, and Business Analysis, as dwse, in retrospect, 
showed very specific developments in accountability. 
The integration of Sales and Marketing was an initiative which began in early 1999, 
stemining primarily frorn International's appointment of' a new Vice-President in Sales 
and Marketing. The talk froin this level was of' segmenta(ion, a strategic move which 
gave credence to Marketing practices alongside the revenue-generating purity of Sales. 
The importance of marketing concerns were at once recognised and underscored 
through the naming of the function as Sales & Marketing, with consequent discursive 
effects. These effects within the U. K. proved of key importance in the final stage of this 
study of accounting practice, For what bc(ýýanic apparent within Marketing's discourse 
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was the embrace by the marketeers of hardened accountability practices in their search 
for equal or priority positioning within the firm. 
Speaking to Norris, the U. K. Marketing director, I discovered that they had been 
allocated no budget in the previous year (1998), in his words 'a certain indicatoe of their 
previously under-rated status. In addition, they had been under much pressure, as they 
were under fire from sales for an apparent lack of performance. In 1999, however, 
knowledge of the customer was promoted as paramount, and a personal crusade for 
Robert, as being critical to the whole process of selling. Speaking to Norris and then to 
Katz, it became clear to me that marketing management began chasing success through 
subordinating themselves (and in the process rendering themselves accountable) to 
quantitative objectives. These included such targets as number of leads generated, 
number of leads converted into sales etc., ascribing power to and deriving power from 
calculative marketing technologies (Knights, Sturdy and Morgan, 1994: 48-49; Morgan 
and Sturdy, forthcoming: 194). But this internal adoption of a new form of calculability 
was not necessarily rolled out easily to other parts of the organisation. 
'GSL: What aboutfeeding the leads you've generated sofar into the salesfOrce? ' 
Katz: Not doing very well... ifs a big cultural change. They're not being sold the benefits of the 
feedback.. Ws most frustrating. The feedback from Sales is poor. Not about the leads being 
bad but they don't comment on the data sets we give to them. ' 
(Katz, U. K. Marketing Manager: June 1999) 
The difference between the top-level commitment to extending and integrating new 
numbers and the actual implementation was marked. 'Me new calculable practices 
remained private and insular, and failed to gain assent from other subjects to being 
rendered accountable in this extended way. But then I found that there were few 
processes in place which employees felt they could rely upon or turn to, in order to 
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assist them in operating within a more joined-up entity. The integration was very much 
'emergent', thus helping to maintain or reassert the split between higher and lower opco 
management, In much the same way as International failed to provide strategic 
directions in addition to the formal financial plan. Perhaps opco management felt 
empowered by their International concerns, enabling them to disown responsibility for 
implementation directives. A culture of a lack of responsibility certainly featured 
strongly in interview responses opco-wide. As such. the repelling of accountability to 
internal concerns was particularly striking in the context of Marketing's jostling for 
position within the organisational structure. Contradictions emerged between 
accountability for Marketing's overall positioning and accountability for Individual 
performance, replicating the disequilibrium of the opco Itself Despite this, the 
willingness of Marketing to incorporate accounting practices was most noticeable. 
Moving on to Installation and Repairs, the establishment of this department came at 
a critical time for Teleco. 
GSL-- How much interaction do you have with other departments? 
A lot. This is quite Interesting if you talk about my role in the 90-9100 million [revenue], and 
the 9100 billion. In the LO-9.100 mill, 80% of my time was facing outside the company, by 
bringing new business, so suppliers, competitors, a outside. More fun. As the company gets 
into the 9100 billion bracket, that role changes completely, and you find that the broad 80-20 
rule goes the other way, and you find yourself spending huge amounts of your time on 
internal activities. Dealing with lawyers, finance, IT, operations... 
(Gilbert, UK Sales Director: Jan 1998) 
Gilbert's quote sums up the cultural shift that he had encountered during his four 
years at Teleco. Throughout 1998,1 began to notice Increasing attention by both the 
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opco and International being focused on the support functions for sales. The sales 
force (driven by the then MD, Alex) was loudly demanding (and claiming a lack 00 
support from the organisation, in particular the old-Customer Quality department. 
'Ibis coincided with International stripping control over Network Operations away 
from the opcos and establishing their own core Network department. As such, 
International took over all engineering functions for the whole of Europe and Asia, 
leaving the opcos with responsibility to provide a working day-to-day service. 
During this time, apparently out of the blue at first (having little initial real internal 
significance), the role of external regulatory bodies, in particular OFrEL, emerged as 
significant within the opco, through a focus on an externally generated set of numbers, 
OFrEUs CPIs (Comparative Performance Indicators) 45. The CPIs are indicators which 
OFIEL publishes quarterly for business and residential customers, and which have 
been developed jointly by telecoms companies and consumer organisations, under 
OFrE1; s oversight. With the widening range of service providers, the stated purpose of 
CPls Is to provide information to enable customers to make an informed choice. taking 
into account quality of service as well as price. They offer qualitative objectives that are 
then operationally defined in calculative terms, not dissimilar from the accounting- 
derived terms appropriated in Marketing. So we find: 
Service Provision 
'the ability of companies to keep to their promises to provide services' 
Measure: % installed by Customer Due Date 
Fault Repairs 
'the ability to repair faults within target times' 
45 CPls were first reported in early 1998. 
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Measure: % repairs within Target Time 
From the perspective of this study, the striking aspect about Installation & Repairs was 
its organisation as a new department around these quality-focused quantitative 
measures. While internal indicator statistics had been previously prepared, they were 
'produced after the evenf (Kevin, Fault Manager: 8/99) and little management reliance 
was placed on them. Compared to the 'hardness' of Sales f1gures, and in the context of 
widespread dissatisfaction and distrust of available information, quality measurement 
had been relegated to a very secondary support role. But with the new requirement to 
report quality externally, along with the top management commitment to developing 
measures to go behind the sales numbers, there was an opportunity for numbers such 
as CPIs to take on a new signifIcance. 
So the emergence of CP1s can be seen as a sign of how far management was now 
beginning to accept that measurement was effective in non-financial as well as financial 
areas. It also proved timely as International's strategy (and associated discourse) of 
standardisation was causing much upset within the opco, and especially among the 
people involved in the old Customer Quality and Operations departments. One key 
battle that had emerged was over the degree of centralisation versus decentralisation, a 
battle in which International had won a major victory with the removal of network 
responsibility from the UK. Indeed this was perhaps the deciding blow, as the network 
is seen as the core of telecoms companies activities. Unease was therefore rife as 
employee roles were shifted into a new, network-less, opco. It was at this moment of 
stress and amdety that Installation and Repairs was developed as a new department. 
and I would argue that the selective focus on CPIs cannot be dissociated from that. 
'-whenever we've found problems with someone who supports us, we've tended to take over 
the function... ' 
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(Dave, Installation & Repairs Director: July 1999) 
Dave, the director of Installation & Repairs, was able, under the above circumstances, 
to amalgamate elements of the old Customer Quality and old Operations departments 
into the new form. He took a number of steps to produce a new kind of unity, in the 
absence of the old raison d'etre. Teams which were previously geographically separate 
but which worked on complementary functions were placed together under the new 
Installation & Repairs umbrella. At the same time, producing quarterly statistics for 
both service provision and fault repair enabled a strong sense of purpose to be 
established within these teams. It did strike me that a real sense of unity emerged. 
However it was a unity in opposition: against International's colonisation of Teleco 
functions as well as against Sales' persistent and 'unfaiT, criticisms of customer support 
activities. There was already a sense of 'oppositional culture' amongst these 'techies'. As 
Raj pointed out to me (in no uncertain -terms) in 1998: 
I think my team do a f*****g good jobl Nobody recognises them... they're unsung heroes. 
Nobody wants to know about faults. unless somebody screams. The director saying your 
service is crap, then we come onto the scene. But hundreds of faults that get cleared daily, 
there's no recognition as such. Just seen as engineers in the background. ' 
(Raj. Fault Manager: July 98) 
In this spirit, the new express (and obviously widely internalised) mission of Installation 
and Repairs was to meet CPIs rather than the more 'obvious' alternative, the company's 
own KPIs. Thus was encountered here a particularly poignant and intriguing expansion 
in the discourse of 'managing through numbers' within the opco. For here was a set of 
numbers which had almost nothing to do directly with the strategic direction that top 
management wished to set, and which might well operate agatnst rather than in line 
with, their strategic plans. As Robert pointed out to me at the start of the year, opco 
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targets were revenue, margin, mix and customer satisfaction. The CPls were arguably 
linked in some way (although see below) for customer satisfaction. but certainly would 
not appear to proxy well for the financial targets. But in the double conflictual 
circumstance (where the opco was set against International and the techies were set 
against everyone), it may well have been the best strategic option around, prectsely 
because it tapped into and even celebrated strategy as absence. 
In any event, while International's appropriation of the budget numbers and of the 
strategy to achieve them meant that, discursively, the opco was denied the comfort of 
Identifying with strategy as purpose and presence, this general extension in 
management through numbers was the practice that it adopted. Within this general 
extension, the adoption of CPIs certainly did not seem to be dysfunctional, and may 
even have helped enable the consolidation of the opco into its new network-less form. 
Thus I could hypothesise, post the CMS conference, that the removal of strategy as 
presence from the UK was instrumental in stimulating new practices to evolve. It is, of 
course, only one factor involved, but yet it launched a new level of mutual implication 
between accounting practice and strategy. For instance, by Summer 1999, Raj had 
considerably changed his perspective towards the opco. telling me that CPls were being 
regularly achieved or even exceeded. Bearing in mind that In 1998, he was one of the 
most vociferous denouncers of opco, management capability, this was a significant 
achievement. With his team in the same building, objectives firmly established and met, 
the respect for his department was significantly higher within the opco. As his 
departmental boss, Dave, said to me, 'it's got to be good when Raj isn't complaining. ' 
So It could even be proposed that this move of adding the non-financial. to the flnancial 
was an exemplary textbook move. But It was not a total solution, and should not be 
read as such. One concerns that soon arose, for instance, was over the way that CPls 
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began to effectively exclude (or downgrade) a focus on the 'real' customer from (or 
within) the management of Installation and Repairs. 
'Continuous Performance Improvement. That: s CPIs. To be honest, KPIs take a backburner. I 
don't really look at KPIs. CPls is what the company is getting measured on in this country cos 
of OFrEL. When other countries deregulate, and CPls are introduced, that will be the driver. If 
you try and introduce a KPI cnd-to-end from London to Milan, may go through Stockholm, 
there's not that enthusiasm to correct that little bit of measure. There is when London says 
I've missed my five hour target cos of Stockholm, so I'll route round you until you've got your 
bit right. So driver is the CPI cos that is what gets recognition outside the company. Within 
the co, you've got to make sure that other parts of the co are serving you well so that you 
achieve your CPI. But for me the driver is CPI not KPI. We'll get improvement in KPI through 
CPI... if the opco cannot produce CPIs, we're likely to lose business. ' 
The above is from Kevin, the senior manager in charge of fault repair statistics, and 
thereby of a key part of the monitoring and control process. He was extremely frank 
about the priority of the external measure, CPL over KPI. But he himself then indicated 
the lack of linkage between CPIs and 'real customer' satisfaction. 
'There is very little correlation between Customer Satisfaction and CPI delivery. We have repair 
delivery greater than 90% but the customer's perception of performance is not speedy delivery. 
It may be this is the third time this week I've had this. So you've cleared (the fault) in time but 
you don't ring me up and tell me. Some customers will want that but others don't. It: s like 
with a telly repair, you get a replacement but might get annoyed that there's no remote, the 
screen's srnallcr etc. The two things are totally different. Not necessarily linked.... 
Customer Satisfaction might be seasonal, or linked to share prices, could be. if money's 
getting tight, they might get angrier... ' 
(Kevin. Installation & Repairs Senior Manager: July 99) 
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Kevin could clearly see the problem of 'getting what you measure' looming large as Fault 
Repair and Service Provision statistics rose, producing a non-customer-relevant rise In 
-quality of service'. But at the same time, he was clear that he could not waste his time 
thinking about 'seasonar matters, and that his attention had to be firmly focused on 
CPIs. So he had to acquiesce in keeping 'promises to the customer' that the customer 
might not want, Insofar as this was what was calculated and managed by the CPI 
system. [To give an Installation example. If Teleco failed to agree on the installation 
timetable suggested by the customer, but suggested an alternative date which the 
customer then was forced to accept, quality of service provision would be measured by 
the ability to keep to this renegotiated date, ignoring the original date which the customer 
wanted. ] But It was not only the Kevins in the opco who saw this problem. As Robert 
put it: 
'CPIs have become the tail that wags the dog... ' 
(Robert: August 1999) 
The flaws inherent In using CPIs rather than KPIs became an Issue of senior 
management concern within the opco as the realisation hit that the former might be 
having detrimental effects on customer satisfaction, and so revenue. A customer 
satisfaction survey was undertaken, the largest ever in Teleco's history, and the results 
were unimpressive (average ranking: moderate). At this point it was concluded 
(ironically on the evidence of still more numbers) that. far from helping the financial 
and non-financial parts of the company gel together, the introduction of CPIs had acted 
to further divide the opco. It was not enough that providing an alternative measure to 
revenue enabled a sense of identity to be established by Installation and Repairs. Since 
the metric was now definably at odds with the continuing revenue drive of the Sales and 
Marketing department, it had to be re-evaluated. [And perhaps the oppositional culture 
of the technicians could also be dealt a fatal blow. ] 
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In a sense then a commitment to integration 'via the numbers' was being refined by 
paying closer attention to the question of 'which numbers' and the further, perhaps 
deeper, question of what key numbers 'really' signified. Ultimately this concern spread 
even back to the 'number of numbers': revenue. 
'Everyone needs revenue in any function and they all have a different revenue report... What is 
revenue, what Is the interpretation. ' 
(Martin, Sales Analysis Manager: August 1999) 
The second department to be introduced in 1999 was that of Business Analysis, which 
came about because of increasing top management concerns over the multiplicity and 
variability of revenue figures. Its remit was to increase the quality of analytical 
information, focusing on Revenue Analysis & Commissions. Its introduction was the 
clearest sign of the concern that revenue itse! f had become the stumbling block for the 
UK opco, as different departments defined it differently, and as far as possible to suit 
their own political and organisational objectives. As Jarvis, a Sales Operations Analyst, 
confided to me, it was increasingly impossible to determine just what the revenue figure 
was. 
Business Analysis was an amalgamation from disparate groups within Sales and 
Finance which had previously to produce revenue figures. Speaking to William, the 
newly appointed Director of Business Analysis (ex-Finance Director), the development of 
this joint department was designed to resolve both technical and 'turf disputes by 
housing the relevant analysts in the same department, within the same building. 
It was a fascinating situation, with measurement practices being at the heart of these 
two major opco re-organisations, thus reasserting the centrality of accounting practice 
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in would-be strategic change. But I could not help noticing how each of these 
reorganisations not only failed in its own terms, but how each actually made more likely 
the failure of the other. The CPI episode ensured that a major part of the organisation 
could now have a 'proper' (i. e. calculative) justification for focussing elsewhere than on 
revenue, thus meeting an espoused strategic aim, but in a way that failed to align with 
the specific strategic objectives. The new focus on 'getting revenue figures you could 
trust' was potentially valuable as a means of reducing a considerable 'moral hazard' 
problem. However it worked against the new wider strategic vision insofar as it sent a 
message that revenue was still the really important number, and as a solution it was 
too narrow and too late to do anything about the unilateral decision to focus onCPIS. 46. 
In this respect it was a classic accountant's solution in a context that now required a 
wider and more sensitive understanding of the power of accounting numbers and 
practices. This 'strategic' function emerged to deal with the revenue problems just as 
the issue had grown beyond revenue alone. 
However, the pressures imposed by the need to continue hitting 'hard' revenue figures 
were likely to continue dominating the 'value' of hitting CPI targets, and I wondered just 
how long this disparity could be sustained. For the cycle of revenue and capital 
provided by International was the lifeblood of the UK opco, and as such formed the 
opco's bottom line, rather than CPls- However, this split in the objectives of different 
parts of the organisation was not easily resolved. 
One sign of continuing inertia within the U. K. organisation was the way the re- 
structuring left untouched internal practices of informal management and 
communication. From an external perspective, substantial change had occurred both In 
46 In discussions with Keith Hoskin during the preparation of a Strategic Management Accounting lecture at 
Warwick Business School. 
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the performance measurement system and the structure of the opco. Talking to 
employees, however, I felt that many of the old ways of organising managed to persist. 
'Ibis manifested itself most audibly in the complaints that continued to arise over the 
lack of cross-functional processes. Far from helping to resolve this, the appearance of 
the two new departments seemed to consolidate the 'silo mentality' which had 
previously marked the opco's activity. Here I was intrigued to find that previously 
antagonistic teams, having been placed together in Installation & Repairs, were soon 
seen as 'giving grief to other functions within the opco. Moving them Into a more 
coherent and unified department, where they had a new sense of 'purpose' conferred 
through CPIs, again deferred the development of cross-functional practices. 
'Iberefore within the opco, the continuation of function-specific discourses and 
practices led to feelings of lack of coordination. with localised forms of accountability as 
distinct from departmental/company accountability being sought and achieved -by 
employees. While Installation and Repairs joined with Sales in their embrace of 
practices foregrounding individualised performance measures, other functions avoided 
the move towards hard internal accountability targets. This led to ineffectiveness in the 
pursuit of alternative agendas, such as Quality (which emphasised KPIs and cross- 
functional processes), as employees could see themselves as 'empowered' to avoid these 
apparently urgent calls for action. On the other hand, this loose accountability acted 
also to resist the infiltration of International discourses and practices, aided, ironically, 
by the inadequacy of International communication, monitoring and evaluation47. 
47 As noted, Opco management did not always appear aware of what International are 
trying to achieve, either in the short or longer long terms, although this lack of 
understanding may have been a strategy of resistance in Itself. 
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The outcome may not have been wholly due to internal problems (growth after all is a 
very tough strategy to achieve over the longer term), however it is perhaps unsurprising 
that reported revenues for 1999 were roughly 20% below target. 
Towards strategic planning? 
As 1999 wore on, I noticed with some despair that Robert's promise of implementing a 
planning model during the calendar year had not materialised. After much chasing, I 
managed to obtain a copy of the opco plan in August. Certain parts were still awaiting 
signoff and it was clear that the document I had was not 'active'. as It had not been 
updated as events progressed. Indeed. upon reading it, many sections were already 
defunct. I was reminded yet again of the consistent deferral of accountability within 
Teleco, with regard to internal process and organisational issues at least. 
Coming into Teleco in the new Millenium, I found that Robert had moved on from his 
post as M. D., and Indeed left Teleco shortly after. It appeared that significant 
restructuring was taking place in terms of making International the source of 
management direction, thus virtually removing the need for an M. D. at opco level. A 
replacement had not been found by May 2000. Instead, the new European Group 
Director took over responsibility for the U. K.. Her objectives are worth discussing 
briefly. As per usual, there was a revenue target, but In addition there were satisfaction 
targets for customers and employees. I noted, however, that there was no stated 
strategy in her objectives, at least in terms of how to achieve these numbers. 7bis 
appeared to reflect the continuing lack of direction from International to the U. K., and 
senior opco management confided to me that there continued to be a lack of strategy in 
the opco. 
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There was again talk of major changes in the opco with regards to formalising the 
approach. What springs to mind is an interview with Pete, an old-Teleco salesperson, 
back in 1997. 
'with growth, (we are) now in the stage of where we need to think about formalising the 
approach* 
(Pete, salesperson: May 97) 
The apparent continuing inability of the opco to introduce formalisation was quite 
surprising. At the same time, the equally apparent ability of measurement practices to 
spread once extemaljustijtcation had arisen was clear. It was quite familiar, therefore, to 
hear the rhetoric of the new directors of the opco, with the new Business Development 
Director talking about 'niachinising the approactf and discussions of using the Balanced 
ScoreCard to bring a process mentality to the opco. The new Finance Director was 
similarly keen and especially emphasised the use of Key Performance Indicators to drive 
performance throughout the company. But this only reminded me that we had been 
here before, with the discourse of strategy failing to reconcile externally and internally 
focussed perceptions and actions, while practices of accounting and accountability 
remained focused primarily on hitting 'hard' external numbers. 
But was this now the time when something would give? It was particularly intriguing to 
note the conjunction within the opco between the absence of strategy/ strategy as 
absence and falling revenue growth. This conjunction would seem to have offered 
renewed influence to those calling for radical change and formallsation. But even by 
May 2000, the new integrative practices of performance management so heavily 
highlighted as necessary by interviewees had not materlalised. 
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Implications 
The experience I was able to trace through in the opco arguably gives a new kind of 
insight into the complex Interactions between accounting practices and the workings of 
strategy, both as presence and absence. It Is not just that the failure of strategy leads to 
its own re-intensification, but that, whether there is success or failure. and whether 
strategy functions as presence or absence, the spread of accounting and accounting- 
based practices seems to roll on. 
So Marketing could be seen embracing accountability to hard targets in their attempt to 
re-position themselves within the opco. Installation and Repairs discovered the 
relevance of CPIs, in preference to the focus others had on revenue, and generated a 
new and coherent identity for themselves (both In their own eyes and the eyes of 
others). Business Analysis, born out of the failure to generate reliable or accurate 
revenue figures, can be seen as an attempt by opco senior management to reinvent 
themselves so as to be perceived as succeeding in a strategically relevant way within 
Teleco. Ironically, this enabled problems caused by the focus on CPIs to persist, and led 
to a failure in both departments to align In a wholly successful way with the redefined 
and wider strategic objectives of the organisation as a whole. 
With perceptions of customer complaints rising, what emerged was a focus on statistics 
never previously seen within Teleco except in the context offinancial performance. Now. 
in line with a recognition within the UK opco that quality had to be managed, as well as 
led from the front by sales, measurement practices were embraced by other parts of the 
opco. However, even here the historic role of accounting practices in constituting the 
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opco was, I would argue, a significant influencing factor. For too long had Sales been 
able to play their own master, answerable only to their own performance system. The 
relative intangibility of the performance measures developed in the support 
departments (along with the focus on external CPIs rather than internal KPIs) enabled 
Sales to maintain the perception of their numbers as being both most strategically 
significant and most objective and 'hard'. 
Thus what had begun as a mapping of the opco's strategic vision and success through 
accounting numbers metamorphosed, as the responsibility for strategy was relocated at 
International level, into a mapping of success in the absence of strategy via an 
intensification and expansion in the use of such numbers. As strategy became an 
absence, I followed with fascination as numbers became the means to re-establishing a 
sense of direction and giving it to areas of the organisation which had previously had 
none. At the same time, this general centrality of accounting was given further 
expression through the new strategic numbers handed down by International to the 




When I first came into Teleco in April 1997,1 felt highly vulnerable, being neither 
confident as a researcher nor competent as a strategist. I was only there through 
personal contacts, and so living on borrowed time. It was therefore an extraordinary as 
well as complex experience to see myself grow as well as Teleco change throughout the 
three years of the ethnography. Being involved in the formative years of Teleco gave me 
a certain credibility through and beyond my research, as I began to develop a 
reputation of 'my own'within the opco. 
The submission of my report to Alex in October 1998 was particularly important, in an 
unanticipated way, as I heaped praise on Robert, the Customer Director at that time, 
little realising that he would be Aleies successor. With the beneflt of hindsight, my 
report was spectacularly well targeted. Upon meeting Robert in January 1999,1 soon 
realised just how much he'd appreciated my praise. I began to see myself as a subject 
constructed in yet another way, sc. as external academic strategy expert, and as such 
one whose dispassionate advice could be relied upon. In terms of my overall identity. I 
would argue that this was a turning point with respect to my confidence within the 
opco. On top of this, I had almost two years of networking under my belt and my grasp 
of organisational issues was becoming quite strong. Ibis, with Robert's personal 
support, gave me the strength to approach subjects such as Shan, whom I would 
previously have found highly intimidating. I found myself being able to articulate 
closely-argued opinions on strategy and process issues, which were seen by senior 
disciplinary experts as demonstrating a critical grasp of events within the opco and 
International. 
This kind of observation of my own changing subjectivity seems to me integral to 
understanding the narrative generated here. I have in one sense attempted wherever 
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possible to let 'the events' speak for themselves. by following a chronological path of 
what happened. At the same time, the events include what was said to me as well as 
what was done in, or recorded about, various parts of the organisation. The 'reality' 
displayed here is therefore partial in a certain distinctive way. Nonetheless the access I 
was able to obtain means that I gained a sense of regularities in what got said and done 
'in the name of strategy'. not only within any one specific department but across a 
whole range of departments at opco and International levels. 'Ibis I hope I have been 
able to relay here, noting my own multiple forms of attendance upon and complicity 
within this process. 
I therefore hope that there are grounds, on the basis of what I have presented here, for 
suggesting that, if and when others begin to look across different industries and 
organisational contexts, they may be able to identify how certain supposed differences 
may prove not to be so different after all, at the level of practices. Also how there may- be 
significant differences to be discerned, where previously all was silence. In that process 
strategy research may go forward with a heightened awareness of how far accounting 
practice is implicated In the doing of strategy. 48. 
48 In the course of which Pettigrew's (1985: 49) question can perhaps be posed in a new 
light, namely: 'I have in mind the question of what constitutes success and failure... ' 
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(V) Theoretical Implications 
Introduction 
'... there has been little if any identification In mainstream management texts ... of the 
importance of 'good' accounting practices in contributing to alternative approaches to the 
design of organisational strategy and structure, let alone any detailed identification of what 
those 'good' practices would be. ' 
'The challenge therefore remains ... to develop the theory of how business accounting 
became powerful, In such a way as to persuade 'mainstream' business and eýonomic 
historians, and 'mainstream' organization and economic theorists that an 
understanding of accounting Is vital, if not central, to their own agenda. ' 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1999: 12) 
From historical work to current research to future trends, the task for critical 
accounting is stated succintly by Hoskin and Macve above. Within the Literature 
Review, for example, I have constructed myself as 'academic theorist' and provide a 
critique of academic writings from within this discursive perspective. Within the 
Empirical Study, I have constructed myself as 'ethnographic researcher'. exploring the 
detail of life within Teleco, but recognising the dilemma of multiple selves as I shifted 
between perspectives. I retain, of course, the theoretical insight gained from my 
literature review but at the same time this is constantly moulded by the activity I both 
watch and partake in. It is within this chapter, that I attempt to synthesise these two 
perspectives and extricate a theorisation based on practices which can have 
generalisable implications. Patterns and regularities in the findings are thus explicated 
in terms of existing theories with a view to understanding how calculability and 
accountability spread across organisations. 
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Given the importance of Hoskin and Macve to this thesis, it is fitting to begin with a 
detailed comparison with their work. 
40 
Comparison with Hoskin and Macve 
Vhat is 'strategy? I ... I strategy is a 
form of 'power-knowledge'. However that does not mean 
that it has always had the same form. To determine the precise form, one must first examine 
the practices through which the 'doing of strategy' is carried on. ' 
(Hoskin, Macve and Stone 1997: 2) 
The theoretical drive is clear. To understand strategic discourse. we must understand 
its practices. Through the radical insight brought about by the study of West Point and 
the Pennsylvania Railroad, we can appreciate that the invention of modem strategy is a 
product of managerialism. Hoskin, Macve and Stone's define managerialism thus: 
'It is always about 'action at a distance', effected primarily through multiple forms of writing, 
and only secondarily through speech. It is 'grammatocentric' carried on via a constant stream 
of memos, directives, orders, budgets, accounts, evaluations. etc. It generates a whole set of 
variations of writing: pictorial, diagrammatic representations (the organization chart, graphics. 
tables, flow charts. matrices, now also available in computer graphics). But it is also action 
through constant examination and grading: of accounting data, personnel evaluations, norms 
and variances, targets and outcomes, projections and post-mortems. 
I 
... I 
Its orientation to time is - like that of accountability- towards the future, a future it strives to 
know by drawing on the medium of objectively measured past performance. 
[ ... I 
By extension of the simple originating practices In administrative coordination managerialism 
can know and control the furthest reaches of organizational space, and actively construct new 
scales of organizational complexity and size (e. g. divisionalization, matrix structures); at the 
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same time, it penetrates Intensively down into every tiny corner of the organization. II 
specifically it is a granunatocentric panopticism. ' 
(Hoskin, Macve and Stone: 1997: 7) 
Hoskin and Macve's contribution has been utilised within this thesis to reproach 
theories of strategy for failing to acknowledge the highly significant effects of the 
accounting practices buried within the genealogy of strategy. What is of import here Is 
how and to what extent this criticism can be extended to the empirical context of 
Teleco. The key is whether the findings within 19th Century America are still applicable 
in today's business environment. 
'While the UK in many ways retained its distinctive management culture, it has always been 
fascinated by US developments, and been eager to import at least aspects of American 
innovation. Today, the American model of calculative, managerial enterprise dominates. ' 
(1999: 21) 
The transplantation of American practices into UK business is indeed apparent within 
the UK opco of Teleco, and not just because of Its American parent. Both U. K. and 
American businesses display a predisposition towards stock market positioning, as it is 
here that demonstration of success or failure is most concrete. 7be American model of 
calculation at the end of the 20th Century is however not as monolithic as Hoskin and 
Macve imply. 
'... the practices deployed by Tyler in undertaking his study, and subsequently required in 
managing the production system, were the same: turning all performance into writing. 
subjecting it to close examination and grading the outcomes, thus initiating a world where 
targets and results were endemically produced from the past into the future, becoming 
internalised both by their linkage to ptece-rates and by strict factory ttme-keeping. This 
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analysis we then applied to Chandler's (1965; 1977) story of how multi-unit management was 
developed on the US railroads (e. g. Hoskin & Maeve, 1994b). Here again we saw 
'administrative coordination" as developed through the application of these practices to the 
problems of planning, coordinating and controlling plant and personnel across extended space 
and time. ' (Hoskin and Macve. 1999: 3) 
The Empirical Chapter argues that the presence of these practices is immediately 
apparent in the telecoms industry through its reliance upon stock market mechanisms 
and the corresponding rationality of the valuation principle. Owning at a distance is 
critical in these global corporations and information is required to be summarised 
succintly through multiple practices of examination. These practices enable analysts 
and Investors to feel confident in the strategies of their corporations, being a means of 
measuring the performance of the directors entrusted to control. At this level, the power 
embodied within accounting numbers constitutes success, thus providing evidence of 
the presence of strategy. What is important is how and to what extent this kind of 
calculability has spread through Teleco. Externally, financial performance figures 
propounded a discourse of success (at least for 1997-1999), taking for granted the 
ability to capture strategy through numbers. Such a relation is a condition and 
consequence of the explicit strategy of the company, explicated to investors and 
analysts through both words and numbers. It is the numbers, however, which circulate 
throughout the opco and International, as the words are too over-simplified to 
constitute a presence of strategy in 1998-2000. Thus on this level, accounting practices 
have been essentialised within U. S. business, giving continued credence to the strength 
of the regime uncovered by Hoskin and Macve. 
It is clear that the practices defined above are imperative for the effective operation of 
contemporary stock markets. Grammatocentrism, examination, grading; these are all 
vital for analysts and investors. In light of the rush on telecommunications and Internet 
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stocks in 1999, these pressures have doubly intensified, being a result both of the high 
capital growth recently yielded (thus focusing attention further) as well as those 
industries themselves dramatically energising the flows of available information. This 
virtuous cycle has seen the panoptic vision vividly constructed by Foucault become a 
reality in late 20th Century investment. As such, a grammatocentrical mode is now 
necessary in order to function 'at a distance'. Ibis is, however, not applicable equally to 
both the inside and the outside of the organisation. Drawing on my experience within 
Teleco, it is arguable (especially in the early days), that this managerialism, In the form 
of revenue pressure, 'penetrated intensively down into every tiny comer of the 
organization' (Hoskin, Macve and Stone, 1997: 7). This pressure was tripled in its force, 
acting through sales, network as well as budgetary activities to underscore the reality of 
revenue target achievement. 
There is a danger, as Hoskin and Maeve (1999: 17) admit, 'to see everything modern as 
yet another "accounting"' and here I feel obliged to build on this acceptance of the 
totalising tendency in their work, beginning to explore just why and how accounting 
practices are manifested differently within and outside of the Organisation. So taking 
this analysis one step further, we expect to find that: 
'[a] leading characteristic of "modernity", certainly by the end of the 19th century, is the 
creation of "calculable persons" in -calculable spaces" (Miller, 1992): a new objectification of 
human performance and normalisation of individuals within large "statistical" (and 
increasingly "insurable") populations, linked also to new modes of State intervention in 
economic and business affairs. ' (Hoskin and Macve, 1999: 20) 
What the Empirical Chapter shows is that calculability has not diffused uniformly 
through the organisational structure down to the level of the individual. There has been 
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strong resistance to the introduction of Key Performance Indicators, measures which 
hold the promise of capturing individual activities. 
'In the business context, the distinguishing features of this new human accountability 
included: 
on the accounting dimension, at shop-floor level the development of standards of work 
performance as a basis for fixing piece-rates and wages. thereby providing both discipline and 
economic incentive to the work-force to internalise business goals so as to begin to become 
calculating, "governable persons" (Miller & O'Leary, 1987); and at higher levels of management 
a comparable. increasing emphasis on "performance" measurement, in tum increasingly 
reflecting alignment with top management emphasis on "return on investment" (1101), which in 
turn again linked the accountability of top management through financial accounting to 
owners', and ultimately to stock-markct, returns; 
on the organisational dimension. a new emphasis on formal structure, which in the USA 
culminated in the "divisional" or "M-form" organisation of profit centres, thereby carrying 
through the linkage between accounting and organisation, and between strategy and 
structure. ' (Hoskin and Macve, 1999: 2 1) 
The accounting dimension above is virtually synonymous with the rationale for Key 
Performance Indicators within business discourse. On the one hand, therefore, 
accounting has penetrated conceptualisations of top management performance and 
formal structure within Teleco but critically is not extended to the Tayloristic evaluation 
of individual performance. 
A number of explanations arise for this, notably the perception of turbulence prevalent 
within the telecommunications industry and the time constraints placed upon 
management. Complaints of 'no ownership or accountability were as common in May 
2000 as in Summer 1998, and there was clearly substantial inertia within Teleco when 
this issue was ever raised. As a senior manager pointed out to me in May 2000, a 
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culture of blame had arisen within the opco and International, and this was potentially 
a reason for the fear of introducing more rigorous accountability systems. These are the 
expressed reasons for the lack of KPIs. but do not appear completely convincing. A 
deeper rationale for this continual roll-back of accountability can now be unearthed by 
examining the ways in which strategic discourse divides the external from the internal. 
It is critical that value is captured in a concrete and mobile fashion for the sake of 
external observers. Intemally, however, this practice Is conspicuous by Its lack of 
uniformity throughout the organisation. Dissimulation Is in play on each side, 
constituted through practices, but In different ways. 
The case of Teleco demonstrates, therefore, that these practices are both resisted and 
embraced at the level of the calculable person. While the activity of the opco. 
International and functions within them were subjected to the external gaze of 
accounting-derived strategic practice, this was not extended universally to the 
individual performance of the employee. While Sales personnel were calculable In terms 
of the revenue they achieved, they were left apparently free to determine the methods 
which they used. These self-disciplinary effects had strong disorganising effects 
especially in the early days of Teleco, leading to perceived uncertainty in cross- 
functional processes. Informal pathways were utilised at the expense of setting up 
organisationally-wide processes, creating significant disorder In the Customer 
functions. In 1999/00, the perceived loss of strategy in the opco led to numerous 
practices of substitution, incorporating Functional Targets, CPls, revenue analysis and 
the Balanced Score Card. Indeed, the calculability inherent in a revenue-driven 
organisation is shown within Teleco to extend heterogeneously throughout the 
departments, with, for example, Sales being monitored by revenue-based comn-dssion 
targets and Installation & Repairs being monitored by CPls. People (as non-grouped 
groups) conspired to engineer differentially constructed 'free zones'. What was 
noticeable, however, was that the perception that the lack of clear strategy for the opco 
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meant that any internalisation of business goals, essentially any other objectives apart 
from those explicitly reported. was left ad-hoc and unstated. Thus, these practices 
extended the potential spread of a grammatocentric panopticism, yet the divergence of 
their effects meant that perceptions of instability continued. As management sought 
more urgently for formal cross-functional processes, frustrations stemming from their 
employees' continued reliance upon informal, politically-weighted processes could only 
increase. 
'... the double paradox that emerges out of the fact that strategy's great success (like 
structure's and accountings) lies in its ability to turn both the world and time into a space for 
writing, examining and grading. I... ] First, concerning time, strategy will (like accounting) be 
most successful where the future is like the past (since what it writes is the past re-wr1tten, 
however sophisticated its rewriting) but that is when it is most unnecessary; meanwhile, it will 
be most necessary when the future is different from the past, which is when it will be most 
useless. But, second, it also confronts a spatial complement of this temporal paradox - i. e. 
that in terms of controlling organizational space, it will always be, through its deployment of 
disciplinary practices and its alliance with structure, most apt at dealing with the space in- 
here; and it is therefore not surprising that strategy as practice (military or business) devotes 
most of its real-time effort to controlling that space (through the various mixes of strategic 
centralisation and operational decentralisation). However, strategic success actually needs 
control of the space out-there, where the enemy/competition lies: but that is where strategy 
proves so easily disproven and overturned, whether by counter-strategy or simply by events. ' 
(Hoskin, Macve and Stone: 1997: 21) 
The findings from Teleco now enable the above double paradox to be further explicated. 
Strategy is undeniably reliant upon the future being an extension of the past. The very 
idea of strategy is contingent upon prediction of an unpredictable future, thereby 
rendering strategy imprecise. It is not appropriate in high-technology industries to 
confer upon either management or observers a naive belief that strategy can be firm. 
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Indeed, the level of perceived uncertainty is decidedly high as the prevailing discursive 
regime Is one of anxiety instead of security. The continuing behaviour of share prices 
failing to submit to fundamental analysis (e. g. that predicted by P/E ratios) is perhaps 
instrumental in this construction. Strategy requires a supplement, and the supplemnt 
'to hand' proves to be that of accounting. The prediction contained within strategy can 
be verified (at least partially) through the supplementary achievement of accounting 
targets. Teleco's stated strategy is extremely general and simplistic, on the one hand 
lauded by the stock markets for its confidence, criticised by those within the company 
for its irrelevance to implementation issues. 7brough quantification practices, its 
strategy can be measured and thereby success can be graded. It is thus made possible 
to announce a strategy which promises to achieve certain financial results which to 
some degree can confu7n or deny the retrospective presence of strategy. I am asserting, 
therefore. that neither strategy nor accounting within Teleco are In themselves 
sufficient, and it is the study of the interpenetration of their practices and discourses 
that is so fruitful. 7be impossibility of predetermining whether a strategy will be 
successful is therefore overcome through a combination of the strategy's rhetorical 
value and the belief that Teleco will achieve predicted financials. Hence the temporal 
paradox so evident within discourses of strategy is partially resolved through the way in 
which future results fold back into the shaping of the perception of a strategy. The 
interpretation of strategy Is thus a combination of past, present and future, in a way 
which leaves any particular point In time contingent upon an unknown future. I feel 
this forms a partial resolution of Hoskin and Macve's temporal paradox, demonstrating 
how accounting practice is embedded within strategic discourse in a unsettled 
synthesis of anticipation and realisation. 
The second paradox takes on a different twist. The impression Is given of control of in- 
here, as performance of opcos and International is presented in terms of financial 
expectations and achievements. Externally, such apparent control, reduced as it is to 
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numbers, is sufficient to indicate fast International growth, which is considered a 
critical part of a global telecoms strategy. Establishing this apparent control is not 
necessarily a precursor to disciplining space in-here as the presence of strategy from an 
external perspective does not immediately correspond to a manifestation of that same 
strategy in an internal context. The two aspects of strategy must not be conflated, as 
this conceals a vital part of strategic practice. It is the representation of in-here that is 
paramount, and this, drawing on the detail of Teleco, is constituted through 
examination practices in a way which does not map in any immediate or obvious way 
onto the internal experience of control in-here. 
The construction of the meanings of strategy is thus a violently complex process, with 
apparent truths sympathetic to complete reversals. 'Ibrough a symbiotic alliance, what 
occurred in Teleco was a discursive re-constitution of what was seen as a successful 
strategy through complex changes in accounting practices. These changes constituted 
an absence at opco level In addition to a demonstration of financial under-performance. 




, ... the orthodoxy [of strategic management] is ... 
biased towards binary logic ... I ... I 
[Derrida) aimed to show that rationalization seeks to hide contradictions. For him. two terms 
of a contradiction are not peacefully co-existing vts-&-vts, but rather are linked by a violent 
hierarchy. His process of deconstruction aims at eliciting this hierarchy. ' 
(Calort. 1998: 294) 
Calort's insight is that axioms of strategy can be shown to be actually doubled terms, 
where the lesser term appears to have been violently dominated, yet continues to 
dominate. The empirical chapter draws out in particular the presence/absence relation 
as well as the way In which this is played out differentially between external and 
internal contexts. I shall assert that the roles of accounting in such an explication are 
critical as well as unyielding in contemporary corporate life. This is, I must stress, far 
from being a simple deterministic explanation. It is not surprising that the practices 
described have not been able to colonise uniformly the discourse of strategy. Strategy 
discourse as propounded by management experts has created a distinction (albeit 
partial) between the external and the internal of the organisation. Concepts of the 
environment and the organization were born, ones which will affect how practices 
spread throughout, preventing any natural folding-in of the external to the internal. The 
case of Teleco demonstrates that this dissimulation only becomes apparent with a deep 
study into the organisation, one which penetrates the faqade of formal accountability 
systems. 
'There are two ways of interpreting such binarity: (a) by placing the emphasis on the two 
separate terms, or (b) by focusing on the division boundary beftwen the two terms. (... ) To 
understand (b) requires that the division between terms be conceived no longer just as a 
separation but also a structure that joins terms together, i. e. division both separates and 
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joins. In fact, it is the act of separation which, parado)dcally, creates the perception of 
something that is also whole or unitary. ' 
(Cooper 1990: 173) 
Drawing on Cooper (1990). strategy is positioned at International level as being focused 
upon the external. The internal is, however, never just separated and joins onto the 
external through the disciplinary visibility conferred through the spectacles of 
accounting practices. Within Teleco, strategy is made successful through the 
achievement of revenue targets. This has opposing effects, promoting both constraint 
and freedom. Throughout 1997-98, the achievement of targets by the opco enabled the 
lack of explicit strategic direction from International to continue, simultaneously 
creating a perceived external presence of strategy through the numbers as well as 
stimulating a feeling of strategic presence to be evolved in the opco, within the 
numbers. Strategic presence extended throughout both the external and internal of the 
opco. I assert the above with a warning. Outside of Teleco, revenue target achievements 
are insufficient in themselves to denote* strategic success. The complex interplay of 
accounting practices and strategic achievements is not tackled within the Empirical 
Chapter. What is covered is how these practices construct the internal of Teleco, as well 
as the boundary to the external. 
Teleco further illustrates how the assumption of presence within management discourse 
obscures the oscillation between presence and absence, a play which is productive as 
well as being a product of the work of accounting practices. As Inkpen and Choudhury 
(1995) argue, absence in strategy should be taken as a serious phenomenon. Firstly, 
the early period of Teleco (1997-98) reveals the ways in which accounting can create 
strategic presence In different ways at different levels. Secondly, even at the 'core' of 
doing strategy, International Strategy, presence and absence are intertwined, with the 
critical importance of Wall Street indicators (including of course revenue targets) in 
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determining capital allocation. Thirdly, strategic absence stimulated strategy-simulating 
practices, a different kind of presence, in the U. K. opco 1999/2000. There is a pivotal 
role of accounting in circumscribing the domain of what can be called a successful 
strategy. and therefore how practices will spread and circulate. Following John Law's 
(1994: 267) cryptic pursuit of the non-strategic organisation, strategy can be 
investigated along the precarious fold of presence/absence. 
As a way of looking elsewhere, we can here raise the case of Cisco, a leading global 
provider of telecommunications (including Internet) technology and equipment, 
analysed within Kalakota and Robinson (1999: 75). Cisco's strategy is one of earnings 
growth through acquisitions, a strategy that makes explicit use of the value constituted 
through as well as within stock prices. 'A rising stock price is a critical element in modern 
business strategy because it provides currency for companies like Cisco to use stock to 
buy other companies. ' (1999: 75). Purchasing companies is made possible through the 
confidence the stock market has in Cisco's strategy of acquisition. Stock prices become 
more than just the validation of strategy, they become inherent in the strategy itself. 
The simple act of strategically purchasing a company is not, however, sufficient, as the 
integration of acquisitions is just as critical. How, though, can the success or failure of 
integration be gauged? Revenue figure growth meeting expectations Is perhaps the 
single most deciding factor in today's stock market, thereby appearing to confirm that 
the internal merger took place cleanly and smoothly. The experience of Teleco begins, 
however, to undermine the total coherence of this presumption, revealing just how 
messy and problematic (despite strong combined revenue growth) a large merger 
situation can be. 
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Augmentations 
This convergence of the external and internal is, of course, one of the very 
presuppositions of classical discourses of strategy. Porter, for example, made such 
headway through his characterisation of the external environment as controllable. 
Strategic companies would analyse this and position themselves accordingly. The 
internal then needs to be mapped onto the external for this 'strategy' to be effective: this 
being achieved through the value chain. As such, there is a fundamental reliance upon 
costs and revenues (the latter being value from the buyer's perspective) both within and 
outside of the organisation. Like Porter's analysis, Teleco appeared to be strongly 
influenced by accounting practices. The presumption, however, of accounting as mirror 
means that the circulation and reproduction of these practices is left unanalysed. 
Porter's (1998/1985) book Is subtitled '[cireating and sustaining superior perforTnance7. 
With the value chain as the representation of the firm, different strategies are proposed 
which promise to maximise value in different ways. This approach, drawing on Teleco, 
can now be critiqued as constantly blocked off. In a reversal, strategy is practised 
through numberS49. 
The ways in which practices in Teleco were manifested defied the economic rationale so 
pervasive in Porter. It is fascinating, however, that Porter unwittingly focused on the 
construction of an image which carries great external weight, one which can persuade 
the stock markets that strategy is in place. Whereas his approach has serious 
limitations in capturing the process and practice of strategy, it does appear to capture 
the 'what' of strategy and thereby can contribute to the delivery of a successful strategy. 
49 In addition the linear Ume-space model he presents neither always holds true for successful progress nor 
for the orgarilsational structure. 
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As so amply demonstrated by processual critiques, however, his discourse has been 
exemplary in its obsfucation of internal processes, such that the achievement of 
success has become disjointed from any appreciation of the internal reality. Ironically, 
these same critiques of rationalist strategies have introduced a supra-rationality drawn 
from behavioural science. This provides rhetorical power but fails to either recognise the 
dissimulation of truth speaking discursive formations which pervade managerial 
practice or explain firstly how strategy is implemented and secondly how performance 
can be strong despite a lack of strategic plans and decisions. 
At this point, I shall turn to two key empirical papers to further explore the theoretical 
implications of the Teleco study. The first, Smith and Zeithaml (1999), is striking in that 
it covers the same industry, adopting a processual viewpoint. The second, Goold and 
Campbell (1987) is chosen as one of the strategic styles it covers is, at first glance, very 
similar to that experienced in Teleco5O. 
Smith and Zeithan-d (1999) explore strategy in the global telecommunications industry 
from the perspective of the U. S. regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs), examining 
the changing role of International activities over an eight year period (1984-1991). The 
time frame covered is at the turning point for deregulation in the U. S. 
telecommunications market and so entirely predates my study of Teleco. There are, 
however, striking similarities as Lvell as dffferences with the international expansion 
process they describe, the latter highlighting their inability to recognise the effects of 
accounting practices. They characterise the first phase through 'opportunism and 
experimentatiorf as International managers began to dabble in an uncoordinated way In 
international activities. The Importance of entering Europe was undeniable, indeed, se! f- 
evident 'The RBOCS had a herd mentality in entering the international arena' (Mason, 
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1992: 15; quoted In Smith and Zeithaml. 1999: 48). Once one company, Horizon, set up 
an international subsidiary, the others felt compelled to follow, in fear of losing their 
competitive edges. 
This discourse of 'me-tootsm' was strongly in evidence at Teleco, at least in terms of 
clarity of direction received by the U. K. from the U. S. In fact, this was the term used by 
Colin, the M. D. during the start of my study. The account of Smith and Zeithaml is a 
wonderful exposition of the uncertainties rife in high-technology industries. Time 
constraints and lack of reliable information wreak havoc on the perceived imperatives of 
future-planning and coordination. What emerges as a material force, however, is the 
practice of accounting within that. Smith and Zeithaml (1999: 5 1) highlight the fact that 
International investments were of a size that was considered "pocket change"'or *"on 
a shoestring-, therefore warranting little U. S. management attention. They predict that 
as this amount rises, so will the deliberateness of the strategic processes. Hence, this 
changes from Phase I's 'enwrgent and generative to 'transactive, learning' in Phase 2, 
and finally to being a 'legitiniate' part of the global strategy in Phase 3 (1999: 59). 
This provides a first explanation for the changes experienced in Teleco but does not 
uncover the deeper complexities that were found. Put crudely. their model of 
international expansion processes indicates that strategiees emerge as the level of 
resources invested increases. However, this ignores the complex play of practices which 
enable the affirmation of strategy as successful, thus establishing the base upon which 
further investments can be Justified and undertakens'. During the first phase of Smith 
and Zeithaml's model, 'opportunism and experimentation', the level of resources invested 
50 This was pointed out to me during in-depth discussions with Robin Wensley, early 1999. 
51 Ibis may be an indication of how the stock market has changed between the 1980's and 1990's. as analyst 
perception has expanded to incorporate global, as opposed to U. S. centric, concerns. 
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in International activities appears to negate the need for a strategy. This enables 
learning to continue throughout the 'growth and commitment' stage 2, before being 
consolidated in the final level of 'strategic growtIf . 
However, this begins to look incomplete. The presence of strategy I found at the start of 
my study was in fact gradually eroded for the U. K. as International structures were 
formed around them. As the level of resources required by the U. K. grew, so did the 
perceived need to think more 'strategically'. This manifested itself in two broadly 
conflicting ways; firstly through opco management demanding to know why resources 
were not available for the largest revenue earner in Europe, and secondly through 
International management attempting to set their own strategic agenda. Constituted 
through different practices, it was understandable why opco and International were 
clashing. This fits perhaps into stage two, where 'international managers pursued many 
deals and began to make sense of their top managers' general directive to build a global 
presence' (60). Ibis, interestingly enough, sounds very much like the assertions 
International managers made to me to justify their presence. Placing this into the 
context of the fierce turf battles occurring between opco and International, it becomes 
less convincing as a final account of what was happening. The distinction between 
International's expressed rationale to undertake strategy and International's desire to 
justify its very existence becomes blurred. Smith and Zeithaml continue to argue that in 
this phase, 'a strategy had not been identifted. international expansion activities Lvere 
transaction oriented and deals Lvere not compared to ascertain strategicfit. '(60) 
As their presence grew, International management had growing exposure to different 
Wall Street indicators, these being used to build up the broader picture around their 
overall revenue target. At the same time, the opco continued to subscribe to their 
revenue target. The expressed external strategy of International was very clear in 
Summer 1999. to be a driver of a global strategy across Europe and Asia. while being 
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accountable to financial targets. This perhaps fits into the 'strategic' stage 3 of the 
model, being 'represented by a smooth progression representing additional international 
investments fitting with an identified strategy' (1999: 58). However, there is a potential 
conflation of the external with the internal happening within their model, made 
apparent when evidence from Teleco is drawn upon. Internally, a power struggle was in 
evidence, as both opco and International attempted to assert control over strategy, with 
the U. K. wielding the logic of accounting practice, and International brandishing the 
logic of strategy discourse. As the level of committed resources grew, so did the 
compleyity of the practices that circulated. Far from simply increasing the 'strategic- 
ness' of activity, this led, in the final stage of the case study, to rising claims of strategic 
absence in the opco. Critically, this stimulated alternative measurement practices in 
ways which had major restructuring effects for the U. K. 
Drawing on Teleco, it now becomes- apparent that the smooth evolution of Smith and 
Zeithaml's model does not satisfactorily describe events, as practices of strategy at 
different levels of the organisation cannot be so easily combined. Indeed, If the question 
of absence was ignored, as it is within the majority of the literature, the introduction of 
CPIs and talk of the Balanced Scorecard could be encompassed within the growing 
dominance 'of strateV. In the light of the above analysis, this can now be perceived as 
inadequate, as the powerful effects of the practices at work can indeed be analysed and 
in some way understood. 
Turning next to Goold and Campbell, Teleco's structure appeared to be a manifestation 
of their (1987) Imandal contror style of strategy, where formal strategic planning, over 
and above the calculation and dissemination of the annual targets and budgets, is 
perceived as inappropriate. 
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'Financial Control companies focus on control. defining simple, clear objectives and controlling 
against them. Failure to perform brings immediate danger to the responsible management 
team; while success is rewarded with money, status and additional responsibility. ' 
(Goold and Campbell, 1987: 126) 
They examine how financial figures can be used to 'push strategy down to the level of 
thefl profit centres. ' (1987: 15 1). 'Ibus the HQ chooses to devolve strategy within a policy 
of decentralisation. In Teleco, however, this was not all that was happening, as financial 
control was also used to exercise strategy. 'Ibis practice helped to solidify the external 
perception of a successful strategy, demonstrated through the achievement of revenue 
growth figures. Bound explicitly within this external discourse of strategy was the 
practice of capital allocation, forming the cycle of revenue and capital favoured by Wall 
Street analysts. Goold and Campbell's analysis can therefore be extended through the 
appreciation of how practices themselves have differing effects of power and knowledge. 
Financial control in-itse! f tells us nothing about the presence or absence of strategy. In 
Goold and Campbell's companies, accounting practices were used by the HQ because 
financial results were the main priority. This led in general to a combination of 'little 
corporate strategy [and] cautious business unit strategies' (1987: 139). What is thereby 
excluded is the consideration of how financial control can be used, in fact, to 
demonstrate the existence of corporate strategy through the achievement of 
performance indicators. Accounting practices in Teleco enabled both the centre and the 
subsidiary to have claims over strategy. 7be oversimplification of accounting knowledge 
within strategy discourse obscures the powerful effects of the practices. 
Goold and Campbell display a bias towards agency desires, which perhaps explains how 
they produce their categorisation of three different strategy styles. The study of 
practices produces, at least in Teleco, a far more complex picture. The rise of 
International was disruptive for Teleco, as the clashing practices of country and matrix 
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accountability focused attention on resource allocation as an arena for conflict. This 
indicates a move towards the 'strategic control' style as strategic criteria were being 
used to set project priorities. However, the planning process was contained within 
International. so that the U. K. opco continued to only see the budgets that were 
produced out of this. By 1999, U. K. management were still ostensibly within a financial 
control regime, despite the move within International to a 'strategic planning style 
where strategy was taken decidedly away from the opco. International appeared to be 
run from the U. S. using a financial control style which would explain why they were 
unable or unwilling to give clearer directions to the opco. As such, calculative practices 
remained dominant at each level, even as relations between levels were made more 
complex through International management attempts to establish their coherence and 
identity. There were deeper rationales to stated objectives, underpinned through the 
powerful effects of practices. 
The last stage of the Teleco study, where calculative practices spread across the opco, is 
ostensibly a manifestation of Goold and Campbell's Strategic Planning style. Opco 
management were now relegated to proposing strategy, as this was now being practised 
within International, along with resource allocation. In other respects, however, many of 
the Financial Control characteristics remained. Budgeting, for example, was still the 
central focus of the planning process, and International and opco management 
continued to problematise the clarity of themes and thrusts. It is perhaps not 
surprising that opco management, in their confusion, sought alternative practices to 
attempt to overcome the absence of strategy they perceived. Indeed, this would help 
consolidate the appearance of a 'strategic' style despite Wall Streel: s continued 
perpetration of revenue as a success indicator. Similarly, Smith and Zeithan-A Could tie 
this into their third stage 'Strategic growtif where International activities now become 
an integral part of U. S. strategy making. This would appear to make sense within 
Teleco, with the U. S. CEO sending over his adviser to the International Strategy team in 
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August 1999. 'Ibis contrasts, however, with the absence of strategy now found within 
the U. K. opeo. 
Summary 
'Ibus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted 
that very thing within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality. 
This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the centre is, paradoxically, 
within the structure and outside it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the 
center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of centered structure - although it 
represents coherence itself, the condition of the episterne as philosophy or science - is 
contradictorily coherent. ' (Derrida, 1978: 279) 
Derrida's paradox of the center is intriguing as it draws parallels with the analysis of 
how corporate headquarters can control. His argument. however, brings us to a halt. A 
contradictory coherence is uncovered yet left unresolved. Through an understanding of 
practices, however, we can first reveal that the center does not escape structurality. If 
both the center and the structure are indeed products of practices, then they are bound 
by the same power-knowledge regularities, even as these arc played out in differential 
ways. Hence, the concept of the center being somewhere other than at the center can be 
unravelled through the study of how practices will constitute this very center. As such, 
the analysis can focus on the underlying power relations which constitute knowledge of 
both centers and structures. Furthermore, absences as well as presences can be 
appreciated, with a juxtaposition of opposites being made not only visible but indeed 
critical as a constitutive force. 
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This chapter has re-analysed certain key works from the literature. attempting to 
further the critical study of accounting and strategy as inter-subjective practices and 
discourses, following how they worked to blur the boundaries between the inside and 
outside of the organisation, thus providing insight into the regularities that persist. I 
have drawn in particular on the play of practices experienced in Teleco, applying them 
to develop further the empirical research that exists. While this can only form a 
preliminary re-theorisation, it Is my hope that this demonstrates a potential way to re- 
view the roles of accounting within strategy. 
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Conclusions 
'Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging - these preoccupied 
the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense they constitute 
thinking as suc[L.. ... man designated 
himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates 
and measures, as the "valuating animal as such. " (Nietzsche, 1967/1887: 70) 
As I began with history, so I shall conclude. It is indeed fascinating that Nietzsche 
identified the accounting practices of measuring and valuing as intrinsic to the very 
thinking of 'man'. as it strongly emphasises just how pervasive or timeless such 
practices are. A certain invisibility is therefore not surprising, as these practices have 
been internalised so deeply that the powerful traces of their constitutive knowledge are 
today more or less erased. It would not be a reasonable interpretation of the quote, 
however, to assume that these practices remain stable in their effects over time. 
Different times and spaces will be constituted in different ways, akin to a kaleidoscope 
rather than some thing stable. This genealogical approach was adopted by Hoskin et al 
(1997) in their critique of strategy. opening up in many ways a new field of study. 
It is the inauguration of accounting practices as strategic which has been the focus of 
this thesis. While advances have been made in both Critical Accounting and Critical 
Strategy, I felt that there was scarce research being undertaken at the intersection of 
these expanding fields. Taking the basic critical concept of accounting as constitutive 
and applying it to a re-reading of both the strategy and accounting literatures was a 
means of establishing limitations of existing works. I hoped to present considered 
critiques of three dominant schools of strategy, attempting to remain (as far as 
reasonably possible) faithful to the works covered, using their own words and phrases, 
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in a deconstructionist, style. It was never my intention to show how the primacy of 
strategy over accounting should be inverted. Instead my re-reading was aimed at 
showing how accounting practices arc constitutive of strategy in ways which normally 
lie hidden even as they circulate. While advancements have been made both in re- 
conceptualising strategy and re-conceptualising accounting, little has been done in re- 
conceptualising how accounting is perceived within discourses of strategy. I 
concentrated largely on the processual and critical strands, as these presented perhaps 
the greatest challenge to any re-reading. Both propagate characteristic developments in 
strategy discourse, and yet both reduce to the same unreflective characterisation of 
accounting as mirror, one which joins them with the rational strand which they both 
attempt to supersede. It is my hope that the rectification of this oversight has 
commenced within this thesis. 
At the same time, the literature review enabled the emergence of a theory of practices. 
drawing heavily on the methodological pieces of Hoskin (1994) and Foucault/ Florence 
(1994). also being attuned to the developments made within critical studies of strategy 
and accounting. I attempted to synthesise their insights into a stance which re- 
constitutes conventional approaches to ethnography. A theory of practices was 
proposed, one which undermines the dualism of realism and relativism through an 
approach which views the individual and the social as mutually constituted. As such, 
the quandary of the sovereign rational subject is avoided, making redundant the usual 
question of generalisability. The case study is not to be seen as an atomised version of 
reality or generating generalisations at the level of 'the organisation'. Ethnography as 
practised within this thesis is a study of the world and our selves in their specificity and 
regularity, focusing on the role of practices and discourses in our constructing of both. 
The empirical study was always a focal point for this thesis, as it was one of my alms to 
bring critical-theoretical flndings right into the contemporary business context. Being 
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driven most visibly by the accounting-centric practices of the stock market, the 
telecommunications industry was most apt for the study. In addition, it was fascinating 
to attempt to penetrate a highly private technology-focused organisation, one whose 
doors were usually closed to the outside world. Such a deep study became my 
intention, after reading the excellent work of Kondo (1990). As such, it was the 
complexity of the relationship between accounting and strategy, following the early 
example of Roberts (1990) and Dent (1990). which demarcated my fleld of analysis. The 
awareness of my own changing subjectivity proved critical in letting the 'events' speak 
for themselves. mediated through my constituted perceptions. Deriving from this, a 
central empirical finding was that the study of presence for either strategy or 
accounting was overly partial. Allowing for the oscillation of presence and absence was 
critical, in hindsight, for the appreciation of how practices spread throughout Teleco. 
Indeed, even this was insufficient as a doubled yet differentiated presence of strategy 
was In evidence within the earlier part of the study, constituted through practices of 
accounting. Such a complexity of the relation between accounting and strategy has only 
been achieved through the focus on practices, and the corresponding rejection of 
metaphysical categories of 'strategy' or 'accountinW. 
The role of accounting was powerful within the assembling of the UK opco and 
International, operating beneath the usual surface of visibility, with the play of 
difference between presence and absence making this knowledge precarious. 
Accounting practices circulated and were internalised, enforcing a hierarchical 
exclusion whereby only merger and acquisition activity or director-level directives are 
perceived as bearing the Name of strategy, yet extra-organisational discourses still 
constructed notions of the strategic. Strategic discourse. was apparently both invisible 
and visible, re-enacted in locales through accounting-style practices, over and above the 
controls wielded through International. Driven primarily through the 'revenue target', 
strategy was ec-centric, displaying a chequered face, making even locallsed appearances 
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appear partial and displaced. The discursive absence of strategy was found to operate in 
accordance with the spread of measurement practices, strategic but without the Name 
of strategy. Accounting practices were seen to re-present strategy, bearing the promise 
of a new presence and potentially bridging the strategic and the non-strategic, offering 
an explanation for the persistence of apparent inadequacies In top-down management 
as pointed out, for example, by Boxer and Wensley (1986) and Mintzberg (1994). 
I found myself speculating at the time of my Critical Management Studies paper (May 
1999) about the development of this situation. As the need for clearer and more 
controlled business processes becomes apparent. practices of measurement and 
discourses of shareholder value will infiltrate organising. Accounting once again 
emerges hand-in-hand with strategy except critically this is now experienced at a variety 
of management levels. beginning and not ending with Marketing. The exclusivity of the 
strategy discourse will implode as employees buy into the wider availability- of 
accounting practices, with difference made visible and attainable through a discourse of 
accountability. Gross Margin, Mix and Customer Satisfaction targets will be taken on 
board as the new strategic rationales, reverberating throughout the organisation. The 
manifold effects of accounting may thus emerge. constituting discourses of cynicism 
and distrust as the drive towards financials becomes interpreted pejoratively as cost- 
cutting (McCabe et al 1998: 397). What actually happened was that measurement 
practices struggled to accommodate broader financial numbers than revenue, yet non- 
financial practices became internalised and reproduced in 'Customer' departments. 
While the struggle between Teleco and International may appear to indicate cycles of 
centralisation/decentralisation, this extrapolation over-rationalises the practices which 
constitute change. Strategy within the International perspective was rather enacted 
through practices which presumed to effect both Internal and external control using 
financial numbers. Power and knowledge revolved around the careful distribution of 
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performance targets which were kept apparently discursively separate from their 
strategic rationale. Asymmetrically, strategy within the UK opco was discursively 
scorned and despised as practices of financial accountability remain fragmented. The 
deferral of intra-organisational accountability conferred dental and disillusionment as 
well as resistance and affirmation with the UK opco, and as dyad ensued between 
capital-appropriators and capital-users. 
Future Research 
While three of the main schools of strategy were covered within the literature review, it 
will be obvious that the economics-dominated schools were omitted. I felt that it would 
be salient to tackle those schools which proffered the greatest challenge (and thus 
opportunity) in terms of exploring the dissemination of accounting practices. Hoskin 
(1993) already argued how examination practices underpins rational-economic 
paradigms. The introduction of sociological and critical thinking into strategy made 
moves away from this premise and were the least analysed, at least from the direction of 
that this thesis takes. Moving into the future, however, it would be worthwhile to 
examine in more detail just how accounting practices circulate within the contemporary 
economics-strategy schools. Those which are primarily concerned with the 'New 
Economy'. Le. the high-technology sectors, offer potential for developing insights into 
the effects of practices. 
Strategy discourse propounds a focus on both the external and the internal. While the 
Empirical Chapter begins by analysing external perceptions of Teleco. it focuses 
primarily on practices of the internal. This, however. should be extended in view of 
Teleco's increasing difficulties in the face of analyst and investor cynicism towards high- 
technology stocks. In post-doctoral research, I would be very keen to explore strategy as 
'control of out-there'. in terms of how practices and discourses constitute the external 
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field of vision. 'Ibis would involve closer examination of analyst reports, conference 
discourses, business magazines as well as In-depth Interviews. During my time in 
Teleco, I struggled to overcome the confidentiality issues involved in the formulation of 
new strategic initiatives, and therefore was not able to observe first-hand the meetings 
or away days at which such Initiatives were first constituted. In addition, a picture of 
analyst and business discourse was painted through formal written documentation 
only, to enable the reader to appreciate the external perception of Teleco. Further 
research could usefully explore in greater depth how corporations are constituted 
through these powerful discourses and practices. 
The dimension of success and failure was touched upon in various parts of the 
Empirical Chapter, exploring how the financial success of a strategy would constitute 
the strategy itself as successful. 'Ibis poses an interesting question about failure, and it 
would be productive to research a company where financial failure reconstituted a 
strategy previously perceived as successful. The spread of practices in this instance is 
open to speculation. Within the U. K., strategic absence was key in stimulating 
alternative strategy-simulating practices. The question then arises as to whether these 
practices could reconstitute a presence. Once achieved, the exploration of these effects 
would be most productive. 
Strategic Accounting 
As differentiated from the Strategic Management Accounting literature, a Strategic 
Accounting would propound the constitutive practices of accounting and critically 
analyse how different knowledges of strategy were produced and circulated. It is my 
vision that this would take the Critical Accounting literature into the managerial 
mainstream. 'Mis was attempted within the 3rd year Strategic Management Accounting 
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course which I helped lecture on within Warwick Business School, along with Keith 
Hoskin and Mark Whittington, 1998-2000. The lectures and seminars I gave were 
designed to delineate the empirical situation of Teleco in a way which demonstrated just 
how unrealistic conventional portrayals of accounting as mirror were. Drawing on the 
detail of the case, I strove to illustrate how this was implicitly a critique of the way 
accounting was viewed within processual strategy, thereby constituting a new way of 
seeing the relationship between accounting and strategy. 
What was most surprising about conducting the Empirical Study was the widespread 
acceptance of the general theoretical thrust of my Literature review. Upon being asked 
to explain my thesis in Teleco, I would invariably explain that I was asserting that 
'nunibers drive strategL(- 'Ibis was not difficult to propound. Far more difficult was 
attempting to explain how theories of strategy had this relation in reverse. It was not so 
much that accounting practices were hard to uncover, but the name they were given 
was strategy, and not accounting. This discursive conflation of accounting and strategy 
is indeed the argument of Hoskin et cd (1997), and shows just how important their 
genealogical result is in today's management context. While this appreciation of 
practices is of great importance, however. perhaps the greatest lesson that I have learnt 
from this thesis is how these practices were internalised and took effect upon my very 
self. And this may mark the way forward for any vision of 'Strategic Accounting. 
'Perhaps I've insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and 
more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of 
individual domination. the history of how an individual acts upon himself in the technology of 
self. ' 
(Foucault. 1988: 19) 
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